PATTERNS OF POWER

Russian and Soviet Turkestan

The Complete Study

1865 — 1930 — 1991

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with Claude (Anthropic)

Held as tested, not revealed.

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PREFACE AND OUTLINE

Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its fourteen parts

The collaboration

This is a case study in the *Patterns of Power* series, applying the series' framework to Russian and Soviet Central Asia — the territory that is now Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — from the fortress lines pushed across the steppe in the 1840s to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed and held: the floor of force beneath every order, the robe of doctrine laid over the floor to make the force cheap, the settlement that divides the spoils, the cost column in which each subject prices defection, the seam that manages the belief on which the whole depends, the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction, and — running through all of it — position logic, the proposition that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions because a position poses a problem with only a few good answers.

Central Asia was chosen because the collection had no Russian case at all, and because a framework claiming to describe conquest as such has an obligation to test itself on the empire that conquered the largest contiguous landmass, and to find out whether its findings are about conquest or about maritime European conquest under another name. But the case earns its place for a sharper reason than that. It is a doubled conquest, by two states of the same nation, with a revolutionary rupture in the middle. The Tsarist conquest ran from the 1840s to the 1880s; the Bolsheviks retook the same ground between 1918 and the mid-1920s. That permits something no other case in the collection allows: holding the terrain, the population and the conquering nation constant while the legitimating doctrine inverts completely — from an empire that told European chancelleries it was doing what civilised states do

among half-savage nomads, to a state whose founding appeal told the Sarts of Turkestan that their beliefs and customs were henceforth free and inviolable.

Everything the study contributes comes out of that comparison, and its single revision is what the comparison produced. It is not that the second state promised more, though it did. It is that the second state held its promise as a demonstrated law rather than as a policy — and a claim that cannot be revised cannot absorb its own failures, so the failures are transferred somewhere else. They were transferred to the machinery, and the machinery is the part a study can count.

The study was built the way the series is built, one module at a time. The author brought the framework, the direction and the judgement of the whole, and held the collaboration to its disciplines; Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research — verifying load-bearing quotations, dates and figures by search against sources reproducing the primary text before any module was written — and produced the drafts, applying the framework module by module, each presented and confirmed before the next was begun. The framework's concepts are the series'; the Central Asian application, and the refinements it yielded, are the work of the collaboration.

Its engine throughout is the method of information asymmetry. The study exists to show the gap between what was said at the metropole and what was done in the colony, and it works by setting the exact public words beside the exact words of the ground: Gorchakov's circular to the European courts beside the Turkestan budget's twelve thousand six hundred roubles for schools; the manifesto of 3 June 1907 declaring that all the rights of 1905 remained in force while removing six seats because the Duma should be Russian in spirit; the appeal of December 1917 declaring the beliefs and customs of the Sarts free and inviolable, fourteen weeks before Kokand was shelled; a constitution guaranteeing the right of a republic to secede, in the same eighteen months as an annulled census. It lays out the arithmetic and leaves the sum to the reader. It does not preach the conclusion.

The disciplines

Five rules govern every module.

Quotation. Public-domain primary sources — statutes, decrees, treaties, manifestos, parliamentary debates, official reports, diplomatic despatches,

endowment deeds — are quoted exactly, at the length the argument needs, because in a legal fiction the precise wording *is* the evidence. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased, briefly, and credited.

No fabrication. No quotation, date, attribution or figure is invented or reconstructed from memory. What cannot be verified is dropped or flagged, never guessed; contested figures are given as ranges, and this case has more of them than any other in the collection — the casualties of the conquest, the dead of 1916 and of the Ürkün, the dead of Kokand in 1918, the mortality of the famines of 1919–22 and 1930–33, and the numbers who crossed into China. Several of those ranges span a factor of two or more, for a reason the study treats as a finding in its own right rather than as a footnote.

Gravity without partisanship. Suffering is held with gravity, and the study refuses both flattery and demonisation — it names the legal fiction as fiction and explains the order's logic without excusing it. Its recurring watchword is *legibility is not pardon*, and it applies with particular force to a case in which enormous violence was done under a doctrine of liberation, because the temptation to treat the doctrine as the whole explanation is very strong and is a way of not looking at the arithmetic.

Contribution. Every module returns a refinement to the framework, stated plainly in its closing section, rather than merely applying the framework to the case.

Held as tested, not revealed. The pattern is treated as something discovered and tested against the evidence, not handed down as doctrine — a lens laid over the record, a tendency and never a law. Where the leading scholarship contradicts the study's expectations, as it did on the origins of the cotton monoculture and on the authorship of the 1924 delimitation, the scholarship is followed and the expectation is discarded.

What the case added to the framework

Because this is the collection's only Russian case, its only doubled conquest, and its only conquest by a state whose doctrine forbade the word *colony*, it was able to isolate features the other cases obscure. The refinements it contributed, in the order the modules made them: that the cost of a conquest is set less by how hard the conquered fight than by whether anyone among them can surrender on behalf of the rest, so that an order with a seizable apex is cheap to conquer and

expensive to govern while an order without one is expensive to conquer for the same reason; that a floor is frequently laid before its purpose exists, so that frontier logic builds the floor, the floor creates a debt, and the debt selects the extraction; that there is a fourth settlement fiction beyond vacancy, recognition and divisibility — the *norm and the surplus*, which concedes the occupation in full and then quantifies it, and whose instrument is a statistical expedition rather than a title deed; that there is a fifth, belonging to the successor rather than to the Tsar — the *manufactured category*, which declares that a required social class exists so that the prescribed operation can be performed on it, and which attaches to a person rather than to a parcel and is therefore revocable, backdatable and heritable; that a colonial settlement's template is frequently the metropole's own most recent domestic settlement; that the conquered become a load-bearing audience for a robe only when the metropole's own claim requires them to be seen consenting; that a state can destroy the legitimating currency it will later need, and had done so in Central Asia forty years before it wanted one; that withholding formation leaves a conqueror unable to read his own country; that attacking a formation converts it from custom into flag; that a doctrine treating belief as a priestly trick will systematically underprice the cost of attacking it, because it predicts collapse when the coercion is lifted and instead meets a belief that supplies its own enforcement from inside the household; that a survey of colonial prohibitions misses those falling on women even when women are the primary object of policy, because the deaths are inflicted by the conquered upon each other and appear in no state return; that a subject's residual can be a legal disability he reads as a protection, so that revoking the exemption is a breach of contract; that a preserved order's inherited surveillance costs the conqueror nothing and its bill transfers the moment he destroys it; that the medium-of-payment test extends from the feet to the plough, the rate setting the burden, the medium setting the compulsion and the exemption schedule setting the crop; that a monoculture's danger is not that its buyer may find another seller but that the crop it stopped growing was its food; that annulment is a distinct operation from censorship, in which evidence is reclassified as a defect of method and its producers prosecuted for incompetence rather than disclosure; that this is one operation with the destruction of the native cadres and not two, because where the claim cannot be in error the error must be located in a person, which converts an epistemic problem into a personnel problem and generates an unbounded demand for investigators; that

a conqueror may charter existing rivalries rather than manufacture them, supplying finality and reserving the adjudication — *adjudicate-and-rule*, distinguishable from divide-and-rule by what happens after he withdraws; that an arrangement's load-bearing propositions are frequently unwritten and legible only in the wreckage of their breach; that rights can be the residue of a conqueror's parsimony as well as of a quarrel between factions, and that what separates a right from a tolerance is whether its withdrawal creates an obligation to answer; that a colonial order organises its own colonists while declining to organise the conquered, and has therefore already selected who will inherit the gap when its floor cracks; that famine demobilises rather than mobilises; that a colony can be released rather than lost, and the released colony may not want it; that a metabolic debt can be refinanced rather than paid, falling due when the creditor stops lending rather than when the coordination is destroyed; and that the recovery rate of a coordination mechanism after a shock is the one available measurement of what the coordination was doing.

Beneath all of them sits the single revision the study asks the framework to carry: **that what sets the cost of holding a conquest is not the size of the conqueror's promise but its revisability** — and that where a governing claim cannot be revised, the cost of its failures is transferred from the doctrine to the machinery, and from the machinery to the people staffing it.

A note on the dates

The cover gives 1865, 1930 and 1991: the fall of Tashkent, the beginning of sedentarisation and collectivisation on the steppe, and the dissolution. The middle date was contested during the writing and the alternative was 1924, the national-territorial delimitation, which would have made the study's gravity the constitution of the nations rather than the accounting. Two things decided it. The first is that the study's strongest empirical finding is the destruction of the Kazakh herd, its sixfold recovery when left alone between 1921 and 1928, and its second and deliberate destruction thereafter — which is a 1930 fact. The second is that the doctrinal argument and that arithmetic turn out to be the same argument: the peasantry the doctrine required did not exist on the steppe, so a peasantry was manufactured out of nomads, and manufacturing it is what killed the animals and then the people. A reader who prefers 1924 is not

corrected by anything here, and the delimitation is treated at length in Modules 8 and 12.

The arc

A landscape opening and twelve modules, each with a framework function and its own evocative title.

Landscape — the two conquered orders on the eve. **White Bone and Noble Bukhara.** Three Islamic states with courts, endowments and registries, and a steppe whose Chinggisid apex the conqueror had already abolished by statute forty years earlier — both of them former conquests that had become the world — set beside an empire that arrived with a third of its budget going to its creditors.

1 — The Floor of Force. **Only Deficits in the Budget.** A twenty-five-year advance built as a line of forts before anyone could say what the country was for, won by columns of two thousand against armies of thirty thousand, recorded year after year in a single column of an American diplomat's despatch — and laid down a second time, at four times the cost, by a state that had declared the first one a crime.

2 — The Settlement. **What the Nomad Did Not Need.** One statute making two settlements fifteen articles apart: the oasis cultivator confirmed in his fields and the class above him dissolved on purpose; the steppe declared state property and left in the herdsman's use up to the quantity a Russian statistician calculated he required — and then a successor whose doctrine required an exploiting class the steppe did not contain, and which produced one by decree and let the neighbours decide who was in it.

3 — The Robe. **Above the Name of the Caliph Himself.** An empire that spent nothing justifying itself to the people it had conquered, addressed everything it said about them to Europe and to its own readers, and was replaced by a state whose doctrine required the conquered to be seen consenting — and which therefore had to pay.

4 — Formation. **The Word They Chose Was Assault.** A governor-general forbidding a lithographic press and spending twelve thousand six hundred roubles on schools; and a successor that taught a country to read, changed its alphabet twice in twelve years, went looking for a proletariat and designated one, attacked its households through its wives on a theory that belief was a trick

imposed from above — and discovered that the enforcement lived inside the household.

5 — The Cost Column. **Stop Composing the Lists.** Why the ledger came out for compliance for fifty years on thirty-six thousand soldiers and no pass law; what each subordinate population actually paid; and the summer of 1916, when the one thing the arrangement had left them was cancelled by telegraph before the order was legally in force.

6 — Extraction. **Cotton the King of Turkestan.** A conquest taken for frontier reasons that converted a tithe in grain into a debt in roubles, discounted one crop and taxed the rest, and produced within thirty years a monoculture nobody had planned — fed by the same railway that emptied it.

7 — Information and Suppression. **The Principles of Statistical Science.** An administration that bound five hundred and ninety-four volumes of everything printed against it and was troubled by none of it, replaced by a state that put its own doctrine's prediction about religion to fifty-five million people, got a refutation, and answered it not by suppressing a secret but by ruling that the count had not been a count and prosecuting the men who took it.

8 — Elite Coordination and the Default. **He Had Never Been There.** How a conqueror who could not marry in, could not share the creed, had abolished the only throne on offer and had shot the elite he built, held five republics for half a century by chartering the quarrels he found and keeping the right to settle them — until December 1986, when he broke the one rule nobody had written down.

9 — Plurality or Foreclosure. **Russian in Spirit.** A colony governed by statute rather than constitution, whose six parliamentary seats were withdrawn in a manifesto that gave the true reason; and a successor whose written guarantees were the most generous in the collection and which contained no institution anywhere obliged to hear a man repeat them back.

10 — Change and Collapse. **No Armed Force of Their Own.** A territory that rose against an intact floor and was destroyed, watched the order that destroyed it fall fourteen months later for reasons four thousand miles away, lost a third of a nationality without rebelling, and voted by ninety-five per cent to remain in a union that dissolved anyway because the men paying for it had done the sums.

11 — The Grim Accounting. **Forty-One Animals, and Then Two.** Both columns on every side: the dead of the sword; a coordination abolished by

decree and called in twice on the same people, with a sixfold recovery in between that measures what it was doing; a debt refinanced rather than paid that fell due in 1991; and the schools, clinics and literacy that were also real.

12 — Convergence and Divergence. **The Obstacle Was Somebody Else's Empire.** What the case confirms, what it breaks, the one revision it demands and the disconfirming case that fixes its wording — and the strongest argument against the whole of the foregoing, stated by the scholars who make it, answered by way of the reformers who were pursuing the same programme from inside and were shot for it.

A note on sources. This front matter is descriptive and makes no primary-source claims of its own; every factual assertion about the case is established, with its sources and with its limits marked, in the module it summarises. The framework it describes is the series'; the disciplines it lists are the ones the modules hold themselves to and document in their own closing notes. Two limitations declared at the front rather than buried: the study has read the specialist literature on this region substantially through reviews, interviews, published articles and the secondary record rather than through the monographs themselves, and says so at the points where that matters most; and it touches, at almost every turn, questions on which the successor states, the Russian Federation and several scholarly traditions hold present positions — on the famine and whether it constituted genocide, on the borders, on whether the period was colonisation or development. Where the study rests on a claim bearing on any of those, it reports the competing readings as each side states them and does not adjudicate.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

WHITE BONE AND NOBLE BUKHARA

Landscape · the two conquered orders on the eve — a Chinggisid steppe whose apex the conqueror had already abolished, and an Islamic oasis civilisation running on its own conviction — set beside the empire that arrived in 1865 with a third of its budget going to its creditors

Two orders, not one

The single most consequential fact about Central Asia on the eve of the Russian conquest is that there was no *it* — no one society, no one polity, no one way of holding people to the ground. There were two orders, divided by rainfall and by the technology each had evolved to survive it, and they were as different from one another as either was from Russia.

To the south lay the irrigated oases: a belt of ancient cities strung along the Zarafshan, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, where water drawn off the rivers into canal networks maintained by village labour supported dense sedentary populations of farmers, weavers, dyers and merchants under three Turkic dynasties who ruled by written law, collected assessed taxes, staffed courts, endowed colleges and kept archives. To the north and west lay the steppe: an enormous grassland-and-semi-desert running from the Urals to the Altai, too dry and too cold for cultivation across most of its extent, held by Kazakh pastoralists whose entire economy rested on moving herds between seasonal pastures, and whose politics had for four centuries run on a rule of descent inherited from Chinggis Khan.

The framework's first question of any conquest is not which society was advancing and which decaying, but what each *was* — how deeply each had driven its belief, how much force each spent to keep its shape, and, decisively, whether the conqueror could find in it a seat a stranger could sit down in. Asked of Central Asia, that question returns two different answers in the same

territory, and the whole subsequent shape of Russian rule follows from the split. It is worth establishing both orders precisely, because a great deal of what was later done to them was defended on the ground that neither amounted to very much.

Noble Bukhara: the oasis states

Three states divided the settled zone. The largest and oldest in prestige was the Emirate of Bukhara, whose core lay along the lower Zarafshan and whose cities were Samarkand and the capital itself. Its ruling house was the Manghit, an Uzbek tribal lineage that had held real power through the office of *ataliq* from the mid-eighteenth century and formalised its dynasty in 1785, when Shah Murad assumed the rulership outright. Persian was the language of the court, of literature and of administration; Chagatai Turkic was the dynastic tongue, and the state was Sunni Muslim of the Hanafi school with a strong Naqshbandi Sufi presence. Its population toward the end of the century's third quarter is given at roughly two and a half million. The emirate's core was the string of oases along the Zarafshan, with Bukhara and Samarkand at its centre.

To the west, in the delta country of Khwarazm, sat the Khanate of Khiva under the Qungrat dynasty, smaller and less centralised, its settled cultivators interspersed with Turkmen tribes whom the khan taxed when he could and fought when he could not. To the east, in the Ferghana valley, lay the Khanate of Kokand, the youngest of the three: founded in 1709 when Shahrukh Biy, a chief of the Uzbek tribe of Ming, built a fortress near the site of the modern city and was proclaimed its ruler. Kokand had grown fastest and reached furthest. By 1810 Alim Khan had taken Tashkent, with its mixed Turkic- and Iranian-speaking population, from Bukharan and Kazakh control, and by the middle of the nineteenth century the khanate reached across Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Karakalpak nomadic country as far west as the Aral Sea — which is to say that when Russian columns came down out of the steppe in the 1860s, the first thing they collided with was another expanding empire that had itself been conquering nomads for fifty years.

These were not chieftaincies. They were states with the ordinary furniture of states. Land was held under a classified scheme — *amlak* land of the state, *mulk* land in private hands, *waqf* land endowed in perpetuity to a mosque or college — and taxed accordingly, principally by the *kharaj*, a proportional levy on the

harvest, alongside the *zakat* on trade and livestock and a levy assessed by area on garden and lucerne ground. Collection ran through named offices: the *amlakdar*, and alongside him the *sarkar*, an official more commonly documented for Kokand, where he was apparently responsible for collecting the kharaj, could settle disputes over land and water, advised the provincial *bek*, and directed the khan's construction projects. Justice ran through the *qazi*, the judge of the sharia court, under a *qazi kalan* or chief judge at the capital. The endowment sector was not marginal: in the eastern provinces of Bukhara waqf lands made up some twenty-four per cent of the total, and the same source notes that by the century's end rather less than a quarter of the population in each of the three states lived a wholly nomadic life, the rest being settled or in transition.

The texture of that order shows best in its paperwork, which survives in quantity. A dyer's shop on Hoja Halimuddin street in Bukhara was endowed to a madrasa in the month of Rabi al-Awwal in the year 1277 of the Hijra — September or October of 1860 — and the deed was certified with the seal of the *qadi al-qudat*, the chief judge, Mulla Sofikhoja son of Mulla Omonullakhoja. A quarter-century later a merchant named Yoldashboy of Shahrisabz endowed five shops in the Sozangaron passage on 16 March 1885 to build a madrasa, and added nine thousand tengas to finish it, specifying nine cells and a classroom and directing that any surplus be spent on one further shop. This is a society with lawyers in it — with a notion of perpetuity, a registry, a court that certifies, a rule about what happens to residuals, and a class of men who can read all of it.

And it was a society whose intellectual centre of gravity was religious learning. Bukhara was the pre-eminent centre of Islamic learning in Transoxiana, drawing students from across Central Asia and well beyond, its colleges founded and maintained not by the state's budget but by these accumulating endowments, so that the teaching establishment had an income the ruler had not granted and could not easily withdraw. Nor did the mystical and the legal traditions stand apart from one another in the way European observers expected: many madrasa professors were Sufi adepts and many *ishans* — Sufi elders — held madrasa learning, and a survey commissioned by a Russian administrator in Tashkent at the end of the century found that a number of Sufi masters in the region had studied at Bukhara. The interpreter class of this order was therefore not a state department but a dense, self-financing, self-reproducing network with its own money, its own courts, its

own schools and its own succession — which is precisely the configuration that is most expensive for a conqueror to replace and most tempting for him to leave alone.

There is one further fact about these states that the record does not permit to be softened, and it should be stated here rather than left to the module on extraction, because it was to become the conquest's most serviceable justification. All three ran on slavery, and Khiva ran the largest market. Captives were taken by Turkmen and other raiders from Persia and from the Russian frontier and sold in the bazaars of Khiva and Bukhara. When Russian troops took Khiva in 1873 the slaves were freed, and even the count is contested: the number of liberated Persians is given as more than five thousand in one Khwarazmian chronicle and as fewer than two thousand in a Russian source — and the same account records that the freed men were attacked and robbed by Khwarazmian Turkmens on the road home. As for how far the practice actually ended when the treaties said it had, the sharpest available evidence is a piece of deliberate provocation by a foreign diplomat. Russian official accounts had for some years agreed that the Bukharan slave trade had ceased, and unofficial statements to the contrary were disbelieved — until Eugene Schuyler, of the United States legation at St Petersburg, openly purchased a Persian slave in the Bukhara bazaar, had him taken back by the Bukharan authorities, purchased a second, and brought that one to Samarkand and Tashkent as proof. The boy cost seven hundred tengas, or a hundred and seventy-five roubles, and Schuyler took him to St Petersburg, where he lived at the legation as a free man.

The white bone: the steppe order

North of the cultivated line the arrangement was entirely different, and it is the one most often described in ways that would have suited a conqueror.

Kazakh pastoralism was not wandering. It was a scheduled circuit. Herds were moved between four named seasonal pastures — *qystau* for winter, *kokteu* for spring, *zhailau* for summer, *kuzdeu* for autumn — along routes that were customary, known, contested and inherited, with winter quarters often fixed at sheltered sites with permanent structures. The system existed because the land could not be used any other way: a given patch of steppe will carry animals for part of the year and not the rest, and the only way to feed a large population off it is to keep moving the animals so that each pasture is grazed in the season it can

bear and rested in the seasons it cannot. Movement is not a cultural preference laid over the grass. It is the mechanism by which the grass supports people at all, and the human population the steppe carried in the nineteenth century was a function of that mechanism rather than of the acreage. That is a fact to fix now, because it will be tested to destruction seventy years later.

The society running the circuit was stratified by a rule of blood. The descendants of Chinggis Khan formed a class known as *aq süyek*, the White Bone, which remained the ruling elite of Kazakh society until the middle of the nineteenth century; everyone else was *qara süyek*, the Black Bone. Only a man of the White Bone could be khan or *sultan*. Beneath them the *biys* — chosen for demonstrated merit in judgement and oratory rather than by inheritance — held judicial and administrative influence, represented their clans in council and enforced customary law, *adat*, balancing the khan's edicts against collective consent. The khan's authority was real but personal and contingent: he was elected by consensus at assemblies of sultans, biys and elders, his legitimacy resting on Chinggisid descent and demonstrated capacity; he declared war, allocated pastures and regulated migrations, and administered justice largely by ratifying the biys' decisions, while tribute was irregular and limited to wartime levies of livestock and provisions.

Read that against the question a conqueror actually asks — *is there a seat in it, and can a stranger sit down?* — and the answer is no, twice over. Authority was distributed across lineage, age and consent rather than vested in an office; and the one criterion that could confer supreme authority, descent from Chinggis Khan, was by definition unavailable to a Romanov. There was no chair on the steppe, and the Russian state, having discovered this over a century of frontier dealing, did not try to sit in one. It abolished the chair instead.

That abolition is the second decisive fact of the landscape, because it happened long before 1865. The process began in 1731, when Abulkhair Khan of the Junior Zhuz pledged allegiance to the Empress Anna Ioannovna in exchange for Russian help against the Dzungars. What began as a protectorate against a common enemy became, across a century, an administrative absorption. The khanates were abolished between 1822 and 1848 — the Middle Zhuz in 1822, the Junior in 1824, the Bukey Horde in 1845, part of the Senior Zhuz in 1848 — ending six centuries of Chinggisid rule. The instrument for the Middle Zhuz was the Statute on the Siberian Kirgiz, drafted by Mikhail Speransky, which divided the zhuz into eight external districts headed by

appointed sultans, subdivided into *volosts* and *auls*, replacing nomadic tribal governance with fixed territorial units under Russian oversight in order to facilitate tax collection, conscription and settlement. The statute was addressed, in its own opening words, to the dignitaries, the senior sultans of khanly lineage, the other notable sultans, the *starshinas* and *biys*, and to all the good Kirgiz people from the greatest to the least — the vocabulary of the old order deployed to announce its supersession.

The last armed attempt to restore the khanate was Kenesary Qasymuly's, proclaimed khan in 1841 and killed in 1847. It is worth noting how a leading modern authority reads him, because the reading matters for what follows: Morrison presents Kenesary less as the national independence fighter modern Kazakh historiography would prefer and more as an insurgent driven by a demand that the Russians resume respecting his personal Chinggisid authority. The claim being defended was not a nation. It was a rule about who may rule — the same rule the White Bone had lived by since the fifteenth century.

So by 1865 the two orders stood in quite different relations to the empire about to complete the job. The oasis states were independent, intact, and administratively deep. The steppe had already had its apex removed by the same power, forty years earlier, by statute.

No first innocent order

Neither order was aboriginal, and neither would have claimed to be. Both were former conquests that had become the world.

Under the oasis cities lies an Iranian substrate — the Sogdian city-states, mercantile, literate, Zoroastrian with Buddhist, Manichaean and Nestorian minorities — and over that substrate, in eleven years at the beginning of the eighth century, came the Arabs. Qutayba ibn Muslim, governor of Khurasan under the caliph al-Walid I, consolidated control over the principalities of Tokharistan and took Bukhara by about 710, conquered Khwarazm and completed the conquest of Sogdiana with the capture of Samarkand between 710 and 712, then campaigned annually up the Jaxartes valley as far as Ferghana.

The conversion did not take the first time, and the tenth-century local historian Narshakhi says so plainly. His account, preserved in a twelfth-century Persian rendering, records that the people of Bukhara accepted Islam and abandoned it each time the Arab forces withdrew; that Qutayba converted

them three times and three times they returned to their own worship; that on the fourth attempt he took the city and imposed the religious law by force, building mosques, destroying the fire-temples and punishing those who broke the new rules. And Narshakhi names the instrument that finally worked, which is a settlement rather than a sermon: Qutayba ordered the Bukharans to give up half of their houses to the Arabs, so that Arabs would be mixed among them, would know what they were about, and they would be obliged to remain Muslims. Public compliance and private idol-worship, he adds, went on for some time regardless.

Twelve centuries later, the sanctity of *Bukhārā-yi sharīf*, Noble Bukhara, was the most durable fact in Central Asia. The distance between the two moments is the whole of the recursion: what began as a billeting order enforced at the point of a sword had become, by the nineteenth century, the ground of a civilisation whose scholars, judges, endowments, calendar and law were not experienced as anybody's imposition but as the shape of a decent life. Naming that origin is not a debunking. It is the opposite: a built thing that became real is more durable than a lie, and the order the Russians met was authentically the Bukharan's own world precisely because the building had succeeded so completely.

Nor was the Arab layer the last. The Mongols came through in 1219–21, taking Otrar after a siege that ran from December 1219 into February 1220, then Bukhara, Samarkand and Gurganj in turn. The scale of the killing is genuinely contested and the medieval figures cannot be used: modern historians regard the chroniclers' numbers as vastly exaggerated — one account gives 2.4 million killed at Nishapur alone — while treating them as registering a social catastrophe the survivors found difficult to quantify. What is not contested is the political residue, which was that descent from Chinggis Khan became, across the whole of Inner Asia, the sole recognised currency of supreme legitimacy. Timur, a Barlas amir who could not claim it, ruled through a puppet Chinggisid and married into the line rather than assert a title he had no standing to hold. Then, at the very end of the fifteenth century, the Timurid order was in its turn overthrown by nomads out of the northern steppe: Muhammad Shaybani Khan, tracing descent from Shiban son of Jochi, led Uzbek forces from the Dasht-i Qipchaq against the fragmented Timurid remnants from 1499, took Bukhara in 1500 and Samarkand thereafter, and by 1507 held Herat. The Uzbek tribal aristocracy that ruled all three khanates in 1865 — Manghit,

Qungrat, Ming — descends from that conquest. The Kazakhs are the other half of the same fracture: Janibek and Kerei founded the Kazakh Khanate in 1466, breaking away from the same Uzbek confederation, and carried the Chinggisid rule north with them.

And here the landscape offers something the framework has not previously caught in the act. The Manghits were not Chinggisids, and they knew that the currency they needed was one they could not spend. Shah Murad accordingly abolished the khanate and ruled under the caliphal title *amir al-mu'minin*, Commander of the Faithful, lending his non-regal status an Islamic legitimacy instead; the transition from the neo-Chinggisid khanate to the Manghit emirate consisted in exactly this — legitimation became Islamic rather than descent-based, while the power of the non-Manghit Uzbek amirs was systematically reduced and a small standing army made the emirs largely independent of tribal military support. Bukhara staked its legitimacy on Islamic principles rather than Chinggisid blood, and its ruler took the title of emir instead of khan.

That is a legitimating story deliberately swapped, by a named man, on a dateable occasion, eighty years before the Russians arrived — and swapped for exactly the reason the framework would predict, namely that a claimant who cannot borrow the currency his audience already honours must find another currency the same audience already honours, since no ruler mints his own. The conquered order was not a timeless inheritance. It was a construction whose most recent structural revision was within living memory of men still alive in 1865.

The empire that arrived

Now the other side, and it is not the confident colossus of the standard telling.

The Russia that took Tashkent had lost the Crimean War nine years earlier and was in the middle of the most drastic internal reconstruction of its modern history. The Emancipation Manifesto of 19 February 1861 abolished serfdom and granted personal freedom to roughly twenty-three million privately owned serfs, converting their obligatory labour into redemption payments for allotments frequently inferior to what they had previously worked, so preserving noble landownership while imposing long-term financial burdens on the peasantry; the judicial statute of 1864 introduced independent courts, public trials and juries; the *zemstvo* reform created elected local assemblies the

same year. A rising in Poland was crushed in 1863. And on 21 May 1864 the longest war in Russian history ended in the western Caucasus, with a victory parade presided over by Grand Duke Michael at Qbaada, followed immediately by the expulsion of the Circassians who would not accept resettlement, directed to Ottoman territory through the ports of Sochi and Tuapse. The southward advance into the steppe accelerated in the campaigning season that followed.

The state doing all this was short of money, and this is the fact that governs the pace of everything. Reutern at the Ministry of Finance built a unified treasury and centralised departmental accounts, introduced a public budget in 1862 and a system of excise in 1863; none of it improved the government's financial position, and up to a third of annual expenditure was consumed by debt. A conquest run by such a treasury is a conquest run on the cheap, and the arithmetic of the decisive engagement shows it. At Tashkent, between 9 May and 17 June 1865, Chernyaev's force of 1,951 men took a city defended by something in the order of thirty thousand, at a cost of 41 dead and 179 wounded; Alimqul, the effective ruler of Kokand, was killed. Two days of street fighting were followed by an accommodation reached with the city's *ulama* — which is to say that the first political act of Russian rule in the settled zone was a negotiation with the interpreter class of the order being conquered.

Why the advance happened at all is the point on which the historiography has moved most, and the study must take the movement seriously rather than reach for the tidy answer. The tidy answer is cotton: Russian mills lost their American supply during the American Civil War, and the conquest of the cotton country runs through the same decade. The leading modern account rejects it. Morrison calls this the "Cotton Canard": the shortage was real but brief, Russian expansion into the region had begun some thirty years earlier, before Russia had a noteworthy cotton textile industry, and demand for Central Asian cotton was already falling away in 1865–66. Central Asia did not become a significant source of cotton until the turn of the twentieth century, and what it produced could readily have been bought by trade. Morrison equally rejects the Great Game and the man-on-the-spot explanations, noting that logistics alone rule out accidental empire — acquiring the ten thousand camels for the failed winter march on Khiva in 1839–40 took eighteen months, so campaigns could only proceed with the explicit consent of the War Ministry and the tsar. What his account puts in their place is more prosaic: the War Ministry and the governors of Orenburg had wanted Tashkent since the late 1850s, and the

motives combined supply lines to the steppe fortresses, a wish to anchor the new frontier in country with a sedentary population that could feed it, and security against attacks from Kokand.

Two things follow. The first is that the founding question of a conquest — *what did the conqueror want?* — has no economic answer here at the outset, and a study that assumed one would be writing the later monoculture backwards into the conquest that preceded it by a generation. The second is that a conquest undertaken for supply lines and frontier security is a conquest with no built-in account of what the territory is *for*, which leaves a vacancy that somebody will later fill.

The vacancy was filled first, and immediately, at the diplomatic level. On 21 November 1864 — 3 December by the Western calendar — Prince Gorchakov, the foreign minister, sent a circular despatch to Russia's representatives at foreign courts. It is the founding document of the conquest's public account of itself, and its opening proposition is that the position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilised states brought into contact with half-savage nomad populations possessing no fixed social organisation. It then names the company Russia was claiming to keep: the United States in America, France in Algeria, Holland in her colonies, England in India — all forced by imperious necessity into this onward march, where the greatest difficulty is to know where to stop. The circular also stated a limit, announcing that Chimkent "fixed for the Russians with geographical precision the limit up to which they were bound to advance, and at which they must halt" — and the member of the House of Commons who read that sentence aloud in 1873 observed that the ink was scarcely dry before the conquests resumed.

Note the address. The despatch went to European chancelleries. It was written in French, it argued by analogy to four Western empires, and its claim about the conquered — that they had no fixed social organisation — was made about a population that included the qazis of Bukhara, the endowment registry of a city of colleges, and the four-season pasture circuit of the steppe. Whatever else it was, it was not addressed to anybody in Central Asia, and nobody in Central Asia was expected to read it.

The administrative machinery followed within three years. An imperial decree of 11 July 1867 established the Turkestan Governor-Generalship with its capital at Tashkent, and Konstantin von Kaufman held the post from 1867 to 1882. Kaufman took Samarkand on 2 May 1868 after a brief action on the

heights of Chupan-Ata; the city itself surrendered without a fight, and a peace treaty was signed on 5 July 1868 under which Bukhara lost Samarkand and remained a semi-independent vassal until the revolution, while Kokand, confined to the Ferghana valley, remained independent until 1876. In the same year, 1868, the emir who had just lost Samarkand endowed a college in his own capital: the waqf deed records that Hazrat Amir Muzaffar built a nine-room madrasa at Lab-i Hauz in the Istemurbi quarter, in the month of Zulqada of the year 1285 of the Hijra, with the cream market of one quarter and the rag market of another endowed for its support, the surplus revenue to be divided into twenty-one shares. The seal on the deed is a judge's. The emir had been defeated in the field, had lost his second city, and was still doing the thing his authority actually consisted of.

What was already installed before the first shot

One last element of the landscape must be recorded, and it is the one least likely to appear in an account organised around the conquest, because it runs the wrong way.

The Russian state had spent the previous eighty years deliberately deepening Islam among the Kazakhs. On 22 September 1788 Catherine II issued a decree on the appointment of mullahs and other clerics of Mohammedan law and on the establishment of a Spiritual Assembly at Ufa to administer all clerical ranks of that law in Russia. The Assembly licensed clerics of good conduct and reliable loyalty, ensured that Islamic schools did not run counter to the state, standardised the promotion of teachers — and the Russian treasury spent money building new mosques and madrasas at Ufa and Orenburg. Under its first three muftis it functioned as a frontier instrument: it certified and despatched mullahs to the Kazakh hordes, mediated disputes along the Orenburg line, and served imperial objectives in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Whatever the intention, one strand of the scholarship credits it with real effect — that Catherine established the institutional foundation for the Islamic revival which fundamentally transformed Kazakh society over the following century, and that nineteenth-century complaints by Russian officials and the Russianised Kazakh elite about "Islamising the Kazakhs" were complaints about a policy that had in fact worked as an instrument of integration.

And then it was reversed. In 1868 the Kazakhs of the northern Central Asian steppe were removed from the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, which had long administered Muslim legal and religious affairs there. From the 1860s Russia reassigned frontier governance in the steppe to the new military governor-generalships and secular courts, narrowing the Assembly's external remit. In the newly conquered south the equivalent institution was never built at all. In Turkestan, Islamic practice remained beyond the state's control: traditional patterns of learning continued and even flourished, and the ulama accommodated themselves to the new political realities without ever being brought under the bureaucratic control of a spiritual assembly — by the time of the conquest the notion of tolerance was itself under attack, the Enlightenment having brought the concept of fanaticism to Russia, and Russian administrators deemed Islam inherently fanatical, the question being how to curb or contain it.

So the empire arrived in Turkestan having, within the space of a single lifetime, first paid to strengthen the faith of its Muslim frontier subjects and then decided that faith was the problem — and having, in the newly taken south, no instrument for managing it at all.

Reading the landscape against the framework

Four things this landscape establishes, of which one is a genuine addition.

The first is that the recursion holds and can be caught in the act. Both conquered orders ran on legitimating rules that were the naturalised residue of earlier conquests — Islam, imposed on Bukhara by an eighth-century Arab general who found that sermons failed and billeting worked; Chinggisid descent, imposed on the steppe by a thirteenth-century Mongol conquest and still, six hundred years later, the only thing that could make a man a khan. Neither was fake and neither was forgotten; both had become simply the way authority worked. What Central Asia adds to the corpus is a dated instance of the mechanism operating *inside* the conquered order shortly before the conqueror arrives. The Manghits could not claim Chinggisid blood, so in 1785 Shah Murad abolished the khanship and took a caliphal title instead, exchanging one borrowed currency for another because the first was closed to him and both were already honoured by the audience whose compliance he needed. Legitimacy is borrowed rather than minted; here is a conquered dynasty

demonstrating it, on the record, eighty years before the Russians made the point again from outside.

The second is that the chair question returns two answers in one territory, and that the conqueror had already acted on both. The oasis states had offices a stranger could enter — a *bek* in each province, an *amlakdar* collecting the *kharaj*, a *qazi* certifying deeds, and above them a throne — and the Russians would find those offices in working order with archives attached. The steppe had no such seat, because supreme authority there was vested in a bloodline no outsider could join and the working authority was distributed across biys, elders and consent; and so, across 1822 to 1848, the same empire abolished the khanates by statute and substituted districts, *volosts* and appointed sultans on paper. The prediction to carry forward is therefore not one settlement but two, made in different decades by the same state, on the same subsequent map — and the difference between the instruments should be legible in the instruments themselves.

The third is that the metabolic question is visible from the first page rather than arriving with the catastrophe. The steppe carried the population it carried because the herds moved on a four-season circuit; the carrying capacity was a property of the movement, not of the ground. Any arrangement that stops the movement has not restricted a custom. It has removed the mechanism by which the land feeds people, and the note falls due in the following winter. That is a proposition with a date attached, and the study will come to it.

The fourth is the addition, and it concerns formation. The framework has expected a colonial order to *withhold* formation from the conquered, because forming them would mean admitting them, leaving the old order holding the field by default. Central Asia shows a different and sharper case: **a conqueror can install the counter-formation himself, at his own expense, decades before the conquest, for reasons that made sense in an earlier phase — and then meet it as the principal obstacle.** Catherine's state licensed the mullahs, standardised the teachers and paid for the mosques, because a legible clergy answerable to Ufa was a cheap way to hold a frontier. Two generations later the same state was removing the Kazakhs from that Assembly's jurisdiction, declining to build any equivalent in the newly conquered south, and describing the faith it had subsidised as fanaticism to be contained. This is not the withheld formation of the corpus's other colonies, and it is not simple neglect. It is a formation supplied by the conqueror in one key and confronted by him

in another, and the corpus should carry it as its own item, because it predicts something the withholding model does not: that the strength of the counter-formation a colonial state faces may be partly a measure of its own earlier investment, and that an administration which finds an unusually robust indigenous religious establishment should be asked, before anything else, who paid for it.

A note on sources. The exact wording quoted here from Prince Gorchakov's circular despatch of 21 November 1864 (3 December, New Style) — that Russia's position was that of "all civilised states which are brought into contact with half-savage nomad populations possessing no fixed social organisation," the naming of the United States, France in Algeria, Holland and England in India, the "imperious necessity" of the onward march "where the greatest difficulty is to know where to stop," and the claim that Chimkent "fixed for the Russians with geographical precision the limit up to which they were bound to advance, and at which they must halt" — is public-domain primary material, reproduced consistently across independent renderings including the House of Commons debate of 22 April 1873 and the standard scholarly citations; the phrasing varies slightly between the French original and the English versions in circulation, and a study resting further weight on it should specify which text it quotes. The waqf deeds quoted or summarised (the Bukhara dyer's shop endowed in Rabi al-Awwal 1277 AH under the seal of the *qadi al-qudat*; Yoldashboy of Shahrisabz's endowment of 16 March 1885; Amir Muzaffar's nine-room madrasa at Lab-i Hauz in Zulqada 1285 AH) are quoted at second hand from the published research of Abdusattor Jumanazar on Bukhara's educational endowments, and the Hijri-to-Gregorian conversions given in those summaries are not always internally consistent; 1285 AH ran from April 1868 to April 1869, which is the year Samarkand was lost, and that is the form in which the point is made here. Narshakhi's account of the repeated apostasy of Bukhara and of Qutayba's order that the inhabitants surrender half their houses to Arab settlers is paraphrased rather than quoted, since the standard English rendering is Richard N. Frye's copyrighted translation of 1954; the substance is stable across the editions.

The institutional and dynastic framework — the Manghit accession of 1785 and Shah Murad's assumption of the title *amir al-mu'minin*; the Qungrat dynasty at Khiva; the foundation of Kokand by Shahrukh Biy in 1709 and Alim Khan's seizure of Tashkent by 1810; the *amlak*/*mulk*/*waqf* classification and the *kharaj*, *zakat* and area-assessed levies; the offices of *amlakdar*, *sarkar*, *bek* and *qazi* — follows the standard reference and specialist literature, principally the Encyclopaedia Iranica, the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History, Alexander Morrison's work on the Zarafshan valley, and Seymour Becker's study of the protectorates, paraphrased and credited. The account of Kazakh seasonal pastoralism and of the *aq süyek*/*qara süyek* division draws on Tattigul

Kartaeva's study of seasonal migration and on the Oxford Research Encyclopedia entry on the Kazakh Khanate. The dates of the abolition of the Kazakh khanates (Middle Zhuz 1822, Junior 1824, Bukey Horde 1845, part of the Senior Zhuz 1848) and the structure of Speransky's Statute on the Siberian Kirgiz follow the same sources; the Statute's text is quoted only in the address formula reproduced in the published translation.

The rejection of the "cotton canard," of the Great Game, and of the men-on-the-spot explanation is Alexander Morrison's, in *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in Imperial Expansion, 1814–1914* (2020) and in his earlier article on the search for a natural frontier, paraphrased and credited; it is the current authoritative position but not an uncontested one, and the Soviet economic reading it displaced is named here rather than suppressed. The reassessment of Kenesary Qasymuly is Morrison's likewise. Casualty figures for the Mongol conquest are deliberately not given: the medieval Persian chroniclers' numbers are regarded by modern historians as exaggerated by a large factor, and no reliable replacement exists. Casualty figures for Tashkent are given as the standard accounts give them, and it should be noted that Russian returns for these campaigns record their own losses far more precisely than their opponents'. The count of slaves freed at Khiva in 1873 is given as a range with both sources named, because the range is the honest state of the evidence. Eugene Schuyler's purchase of a Persian slave at Bukhara is drawn from the United States diplomatic correspondence printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, a public-domain government publication.

Population figures for 1897 are not used in the body of this landscape and are reserved for later modules; where the eve-of-conquest population is concerned the record is fragmentary, particularly for the nomadic steppe, and no first Russian census exists before 1897. The Bukharan figure of roughly two and a half million for 1875 is given as the reference literature gives it and should be treated as an estimate. Where this landscape has been unable to establish a total — the number of madrasas operating in Bukhara, for instance — it has given verified individual instances rather than an aggregate.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE ONE

ONLY DEFICITS IN THE BUDGET

Module 1 · The Floor of Force — a twenty-five-year advance built as a line of forts before anyone could say what the country was for, won by absurdly small columns against absurdly large ones, paid for out of a treasury that recorded the result year after year in a single column, and then laid down a second time, at four times the cost, by a state that had declared the first one a crime

The floor was a line of forts before it was a war

The conquest of Central Asia is usually narrated as a run of battles. It is better understood as a construction project that took a quarter of a century and whose pace was set by camels.

Russia's first serious attempt on the settled zone failed completely. In 1839 Vasily Perovsky, military governor of Orenburg, marched on Khiva with about five thousand troops and some ten thousand camels; the column left on 14 November into blizzards and temperatures near thirty below, and the camels, unaccustomed to the conditions, died. He turned back without reaching the khanate. The lesson taken was not that the enterprise was impossible but that it was a logistics problem, and the answer adopted was to build forward rather than march.

So two fortified lines were pushed across the steppe from opposite ends. Small forces of Orenburg and Siberian troops built lines of fortresses from the early 1840s, the gap eventually running between Fort Perovskii on the Syr Darya, established in 1853, and Fort Vernoe in Semirechie, established in 1854. The southern anchor was taken from Kokand: Ak-Mechet, a Kokandi fortress used as a base for taxing the Kazakhs of the river and controlling the trade between Russia and the south, was stormed by Perovsky on 2 July 1853 with over two thousand men against three hundred defenders, after months of preparation and with batteries, trenches and mines dug beneath the walls. It was

renamed Fort Perovsky and became the springboard for everything that followed.

Then, over a single decade, the two lines were joined. The advance ran from Vernoe through Merke, Toqmaq, Pishpek, Chulaq-Qurghan and Aulie-Ata, and from Fort Perovskii through Yangi-Qurghan, Suzaq, Turkestan and Chimkent, storming a series of Kokandi fortresses as it went — and Tashkent itself, a commercial centre of at least a hundred thousand people, ruled by Kokand since 1809 and long contested between that khanate and Bukhara, was the major prize. Chernyaev stormed Aulie-Ata on 5 June 1864; a separate Orenburg detachment of twelve hundred men under Colonel Veryovkin marched from Fort Perovsky and occupied the city of Turkestan on 12 June. Chimkent fell in October. Tashkent fell the following summer.

This is the shape to hold. The floor was not thrown down in a campaign of conquest; it was built, fort by fort, over twenty-five years, by an empire whose reach was limited by what it could feed at the end of a thousand-kilometre supply line. The question of what the country was *for* had not been settled, and would not be settled for another generation.

The arithmetic of the collisions

When the forts finally met the cities, the disparities were extreme in both directions at once, and the numbers are the module's first real evidence.

At Tashkent, between 9 May and 17 June 1865 — the seventeenth by the Russian calendar, the twenty-ninth by the Western — Chernyaev took a city held by something in the order of thirty thousand men with a force of 1,951, losing 41 dead and 179 wounded; Alimqul, the effective ruler of Kokand, was killed in the fighting. Three years later at Zarabulak, a Russian detachment of about two thousand under Kaufman broke an army of some thirty thousand fielded by the Emir of Bukhara. In the campaign of 1866 the ratio is recorded on both sides of the ledger: at Jizzakh the Bukharans lost around six thousand killed and three thousand prisoners along with all their artillery, and across the whole of that year's campaigning Russian losses came to about five hundred killed and wounded against more than twelve thousand of their opponents.

The explanation is not the courage of one side or the cowardice of the other, and the record contains no evidence for either reading. It is that a professional army with rifled firearms, mobile artillery, an officer corps trained to manoeuvre

under fire, and a commissariat that could keep a column supplied in a desert will beat a much larger force that has none of those things, reliably, wherever it is patiently applied. The Khivan campaign of 1873 makes the point from the other direction: the thing that nearly destroyed Kaufman's column was not the enemy but the ground. His march from Khalata to the Oxus, about a hundred miles through unknown desert, cost nearly all his camels and most of the baggage; there was a point at which he feared the whole expedition would perish in the sand. What defeated Russian columns in Central Asia was thirst. What defeated Central Asian armies was Russian columns.

Where the violence was pointed, and the variable that set its level

The floor did not fall evenly, and the unevenness is the most analytically useful fact in the module.

Against the settled states it was, by the standards of nineteenth-century conquest, restrained — not from mercy but because there was somebody to deal with. At Tashkent, after two days of street fighting, Chernyaev reached an accommodation with the city's ulama: the first political act of Russian rule in the oasis zone was a negotiation with the interpreter class of the order being conquered. Bukhara, having lost its second city and its field army, signed. A peace treaty of 5 July 1868 left Bukhara without Samarkand and as a semi-independent vassal, and Kokand, confined to the Ferghana valley, independent for another eight years. Khiva was reduced in one campaign and left standing with its khan restored, subject to a council of which two-thirds of the members were Russians, and a war contribution of some 2,200,000 roubles against an annual income the Russians reckoned at 400,000 — a debt calculated to take at least twenty years to discharge.

Against the Turkmen, who had no such apex, the floor fell with a completely different weight. The first attempt failed: at Geok Tepe in 1879 the Russians lost 445 killed and wounded, about a third of the attacking infantry, and were driven off, with the commander afterwards blamed both for an incompetent attack and for the needless slaughter of an enemy who would probably have surrendered or fled if properly handled. The second did not fail. Skobelev besieged the fortress with some seven thousand men and seventy-two guns against twenty to twenty-five thousand people inside, of whom perhaps eight

thousand had firearms and none had artillery. A mine was detonated under the wall on 12 January 1881, old style; the troops stormed in; the defenders and the civilians fled across the desert and were pursued by cavalry, and around eight thousand Turkmen soldiers and civilians including women and children were killed in the flight, in addition to some six thousand five hundred killed inside the fortress. All Turkmen males in the fort who had not escaped were killed; about five thousand women and children were spared and six hundred Persian slaves freed. Russian losses for the whole campaign of 1880–81 are given as 290 killed and 883 wounded, with 645 further deaths from disease. Estimates of the Turkmen dead run from about fourteen thousand to twenty thousand and are contested; the figure of roughly fourteen thousand is the one the standard survey literature uses.

Skobelev's own explanation of the principle is reported, at second hand and in slightly varying wording, from his conversation and from a St Petersburg dinner the following year: that in Asia the duration of peace stands in direct proportion to the slaughter inflicted, that the harder you hit them the longer they stay quiet, and that they had killed close to twenty thousand Turkmen at Geok Tepe and the survivors would not soon forget the lesson. The remark is not a documentary quotation and should not be treated as one; what is documentary is the count.

Now set the two ends of the range beside each other and ask what actually differed. It was not the ferocity of the resistance — the Turkmen were formidable, but so was the Kokandi army that held Tashkent, and the emir put thirty thousand men in the field. It was that Tashkent had an ulama who could deliver a city, Bukhara had an emir whose seal bound his subjects, and Khiva had a khan who could be put back on a throne and made to sign for twenty years of instalments. Geok Tepe had twenty-five thousand people inside a mud wall and nobody whose signature bound anybody. A conquest is cheap where somebody can surrender on behalf of others, and expensive where nobody can — and the cost is paid in the bodies of the people whose order had no such office.

The cost migrated to the registry — and to the interrogation room

Where the conqueror takes over a working administration rather than destroys one, the expensive part of holding it stops being the battlefield and becomes the paperwork, and the honest measure of the floor stops being casualties and becomes arrests, dismissals and interrogations. Turkestan shows this clearly, and it shows it in a hostile witness's notes.

The Russians kept the machinery they found. The taxes usual under Muslim rule were to a considerable extent retained — the *kharaj* on land and its products, fixed at a tenth of the harvest, and the *zakat* at two and a half per cent on the value of goods imported and on trading capital; from the nomad population a tax of two roubles seventy-five kopecks was demanded on each *kibitka*, or household. The courts were kept too, and altered where it mattered: the *qazis*, judging by the Sharia, were allowed to remain in the towns, but they were made elective by delegates from the population, and their importance in the eyes of the natives was much diminished. Among the nomads the *biys* went on judging by inherited custom under the supervision of Russian district prefects who could remove them. This is an order run through an inherited apparatus with the appointment power taken out of it.

The costs then show up where the framework says they will. They show up as prefects with more power than anyone was watching: the prefect of the Kurama district, living five miles from the governor-general's house, levied ninety thousand roubles of illegal taxes in a single year on a salary of two thousand four hundred, spent the district savings funds on his own house, and forbade anyone to cross the Syr Darya except at points belonging to his friends on pain of Siberia — and when it became too scandalous to ignore he was removed and reappointed elsewhere, the governor-general describing him as "a most useful officer". They show up as interrogations. When an officer named Emmons reported government funds stolen by Kazakhs, several of the arrested chiefs confessed; Emmons then killed himself, leaving a letter admitting he had spent the money himself. The men were released, and the subsequent enquiry found that the judicial officer, Baron Jerenitz of Vernoe, had extorted the confessions by torture — a practice wholly at variance with Russian law. In a second case more than sixty Kazakhs were accused of a robbery, among them

Sultan Tezak, a major in the Russian service and the most respected of the Kazakh chiefs, on the evidence of stolen property found in his tent — until a Cossack confessed he had placed it there at the instigation of the judge, who was thereupon transferred to a similar post at Khujand.

And they show up as riots, and in what the riots were said to be about. A disturbance at Khujand in 1872 required troops and ended in the execution of the ringleaders; it was officially attributed to resistance to universal vaccination, which was believed to be a way of marking men for conscription, but the real cause was found in general discontent at taxes that had been raised rather than lowered as the Russians had promised, and which were then higher than had been paid before. The commandant of the Ura-Tyube district was removed and sent out of the province for having written a letter to St Petersburg stating the truth about that discontent — a letter that had not at that point even been published. And they show up as exit: during the early spring of 1873 most of the Kazakhs of the Chimkent district left the country, preferring the sands of the Kyzyl Kum to Russian rule.

None of that appears in a casualty return. All of it is the floor.

What it cost, in the conqueror's own numbers

The framework holds that the floor is a line in the accounts before it is anything else. For Turkestan that line survives, because in March 1874 the United States legation at St Petersburg forwarded to Washington a long report on Central Asia by Eugene Schuyler, who had travelled the province, and Schuyler had the budget.

There were at that date some thirty-six thousand soldiers in the province of Turkestan, which Schuyler reported on good authority to be more than twice the number necessary. The five-year record was as follows, in roubles: in 1868 an income of 665,922 against expenditure of 4,522,429; in 1869, 2,356,241 against 4,223,482; in 1870, 2,957,229 against 5,966,321; in 1871, 2,113,750 against 6,726,441; in 1872, 2,022,286 against 7,528,627. The deficits ran 3.86 million, 1.88, 3.01, 4.61 and 5.51 million roubles across those five years, with 1873's expected to exceed seven million — and these figures excluded the cost of army stores manufactured in Russia and charged to the imperial budget. Schuyler's summary of the position is exact and worth having in his own words: "So far,

there have been only deficits in the budget of Turkistan, which have increased year by year."

Take the largest of those years apart and the priorities are on the page. Of the 1872 expenditure of 7,529,627 roubles, the pay and maintenance of the army took 3,015,200 and horses for the cavalry and artillery a further 1,249,100; salaries and expenses of officials came to 802,400; postal expenses to 696,800; building to 205,000; lighting and heating to 252,900; the governor-general's house and garden to 30,000; the horse-breeding establishment, described as serving mainly as a comfortable berth for members of the governor-general's chancery, to another 30,000; and schools to 12,600. Twelve thousand six hundred roubles on schools, against three million on the army and thirty thousand on one official residence and its grounds. The proportion is the module's plainest single fact and it needs no comment.

The revenue side is equally instructive. Local revenues amounted to only 1,328,200 roubles, of which personal and *kibitka* taxes were 588,000, the road tax 154,000 and the tax on land and its products 278,000; coal from the government mines was valued at 4,600 roubles but the quantity actually sold brought in a hundred. Against this, the excise on liquor produced 255,000 roubles in 1872 and had more than doubled in five years — paid, since the natives did not drink, entirely by a Russian population of no more than a hundred thousand. The province's largest single growing revenue stream was vodka bought by the conquerors.

Then there is the item that shows what a floor costs the people underneath it even when nobody is shot. The Khivan expedition required fourteen thousand camels, exactly fourteen per cent of all the camels in the province, requisitioned against a promise of fifty roubles for each animal that died. Nearly all of them died, and 700,000 roubles fell due. One prefect, seeing an opportunity to demonstrate the loyalty of his district, told the population the government would never pay and that it would be better to make the animals a present; the example was followed in most other districts, and the result was that most of the inhabitants felt they had been simply robbed. Fourteen per cent of the transport of an economy that ran on transport, extracted in a single season, by persuasion, off the books.

Two further judgements from the same report belong here because they come from men in the machine. Chernyaev, who had taken Tashkent, submitted a long report to the minister of finance arguing that on financial as

well as political grounds the governor-generalship should be abolished and Turkestan returned to Orenburg. And Krizhanovsky, the governor-general of Orenburg, told Schuyler that Kaufman's punitive attack on the Yomut Turkmen after the Khiva campaign had been quite uncalled for: "It will now be necessary for us to have expeditions against the Turcomans for many years. It will be a second Caucasus" — a prediction that Geok Tepe, eight years later, fulfilled.

That attack deserves its own sentence, because it shows a floor being used to manufacture a distinction rather than to answer a threat. Kaufman imposed part of the Khivan indemnity on the Turkmen tribes, summoned the elders of the Yomut, gave them two weeks to pay a portion and held some as hostages — then, without waiting the two weeks, sent a detachment under Golovachev which attacked the encampments, burned the houses and destroyed the wagons of household stores. The officers of the Orenburg column, who thought highly of the Turkmen and believed they would have kept the peace they had signed, understood the operation as one undertaken so that the Tashkent expedition should have an action to its name, the glory of the campaign having so far gone to the other columns.

A floor laid before its purpose existed

Now the finding that governs the rest of the study, and it is a sequence rather than a motive.

Schuyler wrote his report nine years after Tashkent fell, and his verdict on what the country was worth is unambiguous. Peter the Great had gone into Central Asia expecting gold; when Tashkent was occupied there was talk of enormous mineral wealth; but the coal near Khujand cost too much to transport to be burned at Tashkent, the trade with the natives had fallen off rather than increased over eight years, and the only goods then imported from Central Asia were cotton, "very bad in quality", silk, and some fine sheepskins. It will be very long, he concluded, before Central Asia as a property will be of the slightest value to Russia, and unless the administration changes it will be very long before it even pays the expense of keeping it up. And on why it had been taken at all: "The primary objects which led to the occupation of Central Asia were rather military than financial, and so long as the province is considered

valuable from a military and political point of view, the financial burden must be borne."

That is the same sequence this collection found in East Africa, where a commissioner wrote in 1905 that he did not know why the Uganda Railway had been built and believed many others shared his ignorance — and where the answer to a debt already incurred was to plant European farmers along the line and let their agriculture generate the revenue the interior could not. The order of operations is the point. The floor came first, for frontier reasons that made sense to a war ministry. The floor then produced a bill. The bill then produced a search for something the territory could be made to yield. And the answer, when it was found, reorganised everything about the place.

In Turkestan the answer was cotton, and it arrived later than the conquest by a full generation. The leading account of the conquest is emphatic on the point: the American Civil War shortage was real but brief, Russian expansion into the region had begun some thirty years before it, at a time when Russia had no cotton textile industry worth the name, and demand for Central Asian cotton was already falling away in 1865–66. Central Asia did not become a significant source of cotton until the turn of the twentieth century, and what it did produce could readily have been bought by trade. The infrastructure that made the later monoculture possible was likewise built for the floor and not for the crop: the Transcaspian Railway was begun in 1879 and reached Samarkand by 1888, and originally served the military purpose of moving the Imperial Army against local resistance. A railway built to carry soldiers, in a province that had never balanced its books, running into a country whose only export the American consul had described as very bad cotton. What happened next is Module 6's business; what belongs here is that nobody planned it in 1865.

The floor laid a second time

The distinctive fact of this case is that the same ground was conquered twice, by two states of the same nation, within two generations — and the second state held an ideology that named the first conquest as a crime. Holding the terrain and the population constant, the two floors can be measured against each other, and the comparison is the sharpest quantitative evidence this module has.

The second conquest opened with a massacre in a city the first had left alone for a decade. In November 1917 a congress of Muslims at Kokand proclaimed

an autonomy; it was not a call for independence but for representative self-government within a reformed Russia, and it suffered the fatal weakness of controlling no armed force of its own. In February 1918 the Tashkent Soviet — a body from which Muslims were excluded — attacked, with former Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war and members of the Armenian Dashnak party fighting alongside Russian workers, soldiers and settlers. The Soviet shelled and invaded the city, the autonomy's defence collapsed, and a delegation surrendered on 22 February 1918. The death toll is contested and the range is wide: at least five thousand civilians on one account, ten thousand on another, fourteen thousand, with the city razed and the Jadid government ended seventy-eight days after its creation, on a third. A Bolshevik official's own report of 31 July 1921 described the operation as the slaughter of unarmed Muslim townspeople, and said that its effect had been to poison the working Muslims with national enmity and drive thousands of them into the interior with the insurgent bands.

The khanates the Tsar had preserved were then abolished. Khiva was taken in an operation of 1919–20 with a force given as 830 men, ending the khanate and producing the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic. Bukhara was taken between 28 August and 2 September 1920 by six to seven thousand bayonets, some two thousand three hundred to two thousand seven hundred sabres, thirty-five light guns, five heavy guns, five armoured trains and eleven aircraft, against an emirate fielding 8,725 bayonets, 7,580 sabres, twenty-three light guns and twenty-seven thousand irregulars. The emirate the Russians had left standing for fifty-two years was extinguished in five days.

What followed was not a pacified province but a decade of insurgency, and the force required to end it is the number that matters. During Enver Pasha's insurgency Soviet forces deployed approximately a hundred thousand troops under Frunze, with some estimates running to a hundred and sixty thousand or two hundred thousand; a Soviet report put Basmachi strength at twenty-six thousand fighters in May 1922, falling to six thousand seven hundred by October; and the chairman of the commission acknowledged in a report of 7 August that after four years the Bolsheviks had failed to eliminate the insurgency, which had instead spread across Samarkand, parts of Syr-Darya and the Turkmen districts. Enver Pasha, one of the three men who had governed the Ottoman Empire through the World War, was killed fighting the Red Army in eastern Bukhara in the summer of 1922.

The comparison is now available and it is stark. The Tsarist state held the whole of Turkestan with thirty-six thousand men, a number a well-informed contemporary described as more than twice what was needed. The Soviet state required something on the order of a hundred thousand — and by some estimates two to five times that again — to retake the same ground and could not finish the job in four years. Nor was this the result of the centre's enthusiasm for the region: Lenin's own instruction to Moscow on the subject of reinforcements was that the demands for personnel were exorbitant, that it was ridiculous to imagine Turkestan more important than the centre or Ukraine, that Frunze was asking too much, and that Ukraine should be captured first and Turkestan should wait and get by somehow.

There is no scholarly agreement on the total human cost of the reconquest and the study should not pretend otherwise. The largest figure in circulation — some seven hundred thousand Turkestani dead by the end of 1923 — comes from Baymirza Hayit, an émigré historian writing within a political tradition with a position on the question, and it is not corroborated by an independent count. The number is recorded here as a claim, not as a finding, and Module 11 will have to do the accounting properly.

Reading the floor against the framework

Three things the module returns, of which the first is the contribution.

The cost of a floor is set less by how hard the conquered fight than by whether anyone among them can surrender on behalf of the rest. The framework already asks, of any conquest, whether the conquered order vested authority in an office a stranger could occupy, and predicts from the answer what kind of settlement the conqueror will make. Turkestan shows that the same fact predicts the casualty count, and predicts it before the settlement is ever reached. Tashkent had an ulama who could deliver a city and did so after two days; Bukhara had an emir whose seal bound his subjects and who signed after losing one battle and one city; Khiva had a khan who could be restored to a throne and made to accept a twenty-year debt. Each of these is a conquest costing dozens or low hundreds of Russian lives and, on the other side, a defeated field army rather than a slaughtered population. Geok Tepe had twenty-five thousand people inside a mud wall, a war leader who spoke for the men who chose to follow him and for nobody else, and no office through which

a surrender could be transmitted — and it produced the largest massacre of the entire conquest. The same empire, in the same decade, with the same weapons and broadly the same doctrine, killed on two entirely different scales, and the variable was the *addressability* of the order it was conquering. This should be carried forward as a general proposition: **an order with a seizable apex is cheap to conquer and expensive to govern; an order without one is expensive to conquer and, for exactly the same reason, has to be governed by force afterwards.** The two halves are one fact, and a conqueror pays for the missing office either way.

The floor is laid before the purpose exists, and the purpose is then found to pay for the floor. This case confirms, on a completely different continent and under a completely different metropole, what the collection found in East Africa: a line of forts driven across the steppe for supply and frontier security, at a cost the province could not begin to meet, generating deficits that grew every year for at least five consecutive years, in a territory whose principal export a sympathetic foreign observer described as very bad cotton — and only afterwards, a generation later, a use for the place that could carry the bill. The corpus should now treat this as a sequence rather than a coincidence: **frontier logic builds the floor, the floor creates a debt, and the debt selects the extraction.** The consequence for method is precise, and it is the reason the popular account of this conquest has to be refused: a study that reads the later monoculture backwards into the motives of 1865 will produce a tidier story and get the causation exactly the wrong way round.

And a floor laid twice, over one terrain and one population, gives the corpus a controlled measurement it has never had. Two states of the same nation conquered the same country sixty years apart. The first, holding no doctrine about the inner lives of its subjects and content to run their courts, their tax categories and their judges with the appointment power removed, held it with thirty-six thousand soldiers and a contemporary's judgement that half would have done. The second, arriving with a doctrine that named the first conquest as imperialism and offered liberation, needed several times that force, could not finish in four years, and was told from the centre that its demands were exorbitant. The framework holds that the size of the standing force is a measure of how much of the work belief is failing to do. Here that measure exists in two readings taken from the same ground, and the second is the larger.

A note on sources. The Turkestan budget figures, troop numbers, tax schedule, camel requisition, prefect and torture cases, Khujand disturbance, Kazakh emigration from Chimkent, the Yomut punitive expedition, Krizhanovsky's "second Caucasus" remark, Chernyaev's report to the finance minister, and Schuyler's verdicts on the province's value are taken from the report of Eugene Schuyler, United States legation at St Petersburg, transmitted by Marshall Jewell on 7 March 1874 and printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* for 1874 — a public-domain government publication, quoted exactly where quoted and otherwise summarised from the printed tables. Schuyler is not a neutral witness; he was, as the covering despatch says, known to be favourably disposed to Russia, and his report is nonetheless the sharpest indictment of the Turkestan administration in the contemporary record, which is part of what makes it usable. His figures are the administration's own.

The fortress-line chronology, the fall of Ak-Mechet in 1853, the establishment of Fort Vernoe in 1854, the 1864 junction of the Orenburg and Siberian lines and the sequence of Kokandi fortresses taken, and the rejection of the cotton, Great Game and men-on-the-spot explanations for the advance, follow Alexander Morrison's *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in Imperial Expansion, 1814–1914* (2020) and his article on the search for a natural frontier, paraphrased and credited. Perovsky's failed Khivan expedition of 1839–40 and the Transcaspian Railway's dates and original military purpose follow the standard reference accounts.

Casualty figures are given as the sources give them and should be read with the asymmetry stated plainly: Russian returns record their own dead precisely and their opponents' by estimate. The Tashkent figures (1,951 attackers, 41 dead, 179 wounded) and the 1866 campaign totals are as the standard accounts give them. For Geok Tepe the figures of roughly 6,500 killed in the fortress and 8,000 in the pursuit are the most widely reproduced; totals of 14,000 to 20,000 are in circulation and the range is given rather than a single number. Skobelev's remark on slaughter and the duration of peace circulates in several wordings and is reported at second hand, principally through Edmund O'Donovan's contemporary journalism for the *London Daily News* and through later narrative histories; it is described here as reported rather than quoted as documentary, and no study should rest weight on its exact phrasing.

For the second conquest, the Khiva and Bukhara operations of 1919–20 and the orders of battle are as the standard accounts give them; the Kokand death toll is given as a range (5,000 / 10,000 / 14,000) with the divergent sources

indicated, because the range is the honest state of the evidence and the question is politically live in the successor states. Berezin's report of 31 July 1921 describing the Kokand operation, and Lenin's instruction on the priority of Turkestan against Ukraine, are quoted at second hand from the scholarly literature and should be checked against the archival originals before either is made load-bearing. The Soviet troop figure of approximately 100,000 under Frunze, and the higher estimates, are given as the sources give them and vary widely. Baymirza Hayit's figure of roughly 700,000 Turkestani dead by the end of 1923 is recorded as a claim with its author and his position named, and is not adopted.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

WHAT THE NOMAD DID NOT NEED

Module 2 · The Settlement — how one statute made two settlements fifteen articles apart, confirming the oasis cultivator in his fields while dissolving the class above him, and declaring the steppe the property of the state to be left in the herdsman's use up to the quantity a Russian statistician calculated he required; and how the same ground was settled a second time by a state whose doctrine required an exploiting class the steppe did not contain, and which produced one

Twenty years of changing almost nothing

The first thing to say about the Russian settlement in Central Asia is that for two decades there was scarcely one, and that the omission was not restraint but arithmetic.

At first the Russian administration did not interfere much with existing conditions except in matters of security and general political questions, and for two decades the old system of landownership and taxes remained almost unchanged. The reason was the state of the conqueror's books. A province running deficits that grew every year cannot afford to interrupt the only revenue stream it has, and the stream it had was the one it had captured: the *kharaj* on land and its products at a tenth of the harvest, the *zakat* at two and a half per cent on the value of imported goods and on trading capital, and, from the nomads, a household tax of two roubles seventy-five kopecks on each *kibitka*. Three of those four are the categories of Islamic fiscal law with the Russian treasury standing where the emir's had stood. A conqueror who inherits a working revenue system captures it, because capturing a stream costs nothing and building one costs a decade.

But the machine turned out to be legible only from the inside. The imperial senator Konstantin Pahlen, reviewing the administration fifty years after the conquest, recorded that Russian power had at first not been acquainted with the native revenue system and did not have the essential means to work it, and

Kaufman's difficulties with the class that operated it are on the record: he and the military commandant of the Zarafshan district struggled to understand and manage a collection system built around the *amlakdar* and carrying what appeared to be innumerable special exemptions, and suspected that all Bukharan landowners belonged to religious descent groups. The stream was captured. The men who knew where it ran were not trusted, and could not be replaced without knowing what they knew.

What follows from that impasse is the settlement, and it arrived in a single instrument.

One statute, two settlements

The Statute on the Administration of the Turkestan Krai, promulgated on 12 June 1886, is the fundamental law of the colony and remained so until the Bolsheviks. Its land provisions do two entirely different things to two populations under one cover, and the two clauses sit fifteen articles apart.

For the settled Muslim population, Article 255: their rural communities would be ascribed the land that was in their possession, usage and disposition according to their customary law. Put more bluntly, and this is how the reference literature summarises the effect, in the sedentary areas the land was proclaimed the property of those who cultivated it, "according to the custom".

For the nomadic population, Article 270: the law defined the land the nomads used as State property — *sobstvennost'* — and gave the nomads rights of usage only, that usage being regarded as communal, with only a small handful of villages along the river Arys recorded as enjoying individual use. The Steppe Statute of 25 March 1891, which governed the northern provinces, says the same thing more plainly still: its Articles 119 and 120 declare that lands occupied by nomads, and everything belonging to such lands including forests, are state property, and remain in permanent public utilisation by the nomads on the basis of custom and the norms of the present provision.

Read the grammar of the pair. Article 255 reports a fact: this land is already yours, we are writing down what custom already holds. Article 270 also reports a fact: this land is already the state's, and your use of it continues by our arrangement. Neither presents itself as a decision. Both are decisions, and they are opposite ones, and the variable sorting them is whether the population in question stayed in one place.

The settlement that bought nobody

The first of the two is the one that breaks most sharply with everything else in this collection.

Across the colonial record, the standard instrument for binding a conquered elite is a grant dressed as a confirmation: land, office and revenue conferred on the men who already stood at the top of the conquered order, in exchange for tax collection and political compliance, with the clause about armed service deleted. Britain in Buganda granted a thousand chiefs eight square miles each as the estates of which they were said to be already in possession; Lugard left the Sokoto emirs their courts and their religion and took the power to depose them; Transjordan made a paramount shaykh the largest landowner in the country in the decade his raiding was ended. In every case the point is the same: the arrangement is made irreversible by giving a class of powerful men something they will lose if it collapses.

Russia did the reverse. By vesting the land in the man who worked it, the 1886 Statute cut the ground out from under the *mulk*-holding aristocracy and the sacred lineages that had held estates and tax exemptions under the khans. The purpose was not agrarian and not humanitarian. The measure was political, intended to undermine the economic and social positions of the landed aristocracy, which as a rule was the section of the local population most hostile to the Russians.

Set that beside the corpus's standing proposition about registration statutes. The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was drafted to vest usufruct in the actual cultivator and cut out the intermediaries, and across large regions it did the opposite, because it was executed by provincial councils composed of the notables it was drafted against. The Okinawa Land Rearrangement Act of 1899 was the same instrument and it worked, because the survey was run by a bureau reporting to the Finance Minister through a governor who owed the local landholders nothing. The variable is whether the state has a local administration independent of the class the statute threatens.

Turkestan is the third reading of that proposition and it holds. The administration was military. Its officers were Russian, Christian, transferred in and out, and stood in no relation whatever — of marriage, of creed, of kinship, of debt — to the Central Asian landed families. There was nobody in the chain

of execution with an interest in the outcome the statute was designed to prevent. So the statute did what it said.

And the corpus should now record what a conquest looks like when it declines to enfeoff. It has no hinge. There is no class of native grandees whose fortunes rise and fall with the arrangement, nobody whose title comes from a register the conqueror maintains, nobody who will defend the order without being told to because the order is what makes his holding his. What Russia had instead was a payroll, and the payroll was thin.

The living wall

The native administration Russia built in place of an aristocracy was elective, short-term and unpaid by the treasury — which is to say it was designed to prevent exactly the concentration of native power that a settlement normally purchases.

Below the Russian district commandant stood the *volost* administrator and, beneath him, the *aul* elder or the town *aksakal*. Among the nomads these were chosen by the people themselves, in *auls* of one to two hundred families and *volosts* of about ten times as many, under the immediate supervision of the district prefects, who could change or remove them for failure of duty; among the settled population one *aksakal* was chosen from each considerable village, and in the cities from each ward, with the same police and administrative duties. The Steppe Statute fixed the term: volost administrators and aul foremen were elected for three years, their maintenance charged as before to the local aul communities, and they were obliged to assist the colonial administration, carry out all its instructions, keep order and ensure the full and timely collection of taxes; for diligent service they were rewarded with valuable presents, money and medals.

The courts were treated the same way: the *qazis*, judging by the Sharia, were allowed to remain in the towns, but were made elective by delegates from the population, and their importance in the eyes of the natives was much diminished.

Name the consideration and the character of the settlement becomes plain. The volost administrator owed tax collection and compliance. He owed no armed service, and he was given no armed following. But he was also given no estate, no security of tenure beyond three years, no salary from the state that

employed him, and no title that his son would inherit. He had, in short, nothing to lose if the arrangement collapsed — and, since his community paid his maintenance and his Russian superior could remove him at will, an immediate incentive to take what he could while he held the post. That is what the record shows. Morrison's study of Samarkand finds that the "living wall" of volost administrators, aksakals and qazis was supposed to have borne much of the weight of imperial rule, and that corruption seems to have been absolutely endemic in the native administration of Turkestan almost from the start — a failure he attributes to any empire stretched thin and short of colonial manpower rather than to anything peculiarly Central Asian.

It should be added, in fairness to the wall, that the Russian half of it was no better. The prefect of the Kurama district levied ninety thousand roubles of illegal taxes in a single year on a salary of two thousand four hundred, and was removed and immediately reappointed elsewhere as "a most useful officer". The order was not held up by a corrupt native class beneath an honest Russian one. It was held up by a short chain of badly paid men on both sides of the ethnic line, none of whom had been given a stake in its permanence.

What the nomad did not need

Now the second settlement, and the mechanism it made possible, which is this module's contribution to the framework.

Once Article 270 and the Steppe Statute had declared the pasture to be state property in the nomads' permanent use, the question of how much use was required became an administrative one — and therefore answerable by survey. The answer was produced by a statistical expedition. Between 1896 and 1901 the expedition under Fyodor Shcherbina studied twelve counties of the Steppe Governor-Generalship — Omsk, Petropavlovsk, Akmola, Kokchetav, Atbasar, Semipalatinsk, Pavlodar, Karkaralinsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Zaisan, Kustanai and Aktobe — completing a household census of the entire Kazakh population of those regions, assessing the area devoted to pasture for the nomadic *aul* communities, and producing a budget accounting of the food consumption of an average Kazakh family, which entailed studying terrain, soil, vegetation and water sources. The scholarship names what the exercise was for without euphemism: a statistical research programme carried out in the service of the Russian colonial project of searching for land "surpluses" for Russian settlers on

the Kazakh steppes, and the machinery it produced is known in the literature as the norm-and-surplus system.

The logic is worth stating exactly, because it is what makes the instrument new. A norm is fixed: so many desiatinas per household, calculated from a measured budget of consumption and a measured stocking rate. The land actually used is measured against the norm. Whatever exceeds the norm is *izlishki* — surplus — and a surplus, being by definition unneeded, may be transferred to the state land fund and allotted to incoming settlers without anybody having been dispossessed of anything he required. The offer to the Russian landless peasant was fifteen desiatinas per household, roughly sixteen hectares, free, in the Asiatic part of the empire.

The 1891 Steppe Statute is the enabling law, and Morrison's judgement of it is that it made greater legal provision for the expropriation of land for Russian settlement than the Turkestan Statute had. The administrative apparatus followed: the Resettlement Administration from 1896, the Trans-Aral railway from Orenburg to Tashkent completed in 1906, and a movement of people that changed the composition of the northern steppe within a generation. Russians were about twelve per cent of the steppe's population in the 1897 census, some six hundred thousand people; by 1911 they were forty per cent.

The quantities of land are contested and the study should not pretend to a single figure. For Semirechye alone the estimates run from over a million desiatinas of steppe and meadow expropriated from Kyrgyz and Kazakh clans between 1886 and 1912, reducing available grazing by up to half in affected districts to two and a half million desiatinas taken from the Kazakhs in the account of a Kazakh institutional history. Totals for the whole steppe circulate in the range of ten million desiatinas by the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century, and that figure should be treated as an order of magnitude rather than a count.

The failure mode of the instrument was designed into it, and the framework should note it precisely. The norm measures a household's need in acreage; the pastoral economy's actual requirement is not acreage but a *sequence* — winter shelter, spring grass, summer high pasture, autumn return — in which the scarce component may be a very small piece of ground available in one season only. A survey that finds a household using more total land than the norm allows, and removes the excess, may take the one component the circuit cannot run without, while the arithmetic on the page shows a surplus removed and a

sufficiency preserved. It did not help that the statisticians could not find the units they were measuring: the expedition applied the category of the "commune", borrowed from Russian peasant budget studies, to Kazakh land tenure, and in fact could not identify commune boundaries among the nomads at all, those boundaries being highly conditional.

And there is a second failure, of a kind this framework watches for, which is that the instrument was widely bypassed. Krivoshein, the Minister of Agriculture, toured Turkestan in 1912 and estimated that against six and a half thousand households properly settled and allotted land there were a further eight thousand which had not been, concluding that most colonisation was the work of *samovol'tsy* — squatters — rather than of the Resettlement Administration. The norm was a rationing device that arrived after the queue had formed.

The endowments

One further category had to be dealt with, and it is the one that mattered most to the interpreter class the conquest had left in place. The waqf sector — land, shops, caravanserais and bakehouses endowed in perpetuity to mosques and colleges — was the financial base of the entire religious establishment, and the 1886 Statute addressed it in a run of articles.

The record here is genuinely divided and the study should say so. One standard reference states flatly that the waqfs were not touched. Against this, work on the Samarkand madrasas argues that the authorities deliberately distanced the waqf courts from direct administration of their incomes, introduced tax rules inconsistent with the expressed will of the founding deeds, expropriated waqf documentation, and diverted revenues from madrasas, caravanserais and other endowed properties to the state treasury. Both may be describing the same policy from different ends: the endowments were not confiscated, and the administration took control of their paperwork, their tax status and their income streams. The distinction between abolishing an institution and taking over its accounts is exactly the distinction this framework exists to notice.

What Article 265 did to the populated endowment land is a matter of record, and it has a remarkable afterlife. The Statute provided that populated land forming part of waqf and recognised by the government should remain in

the use of the agricultural communities on the basis of the ordinary land-use articles of the Statute — which converts a religious endowment, at a stroke, into ordinary peasant tenure. Thirty-six years later, on 10 June 1922, a Soviet decree distributing agricultural waqf land provided that the right of use to all waqf land of agricultural interest was granted to the *dehqan*, all matters pertaining to it to be regulated by the laws of Soviet power on land use. The scholarship that set the two texts side by side concludes that Article 3 of the Soviet decree is clearly derived from Article 265 of the 1886 Statute. The revolutionary government redistributing the endowments of a religion it proposed to abolish was reading from the tsarist statute book.

The settlement that was not made

Finally, the largest exception, and structurally the cheapest arrangement in the whole conquest: in Bukhara and Khiva, Russia made no settlement at all.

The emir and the khan kept everything — their land, their taxes, their courts, their clergy, their prisons. What Russia took was commercial: the treaty with Khiva of 24 August 1873 reduced the khanate to vassalage, ceded the whole delta and right bank of the Oxus to Russia, closed the river to all but Russian and Khivan vessels, gave Russian merchants freedom of trade with liberty to buy and hold property, and imposed an indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles payable over twenty years against an annual revenue reckoned at 400,000. The Bukharan arrangement of 1868, renewed after 1873, was of the same kind, adding the abolition of the slave trade — an article whose enforcement Schuyler tested in the bazaar and found wanting.

The framework's proposition is that preserving the conquered order's property law is the cheapest form of extraction, because the machine one inherits is already collecting. In the protectorates the proposition holds in its purest available form: no survey, no register, no norm, no statute, no native administration to build and pay for — and, because the *kharaj* went on being collected by the emir's *amlakdars* into the emir's treasury, no Russian revenue either. What Russia bought with a five-day campaign in 1868 and one summer in 1873 was a frontier it did not have to police and a market it did not have to administer. What it did not buy was money. That the protectorates were left standing for over fifty years while Kokand was abolished outright in 1876 is a fact Module 8 will have to explain, because on the evidence of this module the

difference is not in the instruments — it is that Bukhara and Khiva had rulers who signed and stayed signed, and Kokand had a khan the Russians watched lose control of his own countryside.

The category that had to exist

The Tsar's settlement is only half of this module, because the same ground was settled a second time, by a state working from a text rather than from a survey — and the second settlement is where the study's doctrinal argument and its worst arithmetic turn out to be the same thing.

The doctrine specified what a countryside contains. It contains a peasantry, and above the peasantry a rural exploiting class living off the labour of others, and the prescribed operation is to expropriate the second on behalf of the first. That description had been arrived at from an observed European record and it fitted a great deal of Russia. It did not fit the steppe at all. There was no landed proprietor because there was no land tenure to be proprietor of; there was no peasantry because there was no cultivation; the wealth was in animals and the animals moved. State surveyors sent out to make the steppe plannable reported the difficulty in plain terms: they could find no form of land ownership to measure and no standard herd size to record.

A doctrine held as a working hypothesis meets that finding by narrowing its claim. A doctrine held as a demonstrated law cannot, because the law's authority is its universality — so if the terrain does not display the classes, the terrain is at fault and must be corrected.

Both classes were accordingly produced.

The exploiting class was produced first, and it was produced by naming. Filipp Goloshchekin, appointed to run Kazakhstan in 1925, held that the October Revolution had never reached the Kazakh *aul* at all, and launched what he called the Little October to bring it there — a revolution declared to be missing and therefore staged. From 1928 the campaign confiscated the livestock of the richer herders, the *bais*, and deported them; the figure in circulation is that more than ten thousand *bai* households were removed. The mechanism by which the class was filled is the part that repays attention, and it is recorded without embarrassment in the literature: the confiscation was carried out by Kazakhs against other Kazakhs, and it was left to those Kazakhs to decide who was a *bai* and how much to take from him. The category came down from

above with the operation attached; the membership was settled locally, by people under instruction to find some.

Then the peasantry was produced, because the sequence required one. Sedentarisation was decreed and it was decreed to be quick. The specialists in the republic's own agricultural commissariat who said that pastoral nomadism was the most productive use of an arid steppe, and that abolishing it would produce economic catastrophe and perhaps depopulation, were not answered. They were reclassified — denounced as capitalists and bourgeois nationalists and purged from the party — which is the operation this study will meet twice more, in the annulled census of 1937 and in the charge sheet against Fayzulla Khojaev, and which is one operation and not three.

What followed is counted in Module 11 and belongs there: a herd of some forty million head destroyed for the second time in a decade, a famine of between 1.3 and 2.3 million dead, and the Kazakh share of the republic's own population falling from around sixty per cent to around thirty-eight. What belongs here is only the instrument. Nobody set out to kill the animals. The animals died because the arrangement that kept them alive was a seasonal circuit, and a circuit cannot be settled — and the settling was not a policy about animals at all. It was the manufacture of a social category the doctrine required to be there.

Reading the settlement against the framework

Four findings, of which the first and the last are additions to the card.

A fourth settlement fiction: the norm and the surplus. The corpus has catalogued three. *Vacancy* declares occupied land empty, and does the work of dispossession where the conqueror wants ground and has settlers to seat on it. *Recognition* declares un-owned land long-owned, and does the work of binding an elite. *Divisibility* declares a collective holding partible into individual shares, and does the work of manufacturing a market where none existed. The Kazakh steppe required a fourth, because none of the three would run. Vacancy was unavailable: the land was visibly in use by a population the state had been counting and taxing for a century. Divisibility was unavailable: the use was mobile and seasonal, so there was nothing to partition into saleable parcels and no willing seller to manufacture. Recognition was pointless: there was no native

landed class to bind, the Chinggisid aristocracy having been legislated out of office between 1822 and 1848.

So the instrument built instead does something the other three do not: **it concedes the occupation in full, and then quantifies it.** The land is admitted to be the nomads' and is granted to them in permanent use; a norm of need is then fixed by survey; and the difference between the use and the norm is declared a surplus and taken. Its job is *dispossession without denial of occupation*, and its warrant is neither Lockean improvement nor customary right but **measurement** — which is why its instrument is not a title deed or a proclamation but a statistical expedition, and why its executants are not soldiers or settlers but men with household budget forms. This should go on the card as a named family, because its preconditions are legible in advance and recur: a conqueror who wants the ground, has settlers for it, and faces a population whose occupation is visible, mobile and quantifiable will reach for a norm. And the framework should carry its characteristic failure with it, since that failure is structural rather than incidental: **a norm measures a stock and a pastoral economy runs on a sequence,** so the arithmetic can show a sufficiency preserved at the exact moment the one indispensable link has been removed.

The registration variable holds at a third reading, and the settlement's template was domestic. Whether a land statute makes cultivators owners or notables landlords depends on whether the state has a local administration independent of the class the statute threatens; Turkestan's administration was military, foreign and entirely disinterested, and the statute accordingly did what it said. But the case adds something to the proposition. Russia had performed this operation before, on itself, twenty-five years earlier and against its own nobility: the emancipation of 1861 had vested land in peasant communes over the objections of the landowning class, and the officers and officials who wrote and executed the Turkestan Statute were formed inside that programme. The corpus should therefore ask, of any colonial settlement, **what the metropole had most recently done at home**, because the instrument a conqueror reaches for abroad is frequently the one lying nearest on his own desk. It is the field of the visible operating at the level of a state's legislative memory.

And a conquest that enfeoffs nobody has to be manned rather than hinged. The collection's Kenyan finding was that a settlement which buys an elite is a hinge and a settlement which buys nobody is a wall, and that walls have to be manned forever from outside. Turkestan is that finding with a twist,

because Russia did not fail to find an elite to buy — it found one, identified it correctly as the section of the population most hostile to it, and destroyed its economic base on purpose. What it put in its place was a wall built out of elected men on three-year terms, paid by the communities they administered, removable at a Russian officer's discretion, holding no property from the state and passing nothing to their sons. The prediction the framework should now make from this configuration is exact, and the record bears it: such a wall will be endemically corrupt from the first year, because it has been given every incentive to extract and none to endure. A settlement's stability is not bought by the size of the grant. It is bought by giving somebody something he would lose. Russia gave the Central Asian cultivator his field, gave the Central Asian notable nothing, and then wondered why its native administration could not be trusted with the collection.

A fifth settlement fiction: the manufactured category. The four already on the card all declare something about ground. Vacancy says the land is empty; recognition says the grantee already owned it; divisibility says the collective holding was always partible; the norm and the surplus says the occupation is real and quantifiable and this much of it is spare. The successor state needed none of them, because it was not distributing land to settlers. It needed something else, and it built it: a declaration that a required social class exists, so that the operation the doctrine prescribes for that class can be performed.

The family should be named and carried, because its preconditions are legible in advance and it recurs wherever a governing theory arrives with a sequence the ground does not display. Three properties distinguish it from the other four and all three matter. It attaches to a *person* rather than to a parcel, which means it can be revoked, applied retroactively and inherited by children. It is *filled locally under a quota set centrally*, so that the men doing the classifying are not exercising judgement about their neighbours but discharging an obligation to produce a quantity — which is why the class can never run short, a shortfall being read as a failure of the classifiers rather than as evidence that the class was smaller than the doctrine said. And it converts, exactly as the other four do, a decision about people into a fact about the object of the operation: vacancy says the land is empty, and this says *this man is a bai*. Once the entry exists, everything downstream is administration and can be done by clerks who need decide nothing.

The Kazakh case then supplies the property that makes it the most destructive of the five. The other four fictions are false about a thing that continues to exist regardless — the land is not empty, but it is still there. This one is false about a *relation*, and the operation prescribed for it destroys the relation. Sedentarising a nomad to make him the peasant the sequence requires does not misdescribe a herding circuit; it stops it. The fiction and the catastrophe are not cause and consequence at two removes. They are the same act.

A note on sources. The operative clauses are cited as the scholarly literature reproduces them, and the study has not seen the printed statute directly: the Statute on the Administration of the Turkestan Krai of 12 June 1886 (Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov, 3rd series, vol. 6, no. 3814), Article 255 on the ascription of land to settled rural communities according to customary law, Article 270 on nomad land as state property held in communal use, and Article 265 on populated waqf land, are quoted from Beatrice Penati's and Paolo Sartori's published work and from the documentary collection edited by Masevich; the Steppe Statute of 25 March 1891 (PSZ 3rd series, vol. 11, no. 7574), Articles 11, 12, 119 and 120, is quoted from a published summary of the statute's contents. Anyone building further on these articles should read them in the printed original, and the Russian text should be given alongside any translation.

Eugene Schuyler's report of 7 March 1874, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* for 1874, is public-domain government material and supplies the tax schedule retained after the conquest, the structure of the elected native administration under the 1867 provisional regulations, the Kurama prefect, the alteration of the qazis to elective office, and the terms of the Khivan treaty of 24 August 1873.

The characterisation of the 1886 land measure as aimed at the landed aristocracy is from the *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, which also states that the waqfs were not touched; the contrary account of waqf revenues diverted to the treasury is from recent Uzbek scholarship on the Samarkand madrasas, and the two are set side by side here rather than reconciled, because the record does not yet permit reconciliation. The derivation of the Soviet waqf decree of 10 June 1922 from Article 265 is Paolo Sartori's and Beatrice Penati's, paraphrased and credited.

The Shcherbina expedition's dates, counties, methods and purpose, and the "norm-and-surplus" terminology, follow Ian W. Campbell's work and the survey literature. Land-transfer figures are given as ranges with their sources named

because they diverge widely and are politically live in Kazakhstan and in Russia: the Semirechye figures of "over one million" and "two and a half million" desiatinas come from different traditions and are not reconciled here, and the ten-million-desiatina total for the steppe is given as an order of magnitude only. Settler population shares are from Demko's study as summarised in the recent literature. Morrison's findings on the "living wall" and on the expropriative character of the 1891 statute are paraphrased and credited from *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910* and from his chapter on Russian settler colonialism. Krivoshein's 1912 estimate of settled against unsettled households is quoted at second hand from Morrison and should be checked against the original report before it carries further weight.

The material on the second settlement follows the collectivisation literature, paraphrased and credited, and is treated here for its mechanism only; the mortality and the dispute over its characterisation belong to Module 11 and are given there. Goloshchekin's appointment in 1925, his claim that the October Revolution had not reached the Kazakh *aul*, and the Little October campaign follow Sarah Cameron's work as summarised in the reviews and in the recent survey literature. The account of the 1928 confiscation — that it was carried out by Kazakhs against other Kazakhs, and that it was left to them to decide who was a *bai* and how much to take — and the figure of more than ten thousand *bai* households deported are from the reference literature on Soviet collectivisation and should be checked against Cameron's text before either is made load-bearing. The surveyors' difficulty in finding a form of land ownership to measure or a standard herd size to record, and the denunciation of the agricultural specialists who opposed sedentarisation as capitalists and bourgeois nationalists, follow Cameron and Kindler as reported in the published review literature. This study has not read Cameron, Kindler or Ohayon in the original and says so here as it does elsewhere.

ABOVE THE NAME OF THE CALIPH HIMSELF

Module 3 · The Robe — an empire that spent nothing to justify itself to the people it had conquered, addressed everything it said about them to Europe and to its own readers, and was replaced in 1917 by a state whose founding doctrine required the conquered to be seen consenting — and which therefore had to pay

The audience test, answered by an absence

Begin with the sharpest diagnostic available and let it do its work, because in this case it returns an unusually clean result.

Force never pays for what it does not need. An apex that already holds uncontested violence and *still* spends real money, or forgoes real revenue, or performs a costly and avoidable act in order to be thought rightful, has thereby revealed that some audience's belief was genuinely load-bearing. And the converse holds equally: where an apex secures the floor and then spends nothing further toward a population, that absence is itself the finding.

Russian Turkestan is the corpus's cleanest instance of the second case. The administration built no mosque, endowed no shrine, appointed no mufti, published no catechism, patronised no clergy, sponsored no mission, and — as the budget shows — put twelve thousand six hundred roubles into schools in a year when it spent three million on the army. It made no claim to Muslims that Muslims were expected to honour. The one thing it did with the religion of five million subjects was to remove the machinery that had enforced it, and the effect is recorded by a foreign observer with no interest in the point.

Nothing was done against the free exercise of Islam, Schuyler reported, except that the dervishes were generally forbidden the cities as disturbers of the peace; no efforts were made to spread Christianity, and Kaufman had speedily put down all missionary projects. The consequence, he wrote, was that Islam had grown weaker rather than stronger — because the natives had not been

driven to attach themselves to their religion by seeing it forbidden, and because the abolition of the native functionaries who had compelled the performance of the regular rites and attendance at the mosques had let indifference and carelessness creep in. And then the detail that makes the point unanswerable: the clergy saw the danger, and on one or two occasions appealed to the Russian authorities to prohibit practices they held contrary to the Koran — and the Russians, with much good sense, refused to interfere.

An interpreter class asking the conqueror to be its enforcer, and being turned down. That is what it looks like when a conquering power decides that the belief of the conquered is not its business, because the floor is doing the work and the ledger says the floor is cheaper than a robe.

So the question this module has to answer is not what Russia told Central Asians. It is what Russia said about Central Asians, and to whom.

What was said to Europe

The first audience was the European chancelleries, and the address is explicit in the founding document.

Gorchakov's circular despatch of 21 November 1864 — 3 December by the Western calendar — was sent to Russia's representatives at foreign courts, written in French, and framed by analogy. Its opening proposition is that the position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilised states brought into contact with half-savage nomad populations possessing no fixed social organisation, and it then names the company: the United States in America, France in Algeria, Holland in her colonies, England in India — all forced by imperious necessity into this onward march, where the greatest difficulty is to know where to stop. It also announced a limit, declaring that Chimkent "fixed for the Russians with geographical precision the limit up to which they were bound to advance, and at which they must halt".

Read the argument's structure, because it is not the ordinary civilising claim. It does not say that Russia is bringing anything to Central Asia. It says that Russia is doing what civilised states do, that four named Western powers are doing the same thing at the same moment, and that none of them can help it. The proposition being advanced is about *Russia's membership of a category*, and the people described as possessing no fixed social organisation — a description applied, among others, to a society of endowment registries, sharia courts and

chartered colleges — are not the subject of the sentence but its evidence. This is a claim to be recognised as European, made to Europeans, using Central Asia as the proof.

The same audience is visible in what the conquest paid for when it did not have to. The article abolishing the slave trade in the Bukharan treaty was inserted after a foreign diplomat had embarrassed the administration by buying a slave in the bazaar; the Khivan treaty freed the Persian captives; and the whole Central Asian advance was conducted, on the record of the correspondence, under constant anxiety about London. Schuyler put the constraint plainly: there was a strong objection in the foreign office to taking steps of any kind in Central Asia lest a difficulty with England arise, so that the governor-general could not always act as he thought the situation required; Russia, apparently, did not feel herself strong enough to take her own course without regard to what England might say or think. That is a real, avoidable, costly restraint accepted for the sake of an audience's opinion, and by the revealed-preference test it identifies which opinion mattered.

What was said to Russians

The second audience was at home, and the clearest statement of what the conquest meant to it was written in the month Geok Tepe fell.

Dostoevsky's essay "Geok-Tepe: What Is Asia to Us?" appeared in the January 1881 issue of *A Writer's Diary*, the last he lived to publish. It opens on the victory — Geok Tepe is taken, the Turkomans are defeated, society and the press are jubilant — and it argues that Asia is Russia's future because Europe will never accept her. Its most quoted lines are these: "The name of the White Tsar must soar above the khans and emirs, above the Empress of India, above the name of the Caliph himself... In our future destinies Asia is, perhaps, our main outlet... In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas we shall go to Asia as masters." And "In Europe we were Tatars, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans." He adds an instruction about how the argument is to be held: that Russians must banish the servile fear of being called Asiatic barbarians in Europe, and of being said to be more Asian than European.

Two things about this are worth extracting. The first is that every clause of it is about Russia. The Turkmen appear as the occasion; the khans, emirs, the Empress of India and the Caliph appear as competitors for precedence; and the

emotional content — humiliation in Europe, mastery in Asia — belongs entirely to the writer's countrymen. A conquest is being offered to a metropolitan readership as compensation for a wound the metropole received elsewhere. That is the reversed robe of the colonial pattern in almost undisguised form.

The second is the currency he reaches for. The White Tsar — *belyi tsar'* — is not a Russian invention. The term appears to date from the time of the Golden Horde, was used occasionally in Muscovite diplomatic correspondence, fell out of use, and was thereafter employed in relation to Asian nationalities in order to legitimate Russia's claims to dominion over the East, appearing frequently in Russian writings on Inner and Eastern Asia toward the end of the nineteenth century. It is, in other words, a piece of Chinggisid vocabulary picked up off the floor of a former conquest — precisely the cheap kind of robe the framework predicts a conqueror will reach for, a claim the conquered had already written for somebody else.

But it did not work in Turkestan, and the reason is the sharpest thing in this module. The White Tsar was a claim on the Chinggisid currency, and the Chinggisid currency was not available. On the steppe it had been the sole criterion of supreme legitimacy for six centuries — and the Russian state had itself abolished the offices that carried it, between 1822 and 1848, by statute, replacing khans with appointed sultans and districts. In the oasis it had already lapsed before the Russians arrived: the Manghits could not claim Chinggisid descent, so in 1785 they had exchanged that currency for the caliphal one and ruled as commanders of the faithful. By 1865 there was no living institution in Central Asia through which a claim of Chinggisid succession could have been transmitted, and Russia had destroyed half of it herself. So the White Tsar remained what Dostoevsky's usage shows it to be — a phrase in Russian print, for Russian readers, about how Russians should feel.

Ignoring Islam was a prediction, not a courtesy

It is tempting to read Kaufman's refusal to touch the religion of his subjects as liberal restraint, and Schuyler, who was well disposed, read it that way. The administrative record does not support the reading, and the actual reasoning matters because it is the module's clearest instance of a doctrine held in a particular way.

The policy has a name in the literature, *ignorirovanie* — official non-interference. Its purpose was not neutrality. Von Kaufman did not want to administer Islam but to eliminate the threat it represented; he was convinced that once the state's support was taken away, Islamic institutions would collapse and be replaced by a more advanced civilisation, that of Orthodox Christianity. On that reasoning he walled the region off from the one Muslim institution the empire already controlled: from 4 March 1880 the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly was officially forbidden to extend its influence into the governor-generalship.

Set that beside the fact established earlier in this study and the shape becomes clear. The same empire had founded the Orenburg Assembly in 1788, licensed its mullahs, paid for its mosques and despatched its clergy to the Kazakh hordes as a frontier instrument. Ninety-two years later it barred that instrument from its newest Muslim province, on a theory that unsupported Islam would wither. Two policies, opposite in every particular, both adopted for the same purpose, by the same state, toward the same religion.

And non-interference was never as complete as the name implies. The administration did not abolish the endowments; it audited them. In Turkestan, unlike the Volga-Urals, the colonial state intervened directly in Muslim charitable life: it recognised only those *waqfs* bearing a khan's stamp, thereby invalidating numerous local endowments. That is worth pausing on as an instrument. Nothing is confiscated, no institution is closed, no doctrine is condemned; a documentary standard is set, and every endowment whose deed cannot meet it ceases to exist as a matter of record. The elaboration is the measure of the constraint: an administration answerable to a metropole that governs by law cannot suppress a religious foundation, but it can decline to recognise a document.

The prediction fails, and the policy changes

Kaufman's theory was a claim about what would happen, and it was tested.

In May 1898 a Sufi *ishan* named Muhammad Ali of Mingtepa led several hundred followers in an attack on the Russian garrison at Andijan in the Ferghana valley. It was militarily trivial and politically enormous, because it was precisely what the policy had said could not occur: an Islamic mobilisation, led by a religious authority, thirty years after the state had withdrawn its support

from Islam and confidently predicted its decay. The administrative consequence is on the record. After the Andijan uprising of 1898 the policy of non-interference in Islamic legal matters was felt to be too permissive and was therefore abandoned; the new interest in Islamic courts and jurisprudence that followed led to stricter monitoring of the sentences handed down and to attempts to codify Islamic law.

Record that operation exactly, because the study will need it later. A governing doctrine made a prediction; the world falsified the prediction; and the administration read the failure as evidence about the doctrine and changed the policy. The revision was late, grudging, and — the same scholarship notes — came too late to significantly influence how the Islamic courts were administered. It was nonetheless a revision, of the kind that is performed by an order which holds its governing claims as generalisations answerable to experience.

The robe inverts

Then, in a single generation, everything above was replaced by its opposite.

On 20 November 1917 — 3 December, new style — the Council of People's Commissars issued an appeal to the Muslims of Russia and the East, published in *Izvestiia* on 7 December, signed by Lenin as chairman of the Council and by Stalin as commissar for nationality affairs. Its address names the populations of this study directly: "Moslems of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of Trans-Caucasia, Chechens and mountain Cossacks! All you, whose mosques and shrines have been destroyed, whose faith and customs have been violated by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia!" And its promise is unconditional: "Henceforward your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are declared free and inviolable! Build your national life freely and without hindrance. It is your right." The same document renounced the secret treaties on Constantinople and declared that the city must remain in Muslim hands.

Three years later the claim was made at scale and in the conquered's own religious vocabulary. The Congress of the Peoples of the East met at Baku from 1 to 8 September 1920, with about 2,050 participants drawn from thirty-seven mostly Asian and Muslim peoples, and its presiding officer put the summons in terms nobody could mistake: the Communist International, Zinoviev told

them, turns today to the peoples of the East and summons them to a holy war, in the first place against British imperialism — at which the delegates rose, brandished their weapons, and shouted for so long that the speaker could not continue. The congress's closing statement called on the peoples of the East to go forward as one in a holy war against the British conquerors, to end the division of humanity into oppressor peoples and oppressed peoples, and to achieve complete equality of all peoples and races whatever their language, colour or religion. The translation practice is itself the finding: for the Middle Eastern delegations the term "class struggle" was rendered by the word *jihad*, and the old law of the Prophet on the common ownership of land was invoked to help Muslim delegates understand Marxism in their own traditions.

This is a legitimating claim cut, deliberately and expensively, for the conquered. Nothing else in this collection looks like it. And its content is the exact negation of Gorchakov's: not *we are what civilised states are when they meet half-savages*, but *the civilised states are robbers and you and we together will destroy them*.

What the new doctrine made unsayable

Now the arithmetic, laid beside the words in the order the study has used throughout.

The Appeal of December 1917 declares the beliefs, customs and cultural institutions of the Sarts of Turkestan free and inviolable, and promises the protection of the revolution. In Turkestan at that moment the organ of Soviet power was the Tashkent Soviet, a body from which the Muslim majority was excluded from leadership as a matter of policy, and which fourteen weeks later attacked the autonomous government the Muslims had constituted at Kokand — shelling and invading the city, whose disorganised defence collapsed, with a delegation surrendering on 22 February 1918 — killing, on the divergent estimates in circulation, between five and fourteen thousand people. Three months after the promise of inviolability, the largest single massacre of civilians in the region's modern history was carried out by the government that had made it.

The gap is the ordinary colonial seam, and this study has measured it before. What is new is where it runs. Under the Tsar the distance was geographic and it was managed by distance: what Gorchakov wrote in French for the chancelleries

and what a district prefect did at Kurama were separated by four thousand miles and two languages, and the officer who wrote the truth about Khujand to St Petersburg was removed from the province for it. Under the new order the distance runs through a single doctrine, because the doctrine has declared colonialism abolished and cannot therefore describe its own periphery as a colony — which means that every fact answering to the description becomes, by the doctrine's own logic, something other than what it is.

The mechanism is visible at once, in the first Bolshevik operation in the region. In February 1918 Kolesov, chairman of the Turkestan government, arrived at Bukhara with five hundred Red Guards on the strength of Fayzulla Khojaev's promise of a mass popular rising against the emir — and found the promise was a bluff. He had to retreat, and Bukhara was left alone for more than two years. A theory had said that the toiling masses of Bukhara would rise against their oppressor when given the opportunity. They did not rise. The conclusion drawn was not that the theory had been wrong about Bukhara, and the search that followed was for the reason the masses had failed to appear.

Set that operation beside the one performed after Andijan twenty years earlier and the difference is not in the sincerity of the men involved, which is unrecoverable in both cases, nor in the brutality, of which both administrations had a sufficiency. It is in what each was structurally able to do with a failed prediction. The tsarist administration could conclude that Islam had not withered and change the policy, because *ignorirovanie* was a working hypothesis about a religion, held by officials who were not required to believe anything in particular. The new administration could not conclude that the masses were not what the doctrine said they were, because the doctrine was not a hypothesis about the masses; it was the ground of the regime's right to govern them.

Reading the robe against the framework

Three findings, of which the first revises the card.

A colonial robe can be cut for the conquered — and the condition under which it is has now been identified. The corpus's standing proposition is that the colonial robe is addressed away from the ruled and toward the metropole whose belief funds and mans the conquest, because the ruled are held by the floor and their belief is not needed. Turkestan supplies both the strongest confirmation of that proposition in the collection and its first clear exception,

sixty years apart, on the same ground. Under the Tsar nothing whatever was spent on the conquered's belief: no mosque, no mufti, no mission, no catechism, and a schools line one two-hundred-and-fortieth the size of the army's. Under the Bolsheviks an enormous sum was spent on exactly that, in the conquered's own language and religious idiom, at Baku and afterwards. The variable is not decency and not ideology in the loose sense. It is this: **the conquered become a load-bearing audience when the metropole's own legitimating claim requires them to be seen consenting.** A regime that rules by the proposition that it has liberated the oppressed nationalities must produce visibly liberated nationalities, and the audience for that production is at home and abroad — but the performance requires the conquered themselves to appear in it, and appearing costs money. This is not a refutation of the reversed robe. It is the reversed robe running one turn deeper: the conquered are addressed because the metropole needs to watch them being addressed.

The revealed-preference test reads at both ends, and the null result is as informative as the positive one. The framework already holds that an apex which secures total force and spends nothing further toward a population has thereby established that the population required no further currency. Turkestan is that case in near-laboratory form — and it supplies, in Schuyler's despatch, the rare confirmation of what happens next: the belief holding the population quiet was the *old* one, and, deprived of the enforcement machinery the khans had provided, it weakened. A conqueror who spends nothing on belief does not thereby get a population that believes nothing; he gets one held by a belief he did not build, does not control, and cannot repair — which is exactly the position the administration found itself in at Andijan, and exactly why the policy was abandoned there.

And a conqueror can destroy the currency he will later need. The cheapest robe available is one the conquered already wrote for an earlier conqueror, and Russia had one within reach: the White Tsar, a phrase out of the Golden Horde, a claim on the Chinggisid succession that had been the sole criterion of supreme authority across the steppe for six hundred years. It was unusable by 1865, and it was unusable for two reasons that this study has already established. In the oasis the Manghits had abandoned that currency in 1785 because they could not claim it, substituting the caliphal title — so the office through which a Chinggisid claim could have been honoured no longer existed there. On the steppe the office still existed in 1822, and the Russian state

abolished it, by the Speransky statute and its successors, replacing khans with appointed sultans and *volosts* over the following quarter-century. When Dostoevsky in 1881 called for the name of the White Tsar to soar above the khans and emirs, there had been no khans on the Kazakh steppe for thirty-three years, because Russia had legislated them away. **A state that dismantles the institution carrying a legitimating currency has spent that currency permanently, and no later rhetoric can redeem it** — which the corpus should hold alongside the finding that an assumed chair hollows from the day a stranger sits in it. Here there was no chair to assume, because the same conqueror had removed it forty years before he wanted one.

A note on sources. Gorchakov's circular despatch of 21 November 1864 (3 December, New Style) is public-domain primary material, quoted from the renderings reproduced in the House of Commons debate of 22 April 1873 and in the standard scholarly citations; the wording varies slightly between the French original and the English versions in circulation, and a study resting further weight on it should specify its text. The Council of People's Commissars' appeal to the Muslims of Russia and the East, dated 20 November (3 December) 1917 and published in *Izvestiia* no. 232 of 7 December 1917 over the signatures of Lenin and Stalin, is quoted from the public-domain English text as reproduced on Wikisource and in the Seventeen Moments in Soviet History collection, which agree on the passages used; several other renderings in circulation differ in small particulars.

Dostoevsky's "Geok-Tepe: What Is Asia to Us?" appeared in *A Writer's Diary* for January 1881, his last issue before his death on 9 February; the passages quoted are given as they appear in the standard English renderings and are reproduced consistently across independent sources, but they are translations of a translated text and the Russian should be consulted before any weight is put on their exact phrasing. One source encountered in research dates the essay to 1876; that is an error, as its subject is the storming of Geok Tepe on 12 January 1881.

Zinoviev's summons at the Congress of the Peoples of the East, Baku, 1–8 September 1920, and the congress's closing statement, are quoted briefly from the published stenographic report in Brian Pearce's translation and from the summaries of it in the recent literature; the translation is copyrighted and the quotation here is kept to the minimum the argument requires. The rendering of "class struggle" as *jihad* for the Middle Eastern delegations is reported in the secondary literature and should be checked against the stenographic record before it is made load-bearing.

Kaufman's *ignorirovanie* policy, his stated conviction that Islamic institutions would collapse once state support was withdrawn, the prohibition of 4 March 1880 barring the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly from Turkestan, and the abandonment of non-interference after the Andijan rising of 1898, follow Paolo Sartori's survey of tsarist policy on the Islamic courts, paraphrased and credited. The recognition of only those *waqfs* bearing a khan's stamp is from the recent historiographical survey of Islamic law under Russian rule and resolves, in part, the divergence recorded in the previous module between accounts holding that the endowments were untouched and accounts holding that their revenues were diverted. The provenance of the "White Tsar" formula follows Marlène Laruelle's study, which locates its main late-imperial deployment in the Far East and Inner Asia rather than in Turkestan; the application of the argument to Turkestan is this study's, and rests on Dostoevsky's own usage.

Eugene Schuyler's report of 7 March 1874, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* for 1874, is public-domain government material and supplies the account of religious policy, the clergy's petition and its refusal, and the constraint imposed on the governor-general by anxiety about London. Schuyler was, as the covering despatch states, known to be favourably disposed to Russia, and his reading of the religious policy as creditable restraint should be weighed against the administrative record of its purpose. The Kokand death toll is again given as the range the sources give (five to fourteen thousand) rather than as a figure. Kolesov's failed expedition to Bukhara in February 1918 is drawn from the secondary literature and the underlying archival citation has not been checked.

MODULE FOUR

THE WORD THEY CHOSE WAS ASSAULT

Module 4 · Formation — an empire that forbade a printing press and built almost no schools, leaving the old order to form every child in the country; and the state that replaced it, which formed them at enormous expense, changed their alphabet twice in twelve years, attacked their households through their wives, and then shot the men it had made

The press that was forbidden

However reaches a child first sets his first framework, and in Russian Turkestan the state did not try to reach him at all.

The scale of the omission is on the record in the same despatch that carried the budget. As far as education was concerned, Schuyler wrote in 1874, the Russians had done almost nothing: a small school had been opened at Samarkand through the efforts of a city commandant who was himself a Muslim, but neither in Tashkent nor in any other town of the Syr-Darya province, apart from two small Kazakh schools at Perovsk and Kazalinsk, did such a school exist — nor, indeed, a school of any kind. There had been proposals to introduce Russian and modern subjects into some of the *madrasas*, viewed on the whole with favour by the authorities, but the matter had been neglected for want of initiative. The consequence he drew was administrative: the officials arriving in the country knew nothing of it, so the administration was obliged to use as interpreters either natives who barely understood Russian, or Cossacks with a rough knowledge of the local languages, or Tatars — a badness of interpretation that caused not only confusion in dealings with the natives but some ridiculous and even critical mistakes.

And then the single most revealing act in the whole tsarist half of this module. The authorities of Samarkand arranged to buy a lithographic press, in order to make books in the native languages cheaper and so gradually spread

enlightenment; this was viewed with disfavour by General Kaufman and absolutely forbidden.

Set that against the year's accounts — twelve thousand six hundred roubles for schools against three million for the army and thirty thousand for the governor-general's house and garden — and the shape of the tsarist formation policy is complete. It was not a programme with insufficient funds. It was a decision not to have one, taken by a man who had also decided that the existing religion would collapse if left alone, and who therefore had no use for either a school or a press.

What formed a child instead

Since the state formed nobody, the question of who did is answered by the order the conquest had left standing, and it was formidable.

A boy entered the *maktab*, the neighbourhood school attached to a mosque, at five or six, and learned the Arabic script by reciting the Qur'an; a small proportion went on to a *madrasa*, and the *madrasas* were financed not by anybody's budget but by the endowments — a dyer's shop here, five shops in a passage there, a cream market and a rag market assigned in perpetuity to a college of nine cells with two students to a room. Bukhara was the pre-eminent centre of Islamic learning in Transoxiana, drawing students from across Central Asia and beyond, and the legal and the mystical traditions were deeply intertwined rather than opposed, many *madrasa* professors being Sufi adepts and many *ishans* holding *madrasa* learning. The year was scored by the Hijri lunar calendar — Ramadan, the two festivals, the Friday assembly — and the neighbourhood, the *mahalla*, enforced the whole of it for free, through the ordinary machinery of praise and shame among people who could not be avoided.

The framework asks for the portrait of the good subject that a formation installs, and this one is legible. A good man prayed, fasted, gave alms, married, kept his household's women out of the sight of unrelated men, buried his dead by the rites, deferred to age and to learning, took his disputes to the *qazi*, and understood the law of God to be older than any government and not a government's to alter. Nothing in that portrait had a Russian in it, for or against. It simply had no place for one. Which is precisely why a conquest that left it undisturbed could rule for fifty years without ever being believed in, and

why the population was, in Schuyler's word, on the whole content — content in the way one is content with weather.

The one movement that did attempt to change the portrait was native. From the 1890s the Jadids — the reformers of the *usul-i jadid*, the new method — opened schools that taught the alphabet phonetically, added arithmetic, geography and history, and argued that a Muslim society could take the modern world's instruments without ceasing to be Muslim. They were in direct contact with Ottoman and Tatar reformism and were pursuing, in a conquered country, the programme the Ottoman state had been pursuing in an unconquered one. The colonial administration did not fund them. It watched them.

So the whole of formation in Russian Turkestan, on both halves of the two required reconstructions — the identity half that dissolves an old self, and the capacity half that qualifies a man for a position — was delivered by institutions the conqueror neither built, paid for, nor controlled. The corpus predicts that a colonial order which withholds formation stays expensive and brittle, because forming the conquered would mean admitting them. Turkestan is that prediction at its limit: not formation rationed, but formation entirely absent, in a province that ran a deficit every year it existed and had to be held with thirty-six thousand soldiers.

The inversion, and what it cost to do properly

After 1917 the same ground received the most ambitious formation programme in this collection, and it should be described at full strength before it is measured.

The new state taught people to read. It taught them in their own languages, printed books and newspapers in those languages, trained teachers, opened schools where there had been none, and promoted men from the conquered population into the party and the state on purpose and at expense — the policy of *korenizatsiia*, indigenisation. In Uzbekistan school enrolment is reported as rising from under ten per cent in 1924 to over half by 1930, and Uzbek literacy, on the official series, from 78.7 per cent in 1939 to 99.7 per cent by 1970. These figures come from a state with strong reasons to produce them and should be treated as directional rather than exact; the direction is nonetheless real, and a study that refused to credit it would be doing the thing this method exists to prevent.

Credit it precisely, then, and hold it beside what follows without collapsing either into the other. A boy born in Ferghana in 1900 could not read. A boy born in Ferghana in 1940 could. The state that made the difference is the same state this module is about to describe doing everything else in it.

The alphabet changed twice in twelve years

The instrument that best shows what the formation programme was for is the script, because it was altered twice within a single working lifetime and each alteration cut a literate population off from what it had already read.

The first change was decided in public and by vote. The First Turcological Congress at Baku in 1926 approved a switch to a Latinised alphabet known as Yanalif — *yangi alifbe*, the new alphabet — for the Turkic-speaking nations of the Soviet Union, with the transition beginning in earnest from 1929; the vote was reported as a landslide, and the delegates went home to spread it. The purpose was stated plainly enough at the time and is not disputed in the scholarship: between 1927 and 1930 the Latin alphabet was adopted for Kazakh, Tajik, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Turkmen, as one aspect of their separation from Islam and from Perso-Arabic culture. Everything printed in the region for a thousand years became, at a stroke, material for specialists.

The second change was made by decree and against the first. To distance the Turkic republics from a Westernising Turkey and from pan-Turkism, Moscow abolished the Latin script in favour of Cyrillic, which would also make it easier to teach Russian; the decree transferring Uzbek to a Cyrillic-based alphabet was issued on 8 May 1940, with a unified orthography adopted by July. Kazakh followed the same year.

Now note what the second change destroyed, because it is not what the first destroyed and it is the sharper finding. The first cut a generation off from the Qur'anic and Persianate past — from Navoi, from the chronicles, from the endowment deeds, from the whole library the conquest had left standing. The second cut them off from the eleven years of Latin-script printing that the indigenisation programme had itself produced: the native-language newspapers, the schoolbooks, the literacy primers, the first generation of Uzbek and Kazakh Soviet literature. **The state erased its own gift.** A man taught to read by the revolution in 1930 was functionally illiterate again by 1941 unless he learned a third alphabet, and everything he had been given to read in the meantime went

with it. The recollection preserved in one Tatar family — that Kazan Tatars were made illiterate twice in one generation, first when the Arabic script was abandoned and again when the new alphabet was — is a family memory rather than a document, and it describes the arithmetic exactly.

The word they chose was assault

The campaign that this collection's Okinawa study would predict to be invisible was, here, the centrepiece — and it was named in the conquered's own language, by the party, for what it was. *Hujum* means assault.

The chronology is exact. Special commissions were formed in December 1926; the Central Asian Women's Council had announced preparatory work in September; and the offensive was launched on 8 March 1927 — International Women's Day — in Uzbekistan, extending afterwards to the other republics, with mass ceremonies at which women discarded and burned the *paranji*, the full body-and-face veil, and the *chachvon*, the horsehair face screen. It was run through the Zhenotdel, the party's women's department, and combined propaganda, literacy classes, legal reforms including bans on veiling and polygamy, and public ceremonies. The reported results were immediate and enormous: the party reported a hundred thousand women unveiled in Uzbekistan in the months after 8 March 1927, a figure that is likely an overestimate, and many women quickly re-veiled.

Why the veil, and why then? The leading accounts give an answer that is structural rather than moral, and the study should carry it in full because it is the same operation the settlement module found on the steppe, performed on a different missing class.

Northrop argues that the campaign to unveil began only after the isolation of Muslim clerics and landowners as class enemies had failed to win the rest of the population; without a class framework or a working class to build socialism with, Soviet activists attempted to transform the society through the liberation of women instead. Gregory Massell had named the reasoning thirty years earlier and his term is the exact one: women in these societies were segregated and degraded and were therefore a *structural weak point* in the traditional order — a **surrogate proletariat** — through which, it was believed, conflicts intense enough to disintegrate the society could be generated. Northrop takes up the term and it is now standard.

Read the grammar of that. It does not begin with Uzbek women and ask what they wanted. It begins with a theory that requires an oppressed class capable of being mobilised, observes that the available candidates do not fit, and *assigns the role* to the group whose oppression the theory's own analysis makes most legible. The steppe had no rural exploiting class and one was named. The oases had no proletariat and one was designated. The same instrument, twice, in two registers.

And there was a second deduction underneath it, which is the one that decided what the campaign expected to happen. The doctrine held religion to be superstructure: a reflex of material conditions, maintained by a clerical interest for its own advantage, and destined to dissolve once the base beneath it changed. On that theory the *paranji* is a coercion — something imposed on women by a clerical-feudal interest, worn because they are made to. Lift the coercion, burn the garments, and what is left is liberated people. That is why the campaign was designed as a single public act rather than as a generation of schooling, and it is why what followed came as a surprise.

The reprisals came at once and fell on the women who had complied. The estimate most often given is that around two thousand five hundred women were murdered in connection with unveiling between 1927 and 1930, and the same account records the pattern: many of the murderers were from the victim's own family, others neighbours or members of the community, and many Muslim clergy denounced the campaign and called on their fellows to attack and kill unveiled women. The mechanism by which a village restored itself is visible in the incidents: at Mahram, party members raped an unveiled woman, and a hundred of the hundred and seventy women who had unveiled put their *paranjis* back on.

Two qualifications belong here, and both matter.

The first is that the premise was drawn from one part of the region and applied to the whole. The unveiling campaign — and the veil itself — was generally limited to the urban and sedentary agricultural areas of what are today Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; in Turkmenistan, as in other parts of Central Asia with a recent history of pastoral nomadism, women were not secluded and did not wear the *paranji* and *chachvon* at all. The instrument of liberation was designed against a practice that did not exist across much of the territory it was applied to, which is the same error, in a different register, as measuring a herding circuit in desiatinas.

The second is what the attack did to the thing attacked. Northrop's argument is that the confrontational approach treated veiling as mere oppression and ignored its role as a marker of Uzbek identity, piety and female agency within local norms, which galvanised resistance rather than compliance; veiling evolved into a symbol of national defiance, with women buying replacement *paranjis* after the public burnings, and — in 1930 — a surge of self-immolations among unveiled Turkmen girls as acts of protest. No outright ban on the *paranji* was ever enacted, precisely because the authorities recognised they could not sustain one.

That last sentence is the whole campaign in miniature: a state that had declared a practice abolished, could not abolish it, and knew it, and therefore never wrote the prohibition down.

And then the men it had made were shot

The formation programme's finest products were its native cadres, and within a decade of their promotion most of them were dead.

Fayzulla Khojaev had led the Young Bukharans, had helped bring the Red Army into Bukhara in 1920, and had headed the government of Soviet Uzbekistan. Akmal Ikramov, born in Tashkent in 1898, joined the party in 1918 and was first secretary of the Uzbek party from December 1929. Both were exactly what indigenisation existed to produce. In June 1937 Khojaev, still nominally head of the Uzbek government, was conspicuously absent from his own party's Seventh Congress and had not even been elected a delegate; he was removed from office on 27 June and arrested by 9 July. In September the Politburo member Andrey Andreyev arrived in Tashkent to bring the purge to Uzbekistan, and on 8 September he and seven others were denounced as enemies of the people. Ikramov was removed on 27 September 1937. Both were arraigned at the Trial of the Twenty-One in Moscow in March 1938 and shot.

The confessions extracted from Khojaev are worth reading as an index of what the state had decided its native elite was for. He "confessed" that he had belonged in the early 1920s to a secret pan-Turkic society that wished to preserve the Bukharan republic as an independent buffer state between Russia and the British Empire; that he had opposed the breaking-up of Turkestan into four separate Soviet republics; and that he had opposed the decision taken in Moscow, as part of the first five-year plan, to create a cotton monoculture in the

Ferghana valley. He was also, on one scholarly account, accused of having buried his dead brother according to Islamic rites.

Read the charge sheet against the subjects of this study's own modules. The two political acts the head of the Uzbek government was killed for having opposed are the national delimitation and the cotton monoculture — that is, the two decisions by which the metropole had constituted and specialised the country he governed. Whether he had in fact opposed them is unrecoverable; confessions produced under torture establish what the state wanted said, not what was true. What the charge establishes is the standard: a native leader was expected to have held no position of his own on either the shape of his republic or the use of its ground.

The scale of the destruction is contested and the study should not adopt the largest figure. Accounts in circulation hold that the purge in Uzbekistan ensnared not only Khojaev but the bulk of the republic's native elite, resulting in the execution or imprisonment of over ninety per cent of Uzbek party and government officials by 1939; that figure is repeated in the reference literature but is not, in the sources this study has seen, traced to a count, and it should be treated as an assertion until it is. What is not in doubt is that the leadership indigenisation had built was removed in eighteen months, and that its replacements owed their positions to the removal.

Reading formation against the framework

Five things, of which three are additions.

The corpus's prediction about withheld formation holds at its limit, and the limit is instructive. The framework holds that a colonial order withholds formation from the majority because forming them would mean admitting them, and that the old order therefore holds the field. Tsarist Turkestan is that proposition with the dial at zero: no schools worth the name, no missions, no press — a governor-general personally forbidding a lithographic press intended to make native books cheaper — and a *maktab* and *madrasa* system, financed by endowments the state did not fund, forming every child in the country for fifty years. And the cost came in exactly where the framework says it should: in the cost column and the payroll. An administration that has formed nobody has no interpreters, and Schuyler records that it was reduced to Cossacks with rough Turkic and Tatars from another province, with

consequences he calls critical. **Withholding formation does not merely leave the old belief in place; it leaves the conqueror unable to read his own country**, and every subsequent decision is taken through a translation he cannot check.

Attacking a formation converts it from custom into flag. This is the module's first addition and it is the most portable. The *paranji* before 1927 was a garment worn in some parts of Central Asia and not others, by settled townswomen and not by herders, as one item of a dense customary order — the sort of practice that changes slowly and without anyone declaring anything. After 1927 it was a national emblem, bought in replacement after each public burning, and the resistance to unveiling was carried out largely by the population itself, without a state, at the price of some two and a half thousand women's lives. The formation the conqueror attacked did not weaken under attack; it acquired a political meaning it had not previously had, and became the thing through which the conquered identified themselves against him. The corpus should carry this as a general proposition, because it explains a pattern visible elsewhere: **a practice becomes a marker of identity at the moment a foreign power makes its abandonment the test of loyalty.** It also predicts the specific failure recorded here — a state that could not sustain a formal ban and therefore never enacted one, while continuing to enforce informally what it would not legislate.

A doctrine that holds belief to be a trick will underprice the cost of attacking it, and the underpricing is systematic rather than careless. This is the causal half of the finding above, and it is what makes it predictive instead of merely descriptive. The theory said the practice was maintained by an interest — clerical, feudal, external to the women themselves. If that is what the practice is, then removing the coercion is the whole of the operation, the cost is whatever the clergy can mount in reply, and the reply is a diminishing quantity because the clergy's base is being removed at the same time. Every one of those inferences is sound *given the premise*, and the premise was wrong. What was actually being attacked was a formation that had taken — constitutive of the self of the woman wearing it and of the household around her — and the framework's own account of formation predicts what a state will meet when it attacks one of those. It will not meet an interest defending its position. It will meet a defence conducted as self-defence, by people who are not being paid to conduct it, and it will meet that defence *inside every household simultaneously*,

which is a place no state has enough men to reach. The arithmetic of the reprisals is the proof: two and a half thousand women killed by husbands, in-laws and neighbours, at no cost to any institution, in a campaign the state had budgeted as a matter of ceremonies and legal reform. **The general proposition the corpus should carry is that any governing theory treating belief as an imposition will systematically underestimate what attacking it costs, because it predicts collapse when the coercion is lifted and instead meets a belief that supplies its own enforcement** — and that the error is unlearnable from inside the theory, since the enforcement can always be read as evidence of surviving clerical-feudal influence, which argues for pushing harder.

A survey of prohibitions misses those that fall on women — and here is the version of that finding the corpus did not have. The Okinawa study established that colonial prohibitions falling on women vanish from an institutional record because they abolish no office and extinguish no income. Turkestan looked, in advance, like the case that would break that finding, since here women were the primary object of policy rather than incidental to it, and the campaign is documented in enormous detail. What actually happened is more useful. The *policy* is fully visible — dated, named, minuted, celebrated. The *cost* is not, and for a new reason: it was not inflicted by the state. Two and a half thousand women were killed by husbands, in-laws and neighbours, in a society whose own enforcement machinery the campaign had activated against them. Those deaths appear in no colonial casualty return, no punitive-expedition report, no military ledger, because no organ of the conquering state killed anybody. **The refinement is this: where a conqueror attacks a formation, the resulting deaths are inflicted by the conquered upon each other, and are therefore absent from every instrument the framework owns for counting what a conquest cost.** They belong in the accounting all the same, and Module 11 will have to put them there.

And on building an elite and then killing it, the answer is narrower than the obvious one. The obvious reading is that a conqueror who destroys the native elite he manufactured gains a successor elite that owes him everything and has watched what happened to the last one, and that reading is not wrong. But the charge sheet points at something more specific. Khojaev was killed for having held positions on the delimitation and on the cotton monoculture — for having had views about the constitution and the economy of the republic he administered. The purge did not replace a disloyal native elite with a loyal one.

It established that the native elite's function was to have no positions at all, on the two questions that mattered most to the metropole. **What a conqueror gains by destroying the cadres he built is not obedience — the cadres were already obedient — but the removal of the last body of people with the standing to disagree in the conqueror's own vocabulary.** That is a different and more useful finding, and it will matter when the study reaches the men who ran these republics for the following fifty years.

A note on sources. Eugene Schuyler's report of 7 March 1874, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* for 1874, is public-domain government material and supplies the account of tsarist schooling, the interpreter problem, and Kaufman's prohibition of the Samarkand lithographic press. The Turkestan budget lines are from the same report.

The account of the *maktab*, *madrasa* and endowment system, and of the intertwining of the legal and Sufi traditions, follows Adeeb Khalid's work, paraphrased and credited; the waqf deeds cited earlier in this study come from Abdusattor Jumanazar's published research on Bukhara's educational endowments. The Jadid movement is sketched here only as far as this module requires and is treated at length in Khalid's *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, paraphrased.

The alphabet chronology — the First Turcological Congress at Baku in 1926, the adoption of Yanalif and the transition from 1929, and the decree of 8 May 1940 transferring Uzbek to Cyrillic — follows the standard accounts, which agree on the dates. The recollection about Kazan Tatars being made illiterate twice in one generation is a reported family memory published in an essay, not a document, and is used here as an illustration of arithmetic rather than as evidence.

The characterisation of Muslim women as a structural weak point and a *surrogate proletariat* is Gregory Massell's, from *The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929* (Princeton, 1974), paraphrased here from the publisher's synopsis and from the reviews and later literature that take up the term; the monograph itself has not been read, and Northrop's adoption of the thesis is reported from a review of *Veiled Empire*. The account of the doctrine's treatment of religion as superstructure is a characterisation of a general position rather than a citation of a text, and no Soviet document is quoted for it here.

The *hujum* rests principally on Douglas Northrop's *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia* (2004) and Marianne Kamp's *The New Woman in Uzbekistan* (2006), paraphrased and credited, and the two differ: Northrop reads the campaign as a failed imposition of Soviet values on an unwilling population, Kamp as trapping Uzbek women between the Soviet state and patriarchal norms, and Northrop has questioned the reliability of the oral histories Kamp relies on. Both readings are live and this study does not adjudicate between them. The figure of approximately 2,500 women murdered in connection with unveiling between 1927 and 1930 is Kamp's and is the most widely reproduced; it is an estimate, and the same scholarship notes that there are no reliable OGPU accounts of the murders and that rape and assault are almost certainly under-reported. The report of 100,000 unveilings within months is the party's own and is described in the literature as likely inflated. The observation that Turkmen women did not veil and were not secluded is Adrienne Edgar's. The report of 10,000 women unveiling in the Registan at Samarkand, and the surge of self-immolations among Turkmen girls in 1930, are drawn from reference summaries of Northrop and should be checked against his text before either is made load-bearing.

The purge of the Uzbek leadership follows the standard accounts. The date of execution is given here as March 1938: the Trial of the Twenty-One ran in Moscow that month and sources differ on whether Khojaev and Ikramov were shot on 4, 13 or 15 March; the discrepancy is unresolved here. The content of Khojaev's confession, including his stated opposition to the delimitation and to the Ferghana cotton monoculture, follows the trial record as summarised in the reference literature, and confessions extracted under torture are treated throughout as evidence of what the state required to be said rather than of what occurred. The accusation concerning his brother's burial is attributed to Andrew D. W. Forbes at second hand and has not been checked against his text. The claim that over ninety per cent of Uzbek party and government officials were executed or imprisoned by 1939 circulates widely but is not traced to a count in any source consulted here, and is recorded as an assertion. Enrolment and literacy series are official Soviet figures and are given as directional.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE FIVE

STOP COMPOSING THE LISTS

Module 5 · The Cost Column — why a conquered population's ledger came out for compliance for fifty years on a floor of thirty-six thousand men and no pass law; what each subordinate group actually paid; and what happened in the summer of 1916 when the one thing the arrangement had left them was taken away

The ledger from below, in the first decade

Start where the framework says to start: with a man in a village outside Tashkent in 1874, and the question of why he does not revolt.

The answer for the first years is not one this method is comfortable with, and it should be stated before it is qualified. He was, on the evidence, better off. When the Russians advanced, Schuyler reported, they found many ready to welcome them — partly from discontent with the law of the khan and the emir, the extortions practised, and the frequent executions; and immediately after the occupation there was an immense feeling of relief, that now every man's life was his own and his property secure from arbitrary taxation and seizure. A large non-productive population of soldiers and officials arrived and had to be fed, so demand and prices rose, the advantage of which was felt by the landowner and the merchant, while the mercantile class had many opportunities for speculation in the contracts necessary to supply the army.

That is a real cost column and it is not a story about belief. A cultivator who has kept his field, whose taxes are collected in the categories he already understood, whose disputes still go to a *qazi*, whose neighbourhood still runs itself, and whose grain now sells for more than it did — such a man has no ledger reason to revolt, and he has one very good reason not to, which is that the last time somebody tried, an army of two thousand destroyed one of thirty thousand.

But Schuyler saw the direction of travel and named it. Prices as a whole had much risen, and it cost twice as much to support a labouring man as before the

occupation, though he doubted the common people would trace the rise to Russian immigration; and these things, he wrote, must work in time — it would require skill on the part of the government to avert a general feeling of discontent. The inhabitants naturally preferred Mohammedan rule, other things being equal, and were beginning to forget the evils they had suffered from the khan and to think more of the evils they suffered from Russian officials. He added the observation that matters most for what follows: however arbitrary the native rulers had been, their exactions were confined within the sphere limited by the Sharia, and it was thought that there were certain principles which not even the most tyrannical *bek* would dare to contravene.

There is the whole cost column in one sentence. The old order had a ceiling, and everybody knew where it was. The new one had a rate that changed, in Schuyler's words, constantly in form, no principle having yet been adopted.

The floor that scarcely had to be used, and who was actually holding it up

The most striking fact about tsarist Turkestan is how little visible coercion was required. Thirty-six thousand soldiers held a territory the size of France and Italy together with a population of some five million, and a well-informed contemporary reported that half of them would have done. There was no pass law. There was no register of the native population. There was no political police worth the name until very late. There were no restrictions on movement, no identity documents, and — the point of Module 3 — no state church, no missionary establishment, and no attempt whatever to install a belief.

Surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took, and its absence normally indicates the reverse. Turkestan is the case that forces the framework's own caution to the front: the absence of surveillance measures the presence of *a* belief, not the identity of the thing believed. What was policing the villages of the Ferghana valley in 1890 was the *mahalla*, the neighbourhood, through the ordinary machinery of praise and shame among people who could not be avoided; and what was adjudicating their quarrels was a *qazi* whom the state had made elective and left alone; and what was collecting their taxes was an *aksakal* chosen by themselves and paid by themselves.

Every one of those instruments was built, staffed and financed by the order the conquest had left standing. None of them appears in the imperial budget,

because none of them cost the Russian treasury anything. The corpus's proposition is that a preserved order arrives with its surveillance already installed and therefore appears in nobody's accounts; Turkestan is that proposition at full scale, and the scale can be given as a number. A conquering state ran five million people on thirty-six thousand troops and twelve thousand six hundred roubles of schooling because somebody else was doing the formation and somebody else was doing the policing, and neither of them had been asked, and neither of them was paid.

What each population actually paid

Count every subordinate population, because they paid in different currencies and the differences are the arrangement's own ranking of them.

The settled cultivator paid the *kharaj* at a tenth of the harvest — the same rate as before, in the same category, into a different treasury — plus, in time, the *zemskii sbor*, a local levy raised without any representative institution to consent to it. The direction of the burden is not disputed. When Kokand was subjugated the tax burden on local peasants was somewhat lightened, but by the early 1880s it had increased two- to threefold and had become, on one account, between fifty and a hundred and fifty per cent higher than the burden laid on the none-too-liberally treated people of European Russia. The revolts that resulted are dated and local: peasant riots at Khujand in 1872, 1889 and 1906, at Ura-Tyube in 1875 and 1907, and disturbances among native coal miners at Panjakent in 1885. The 1872 rising was suppressed with troops and its ringleaders executed, and the official explanation was resistance to compulsory vaccination — an account that the district commandant who wrote the truth about it to St Petersburg was removed from the province for contradicting.

The nomad paid a household tax, two roubles seventy-five kopecks on each *kibitka* — a flat charge on a countable object, which is the classic tell of a fiscal substrate the conqueror could not capture, and which required a register, an enumeration, and a headman made responsible for the return. And he paid, from the 1890s, in ground: the norm-and-surplus survey measured what his household needed and transferred the remainder to the settlers. His tax was small and his real payment was enormous, and the two do not appear in the same column of any account.

The Russian settler paid too, and the line is instructive. The excise on liquor produced 255,000 roubles in 1872 and had more than doubled in five years; since the natives did not drink, it was paid entirely by a Russian population of no more than a hundred thousand — some two roubles a head for the right of drinking, a large sum by the usual statistics. The fastest-growing revenue stream in the colony was vodka bought by the conquerors, which is a fact about who the colony was actually for.

The population inside the protectorates paid the most and appears in no Russian ledger at all, because Bukhara and Khiva went on collecting their own taxes through their own officials into their own treasuries. Anti-feudal risings in eastern Bukhara acquired an anti-Russian colouring precisely because Russian garrisons unfailingly helped the emir's forces to suppress them, and a large peasant revolt under Abdul Vose that swept Baljuvon, Khovaling, Sary-Khosor and Kulob in 1885 and shattered the emir's power was among the reasons for establishing the Russian Political Agency in Bukhara. A subject of the emir paid the emir's rate, had no recourse to a Russian court, and if he rose was put down by Russian troops. That is the cheapest possible arrangement for the conqueror and the most expensive for the conquered, and it is invisible in every figure this study has quoted.

And the women paid inside the household, in a currency the framework has already noted it has no instrument for. Under the tsarist order the state did nothing to them and nothing for them, which is the null case. What the Soviet order did is Module 4's business; what belongs here is that the cost column for a woman in this society was never held by a garrison and was never going to be affected by one.

Exit was real, and it is in the returns

Where people can leave, the emigration record is the honest ledger, because what a man will pay to be elsewhere is the price he puts on staying. Turkestan has two such records, forty-three years apart, and they measure two entirely different things.

The first is a market transaction. During the early spring of 1873, most of the Kazakhs inhabiting the district of Chimkent left the country, preferring the sands of the Kyzyl Kum desert to being under Russian rule. That is exit as the framework normally reads it: a population weighed the arrangement against a

hard alternative, chose the desert, and went. Nobody stopped them, because the state had no pass law and no interest in the movement of nomads across a frontier it had not yet fixed. The price of staying, for those particular households, was higher than the Kyzyl Kum.

The second is not a transaction at all, and the study will come to it in a moment.

The residual, and what it actually was

Now the question the framework says to press hardest: what was the last thing the arrangement left a man, that made the rest of it survivable?

For the oasis cultivator it was his field, and the 1886 Statute had confirmed it to him in writing, in the terms of his own customary law. For the herdsman it was the circuit — the four seasonal pastures and the right to move between them — and the norm-and-surplus survey was steadily removing it, one seasonal component at a time, while the arithmetic on the page showed a sufficiency preserved.

But there was a third residual, and it belonged to all of them, and it has been sitting in this study's material since the Landscape without being named.

They did not have to fight.

The subject populations of Turkestan and the Steppe were *inorodtsy* — aliens, in the empire's own legal vocabulary — and the status was a bundle. They were not citizens. They had no zemstvo. They were allotted six representatives in the Duma established after 1905, and after the second Duma of 1907 Central Asians were denied all representation. They had no vote on the *zemskii sbor* they paid. They could not sit in the courts that judged Russians. And they were exempt from military service.

That is exclusion administered as a favour, and it is the settlement's real consideration on the mass side. The bargain a subject of the empire in Ferghana was living under, whether or not anyone had ever stated it in those terms, was this: you will not be one of us, and in exchange you will not bleed for us. For fifty years the exchange held, and it is a large part of why thirty-six thousand men were enough.

The summer the lists were composed

In the third year of a war that had already consumed the empire's manpower, the exchange was cancelled by telegram.

The decision to draft the *inorodtsy* had been taken in May 1916 in response to the labour shortage caused by the departure of able-bodied men to the front; the Council of Ministers planned to draft 230,000 men aged between nineteen and forty-three from the Steppe and 250,000 from Turkestan. Nicholas II's decree of 25 June 1916 imposed non-combat labour conscription on non-Christian males aged nineteen to forty-three, reversing the prior exemption of Muslims from military service. Its reach was empire-wide: the edict covered Astrakhan province and most of Siberia; the Syr-Darya, Ferghana, Samarkand, Akmola, Semipalatinsk, Semirechye, Ural, Turgai and Transcaspian oblasts; the Muslim population of the Terek and Kuban and of Transcaucasia; certain Christian groups in Transcaucasia; and Turkmens, Nogais, Kalmyks and "other non-Russians of this sort" from Stavropol province.

The manner of its execution is worth having exactly, because it shows an administration breaking its own rules in the one week it could least afford to. The order did not specify the ages; that detail was left to the interior ministry and the military. By imperial law it would not take legal effect until published. Officials in Turkestan learned of it before publication, on 28–29 June, when they received an abbreviated version by telegraph, and immediately began implementing it. Accused afterwards of undue haste, the war minister Shuvaev is recorded as answering: "Perhaps I overstepped my authority, but I will continue to do so if I consider it necessary."

So the lists began to be written, by the elected native administrators — the *volost* administrators and *aksakals* who had been given three-year terms, no property, no salary from the state and every incentive to extract — and it was they who now had to say which nineteen-year-old in the village went. Some were bribed to leave names off. All of them were, in that moment, the visible edge of a state that had just revoked the one thing the arrangement had granted.

The first act of the rising is recorded in a telegram from the head of the Khujand garrison to the Tsar, three days after the population learned of the order: "Your Imperial Highness, let me humbly inform you that on July 4 in the city of Khodjent a crowd of the local natives gathered in the office of the police

officer and requested him to stop composing the lists of workers who should be sent to the army's rear, in compliance with the order of Your Imperial Highness of June 25."

They went to the office and asked him to stop writing.

Within a week that was over. The first really serious outbreak came at Jizzakh on 12 July, where the Russian district commandant and his assistant were killed, railway stations and telegraph lines were destroyed, and the town and much of the surrounding region were in open revolt for a fortnight until troops arrived. Unrest in Ferghana at the same time was defused without significant violence. In August the revolt moved to the largely Kazakh and Kyrgyz Semirechye, where tensions with incoming Russian settlers were highest, and the worst violence occurred in the districts of Pishpek and Przheval'sk, where more than three thousand Russian settlers were killed. Rebels destroyed conscription lists, proclaimed a *gazavat*, and in places elected their own khans and beks. In November a rebel force of some fifteen thousand mounted men surrounded the town of Turgai on the Kazakh steppe.

The suppression was of a different order of magnitude from the rising. Against the roughly 3,500 settlers killed in Semirechye, at least ten times as many Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were killed in the Russian punitive expeditions; at the village of Belovodsk, on one account, 517 refugees including women, children and the elderly were killed in a single day. And then the exodus. The punitive expeditions drove an estimated 250,000 Kyrgyz to flee across the border into China, suffering terrible mortality in what became known as the Ürkün, the exodus. The passes they crossed stand above three and four thousand metres and winter came early.

The mortality is contested, and the contest is live in three countries. Regional historians give 150,000 Kyrgyz dead in the flight; some estimates run as high as 250,000, and none are lower than 100,000; most scholars agree on at least 150,000 and some exceed 250,000, and the records of the time were poor enough that it is unclear to this day how many died. Whether the events constitute a genocide is asserted by some Kyrgyz historians and politicians and disputed by others and by Russia, and this study reports the dispute rather than settling it. What is not in dispute is the direction of the intent afterwards. Kuropatkin, the governor-general, issued a decree that land was to be seized for settlement wherever Russian blood had been shed, and proposed an ethnically

cleared zone for Russian settlement on the best land around Issyk-Kul, with the Kyrgyz relocated to the mountains near Naryn.

Now set the two exits side by side. In 1873 a population walked into the Kyzyl Kum because the desert was cheaper than the arrangement. In 1916 a population walked into the Tien Shan in the snow, and between a fifth and a third of it died on the way, because the arrangement had become worse than that.

The column after 1917

The second conqueror's cost column belongs mostly to Modules 10 and 11, but two features of it are settled here because they follow directly from what has just been described.

The first is that the residual was removed again, faster, and from more people. The oasis cultivator's field, confirmed in 1886, was collectivised from 1929, with over eighty per cent of arable land taken into *kolkhozes* by 1932. The herdsman's circuit, which the norm had been eroding for thirty years, was abolished outright by sedentarisation at the turn of the 1930s. And the specialisation the tsarist state had begun and the five-year plans completed — a country converted to cotton and fed on grain railed in from the north — meant that every subsequent political disruption arrived in the villages as hunger rather than as politics. That mechanism, and its arithmetic, is Module 11's.

The second is the one that follows from the surveillance finding. The tsarist state had free-ridden for fifty years on an enforcement apparatus it had not built: the *mahalla*, the *aksakal*, the *qazi*, the endowment-funded school, the neighbourhood that policed itself for nothing. The new state set out to destroy every element of that apparatus — the sharia courts, the endowments, the *maktab*, the veil, the Friday, the alphabet the whole thing was written in — and having destroyed it, had to perform the enforcement itself, with paid men, out of its own budget. A hundred thousand troops rather than thirty-six thousand is one measure of the difference. The political police is another. **A conqueror who breaks the order he inherited must henceforth buy what that order was doing for him free.**

Reading the cost column against the framework

Three findings.

The residual can be an exemption, and this is the module's addition. The framework tells a study to price a subject's residual — the last thing he still holds that makes the whole survivable — and expects to find a thing: a plot, a herd, a trade, a room. Turkestan shows that the residual can instead be a *legal disability the subject population reads as a protection*. The *inorodets* of Turkestan was not a citizen, had no zemstvo, lost even his six Duma seats in 1907, and could not vote on the local levy he paid; and he did not have to fight. Every item on that list is an exclusion, and the last one was worth more than the others cost. So the settlement contained a clause nobody had drafted: **the conqueror could not revoke the disability without also revoking the protection, and could not revoke the protection without offering the citizenship he had spent fifty years withholding.** In June 1916 he revoked the protection, offered nothing, and did it by telegraph before the order was legally in force. The arrangement broke in three weeks, in the one part of the empire where it had been cheapest to hold. The proposition to carry forward is general: **where subject status has been priced as an exemption, the exemption *is* the settlement, and its removal will be understood by the excluded as a breach of contract — because it is one.**

The inherited surveillance is confirmed, and its bill arrives when the inheritance is broken. The corpus holds that a preserved order comes with its policing already installed and therefore costs the conqueror nothing and appears in no budget. Turkestan supplies the figure — five million people, thirty-six thousand troops, no pass law, no register, no political police — and supplies something the corpus did not have, which is the accounting on the other side. When the successor state destroyed the courts, endowments, schools, calendar and neighbourhood authority that had been doing the work, it acquired the whole cost of doing it in-house, permanently. The framework should therefore state the proposition in two halves rather than one: **a preserved order is cheap because someone else is paying for the policing; a destroyed order is expensive not chiefly because of the destroying but because the bill for the policing transfers.**

And exit read as ledger needs a second reading for the case where exit itself is lethal. Where people can leave, what they pay to be elsewhere prices what they were paying to stay, and 1873 is the ordinary version: a district's Kazakhs preferred the Kyzyl Kum, and went. The Ürkün is not that. A quarter of a million people crossed passes above three thousand metres in the first snows, and something between a fifth and a third of them died doing it. When an emigration return records people dying in large numbers to leave, it is not measuring a residual that has been reduced to a low value. It is measuring one that has been removed, and the framework should read such a return as a *collapse* indicator rather than a price signal — the point at which a population has stopped weighing the arrangement and started fleeing it.

A note on sources. Eugene Schuyler's report of 7 March 1874, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* for 1874, is public-domain government material and supplies the account of the early cost column, the retained tax schedule, the *kibitka* tax, the liquor excise, the Khujand disturbance of 1872 and its official explanation, and the emigration of the Chimkent Kazakhs in the spring of 1873. Schuyler was well disposed to Russia and his favourable account of the first decade should be read as such; it is used here because a favourable witness recording a rising tax burden and a population beginning to forget the khan's evils is stronger evidence than a hostile one would be.

The claims about the tax burden by the early 1880s — increased two- to threefold, and between fifty and a hundred and fifty per cent above European Russia — and the list of local risings at Khujand, Ura-Tyube and Panjakent, are drawn from a compilation resting on Library of Congress country-study material and Soviet-era scholarship, and should be verified against Beatrice Penati's work on the Turkestan fiscal system before either is made load-bearing. The 1885 revolt of Abdul Vose in eastern Bukhara and the founding of the Russian Political Agency come from the same compilation.

For the 1916 revolt the standard scholarly account is the volume edited by Alexander Morrison, Cloé Drieu and Aminat Chokobayeva, *The Central Asian Revolt of 1916: A Collapsing Empire in the Age of War and Revolution* (2020), from which the sequence at Jizzakh on 12 July, the Ferghana defusal, the Semirechye outbreak, the figure of more than three thousand Russian settlers killed in the Pishpek and Przheval'sk districts, and the estimate of 250,000 Kyrgyz driven across the Chinese border are taken and paraphrased. The

Council of Ministers' draft quotas of 230,000 from the Steppe and 250,000 from Turkestan follow Aminat Chokobayeva's published account.

The decree of 25 June 1916 is quoted only in summary; its text should be read in the *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov* before further weight is placed on it. The procedural details — that the age range was set by the ministries rather than the decree, that the order was not legally in force until published, that Turkestan officials received an abbreviated version by telegraph on 28–29 June and began implementing it at once, and Shuvaev's recorded reply — are from the Russian Perspectives on Islam collection of primary sources on the uprising, and the telegram of the Khujand garrison commander of 4 July 1916 is quoted from the same body of material as reproduced in *Vosstanie 1916 goda v Srednei Azii*. Both are translations from the Russian and the originals should be consulted before the wording is relied upon.

Mortality figures for the Ürkün are given as the range the sources give — no estimate below 100,000, most scholarly accounts at or above 150,000, some above 250,000 — with the explicit note that the counting is contested and that the characterisation of the events as genocide is asserted and disputed within the successor states and by Russia. This study reports the dispute and does not adjudicate it. The Belovodsk figure of 517 is from a single journalistic account and is flagged as such. Kuropatkin's decree on seizing land wherever Russian blood was shed, and his Issyk-Kul proposal, are quoted at second hand from Morrison as summarised in the press and should be checked against the archival original.

Duma representation figures, collectivisation percentages and Soviet-era enrolment data are taken from reference compilations and official series respectively, and are given as directional. The accounting of the famine that followed the cotton specialisation is deferred to Module 11, where it belongs.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE SIX

COTTON THE KING OF TURKESTAN

Module 6 · Extraction — how a conquest that took the country for frontier reasons converted a tithe in grain into a debt in roubles, discounted one crop and taxed the rest, and produced within thirty years a monoculture nobody had planned; and how the arrangement that resulted fed the country by the same railway that emptied it

Twenty years of collecting somebody else's taxes

The cheapest extraction is the one already running, and for two decades that is what Russia performed.

The instruments were inherited entire: the *kharaj* on land and its products at a tenth of the harvest, the *zakat* at two and a half per cent on imported goods and trading capital, the area-assessed *tanab* on gardens, and a household charge of two roubles seventy-five kopecks on each nomad *kibitka*. Three of the four are categories of Islamic fiscal law with a new treasury at the end of them. And the yield was derisory. In 1872 the whole local revenue of the province came to 1,328,200 roubles against an expenditure of 7,528,627, of which the tax on land and its products produced 278,000 and the government coal mines sold a hundred roubles' worth. Turkestan was extracting almost nothing because there was almost nothing there that the metropole wanted and could move.

Fifty years later the imperial senator Pahlen, reviewing the administration, recorded why the machine had been left alone at first: Russian power had not been acquainted with the native revenue system and did not have the organs to assess it, so revenue reached the treasury in very modest amounts. What changed the position was not a plan to grow cotton. It was a decision about how the tax would be paid.

Three instruments, none of which compelled anybody to grow cotton

The framework's medium-of-payment test asks what will be accepted in satisfaction of a tax, and holds that the answer, not the rate, is the operative clause. Turkestan applies the test in a form the corpus has not yet seen, and the form is sharper.

First, the tithe was converted into a money assessment. The 1886 Statute's land-assessment works replaced the old levies with a cash land tax: the land tax, the *obrochnaia podat'*, explicitly replaced the pre-existing *tanab* and *kharaj*, and on top of it sat the *zemskii sbor*, the local levy, calculated at the beginning of the 1880s as thirty-five per cent of the land tax and later, in the Syr-Darya and Samarkand provinces in 1892, as twenty-five per cent for the settled population, with nomads paying a fixed 1.25 roubles per household in imitation of the *kibitka* tax. The bilingual tax forms called this second levy, in the cultivator's own language, the tax for other expenses.

Follow the arithmetic from the household. A man who owes a tenth of his harvest can pay it out of the harvest. A man who owes a fixed number of roubles must sell something, every year, whatever the season has done to him — and there was in Ferghana after 1890 exactly one buyer holding roubles in quantity, and he was buying cotton.

Second, the metropole built a price. Russian mills required over 400,000 tons of cotton a year, about a tenth of the world's total crop; there were over a thousand cotton mills employing some five hundred thousand people with an annual output valued at a billion roubles; and despite a very high import duty on cotton equal to almost fifty per cent of its value, Russia still imported about half of what she needed, fully seventy-five per cent of it — over a hundred and fifty thousand tons — from the United States. That duty is the whole commercial architecture in one figure. Turkestan cotton was not competitive with American cotton on quality; the American consul had called the Central Asian product very bad in 1874. It did not need to be. A tariff of half the value made a Ferghana crop profitable inside the empire that it could not have been outside it, and every rouble of that margin was paid by a Russian mill-hand buying cloth.

Third, the state discounted the crop it wanted. A land-tax break on American-variety cotton reduced taxes by up to fifty per cent, benefiting local planters; the nominal fiscal advantage grew over time, reaching by the eve of the revolution as much as fourteen times the amount paid by cotton-growing households.

Set the three together and the mechanism is complete. Nobody was ordered to grow cotton. No statute required it, no chief inspected the acreage, no punishment attached to sowing wheat. A cultivator faced a fixed money obligation he could only meet by selling, a single well-capitalised buyer, a price held above the world's by a tariff, and a tax bill that halved if he planted the crop that buyer wanted. The compulsion had been relocated out of the statute book into the arithmetic of the household, where it was invisible to anyone reading the law in St Petersburg — which is exactly what the framework predicts of a colonial fiscal instrument, and here it operates on the plough rather than on the feet.

What it produced

The transformation is legible in one valley. In Ferghana, cotton went from 9.6 per cent of arable land in 1885 to 42 per cent by the end of tsarist rule; the oblast supplied over half of Turkestan's cotton exports to the empire, producing 9.5 million pounds of the region's 14.6 million in 1915. Across Turkestan as a whole, a contemporary account put the annual crop at about two hundred thousand tons, on some 6,750,000 acres of agricultural land — around three per cent of the territory, the rest being counted as waste.

And it should be conceded plainly that this made people money, including Central Asians. A period account preserved in the literature describes the boom in its own register: hundreds of clerks, officers, other government employees and merchants rushed to grow cotton; the dream of American wealth in Turkestan eclipsed everything else, and they planted cotton wherever a piece of irrigated land could be found. Uzbek and Tajik landholders and merchants were among the beneficiaries; the boom did not run along a colour line.

Refusing the tidy story

The obvious narrative — that Russia conquered Central Asia for cotton and then engineered a plantation — has to be refused twice, and the second refusal is less familiar than the first.

The first refusal was settled in Module 1: the advance began three decades before Russia had a cotton industry worth the name, the American Civil War shortage was brief, and demand for Central Asian cotton was already falling in 1865–66. The conquest was not for cotton.

The second refusal is that even the boom itself was not a state programme. Beatrice Penati's work on the land tax is emphatic on the point, and the evidence she rests it on is a percentage. The much-invoked new irrigation works in the Hungry Steppe advanced very slowly, and even in 1914 the additional irrigated surface they created — not all of it under cotton — amounted to 3.6 per cent of the total cotton acreage. It is problematic, she argues, to project Krivoshein's dreams back into the imperial period and read his 1912 report as evidence that the Russians had thoroughly planned to transform Turkestan into a giant cotton plantation, or that they had conquered the region for that purpose; the fact that he was still advocating such a transformation in 1912 shows that the large-scale irrigation projects had not yet taken place, and the flourishing of the cotton sector must be explained elsewhere — for example, by the collective agency of the native population and of investors, both Russian and local. Decisions on the tax break and on cotton policy frequently originated with local officials rather than with St Petersburg.

That is the honest formulation, and it is one this framework already owns: an instrument adopted for one reason was found to do a second thing, and the second thing was then designed for. What Turkestan supplies is the date. The instrument — cash assessment, tariff, discount — was in place by the later 1880s. The design begins with Krivoshein in 1912. Twenty-five years separate the mechanism from the plan, and the mechanism did the work.

The prospectus

The robe that grew over the arrangement is best read where robes are least guarded, in a document written to attract money. In May 1916 an article on

cotton in Russia appeared in an English-language review, aimed squarely at American investors, and it describes the country this study has been building.

What is needed now, it says, to transform the practically desert plains of Turkestan, sparsely settled by nomadic native tribes, into rich cotton plantations, is business energy, enterprise, and capital. Upon these three pillars a throne can be constructed, on which to crown Cotton the King of Turkestan. Here, indeed, is a field for the application of the same American capital and constructive genius that have wrought wonders in so many fields of industrial endeavour.

Practically desert plains, sparsely settled by nomadic native tribes. The same article, four paragraphs later, records that 6,750,000 acres were already under cultivation and that the land was worth four hundred roubles an acre. The sparse nomadic tribes included the endowment registries of Bukhara, the *madrasas* of Samarkand, a valley in which more than two in five cultivated acres were already under cotton, and a population of some five million people. The description is not a lie about the facts; the facts are in the same document. It is a description written from the position of a man deciding where to put capital, for whom a country is a field of unrealised acreage and the people on it are a datum about labour supply.

The railway that carried it both ways

Here is the arrangement's structural feature, and everything in Module 11 turns on it.

Cotton does not feed anybody. Land put under cotton is land taken out of grain, and a valley that has moved from a tenth to two-fifths of its arable into fibre has to eat something. The answer was designed into the transport from the beginning. The proposal for a Turkestan–Siberia railway was examined by a commission set up in Verny in October 1896, and the case for it was stated in a single sentence: it was expected that the line would facilitate the transport of cotton from Turkestan to Siberia and cheap Siberian grain from Russia to the Ferghana Valley.

Read that as an accountant would. Cotton out, grain in, on the same track. The extraction and the subsistence of the extracted population are carried by one piece of infrastructure, in opposite directions, and neither can be interrupted without the other stopping. A monoculture in a food-importing

region is not a specialisation with a price risk attached. It is a hostage arrangement in which the captor also does the feeding.

The bill for that arrangement fell due almost immediately. In 1916 the diversion of grain to the army and a drought in Semirechye produced a deficit of 22 million poods, and settlers who normally sold grain to the Kazakhs became reluctant to part with their harvests, while frequent livestock requisitions left most nomads unable to sell or exchange their remaining animals for grain. The revolt of that summer, the punitive expeditions, the revolution, the civil war and the collapse of the railway then arrived in sequence on a population that had been converted, over thirty years and by three fiscal instruments, into people who bought their bread. The famine that followed belongs to the accounting module. Its mechanism belongs here.

The Soviet intensification

The successor state did not reverse the specialisation. It completed it, on a scale the tsarist administration could not have financed.

Cotton independence was made a policy objective in the 1920s: the Soviet government decreed that it needed to be independent of cotton imports, and Uzbekistan and Central Asia were selected as the place to achieve it. Collectivisation supplied the instrument the tsarist state had lacked, since a state farm plants what it is told. The role was substantially enhanced after 1950, when it was decided that Uzbekistan would be the centre of the nation's cotton production; seed cotton production grew from 300,000 tons in the 1950s to a peak of about three million tons by the mid-1980s, made possible first by expanding irrigation and second by planners mandating that the newly irrigated and other lands be used for cotton on large state and cooperative farms. The water came from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, largely from neighbouring republics.

The water figures are the ones that matter. Between 1960 and 1985 irrigated land in the Uzbek SSR rose by 33 per cent, and in the Turkmen SSR by 123 per cent, with virtually all the newly watered farmland devoted to cotton; the increases came mainly not from switching land out of other crops but from bringing new land into production, so that yet more water was extracted from the feeder streams. Those feeder streams were the Aral Sea's only inflow, and the sea, once the fourth largest inland body of water in the world at some 66,000

square kilometres, shrank in less than a generation to about a tenth of its former volume.

By the end, cotton accounted for around seventy per cent of the irrigated land under cultivation in Uzbekistan and supplied more than two-thirds of the total cotton production of the Soviet Union; other accounts put the share as high as ninety per cent, and the range should be given rather than a figure. The price was set in Moscow, the fibre was processed elsewhere, and the harvest was got in by closing the schools. And the arrangement produced, in the 1980s, one of the largest frauds in Soviet history — officials over-reporting cotton production, selling cotton on the black market and swindling the state out of billions of roubles, uncovered when satellite photographs showed that fields recorded as planted were not. A monopsony that sets its own price and cannot inspect its own fields is a system that will be reported to.

Reading extraction against the framework

Four findings, of which the first and last are additions.

The medium-of-payment test extends from the feet to the plough, and the operative instrument is the exemption rather than the rate. The corpus established that a tax payable only in the conqueror's coin, levied on a household that holds none, is a labour draft: it has no coin, so it must go where coin is earned, and the direction it is pushed is the state's real purpose. Turkestan supplies the variant for a household that is *not* a subsistence household — one that already has a crop, a market and a surplus. Convert its tithe in kind into an assessment in coin and you have not created a labour draft; you have created a **crop draft**, a standing annual obligation to sell that can be satisfied by any cash crop. The direction is then set by a second instrument entirely: the discount. A land-tax break of up to half for American cotton, against no break for wheat, does not compel anybody to do anything, and reliably determines what is planted on hundreds of thousands of acres. So the framework should now ask two questions of every fiscal instrument rather than one — *what will be accepted in payment*, which tells you whether the household must sell; and *what is exempted*, which tells you what it must sell. **The rate sets the burden, the medium sets the compulsion, and the exemption schedule sets the crop.**

The instrument precedes the plan by a generation, and the corpus can now date the gap. The card already holds the honest formulation — that an instrument adopted for one reason is found to do a second thing, and the second thing is then designed for. Turkestan puts numbers on both ends. The fiscal architecture was complete by the later 1880s and was built to raise revenue from a province that had never balanced its books. The planning literature that treats Turkestan as a cotton plantation to be engineered dates from 1912, and the state irrigation it called for had, by 1914, produced 3.6 per cent of the cotton acreage. Between those dates the monoculture was made by cultivators and investors responding to a price the state had built for other reasons. **The extraction a colony ends up performing is frequently not the one its conqueror designed, and the design arrives late, to take credit for a structure already standing.**

Both forks of the extraction question run in one governorate at once. The card distinguishes extraction-as-rate, which needs the native alive and producing and therefore tends toward a tuned equilibrium, from extraction-as-dispossession, which needs the ground and therefore tends toward removal. Turkestan is not on one fork or the other; it is on both, sorted by the same line that sorted the settlement. The oasis was worked as a rate — the cultivator confirmed in his field, taxed in cash, discounted into cotton, and needed alive because the fibre would not pick itself. The steppe was worked as a stock — the pasture declared state property, the norm applied, the surplus transferred, and the herdsman not needed at all. The framework should record that a single administration can run both simultaneously without inconsistency, because they are answers to different questions about different populations, and that a study which classifies a case onto one fork will misread half of it.

And a monoculture in a food-importing region is a hostage arrangement in which the captor does the feeding. The seed for this study asked what a metropole does to a territory's staple when it acquires a competing source, on the proposition that a one-crop territory is hostage not to the world price but to its metropole's next acquisition. Turkestan cannot answer that question, because Russia never acquired an alternative — and the reason it could not is the finding. The tariff that made Turkestan cotton profitable was the same tariff that made American cotton expensive; the empire had chosen to buy dear from itself rather than cheap from abroad, and having chosen, could not unchoose without shutting a thousand mills. So the hostage relation appears, at first sight,

to run backwards: a republic supplying two-thirds or more of the union's fibre would seem to hold the whip.

It did not, and the reason is the railway. The same policy that made Turkestan indispensable in cotton made it incapable of feeding itself, and the grain came in over the track the cotton went out on. A territory that cannot eat without its metropole is not a supplier with leverage; it is a dependant whose indispensability is a fact about the metropole's convenience and not about its own security. **The framework should therefore state the proposition without reference to competing sources at all: a monoculture's danger is not that its buyer may find another seller, but that the crop it stopped growing was its food — and once that is true, every interruption to the arrangement, from whatever cause, arrives in the villages as hunger rather than as politics.** In 1916 the cause was a war and a revolt. In 1918 it was a civil war and a cut railway. In 1930 it would be a decree. The arithmetic did not care which.

A note on sources. L. Pavlov's "Cotton in Russia," published in *The Russian Review*, volume 1, May 1916, is public-domain material and is quoted exactly; it supplies the figures for Russian mill consumption, the number of mills and workers, the import duty of almost fifty per cent of value, the share of imports coming from the United States, Turkestan's acreage and average crop, and the passage on crowning Cotton the King of Turkestan. It is an investment prospectus in the form of a survey article and should be read as such — its estimates of what Turkestan might yield are advocacy, and its description of the region as practically desert plains sparsely settled by nomadic tribes is contradicted by the acreage figures in the same text.

Eugene Schuyler's report of 7 March 1874, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* for 1874, is likewise public-domain government material and supplies the retained tax schedule and the 1872 revenue and expenditure figures.

The conversion of *kharaj* and *tanab* into the cash *obrochnaia podat'*, and the calculation of the *zemskii sbor* as a percentage of it, are from Beatrice Penati's article on the *zemskii sbor* in the *Journal of Central Asian History*, paraphrased and credited; her bilingual tax forms supply the local name for the second levy. The land-tax break on American cotton, the estimate that the advantage reached fourteen times the amount paid by cotton-growing households, the figure of 3.6 per cent for state irrigation's contribution to cotton acreage by 1914, and the argument that the boom was driven by local agency rather than

by state planning, are from her "The Cotton Boom and the Land Tax in Russian Turkestan (1880s–1915)," *Kritika* 14/4 (2013), paraphrased and credited. Pahlen's remark on the administration's early ignorance of the native revenue system is quoted at second hand from Alexander Morrison's essay on the *amlakdars* of the Zarafshan valley.

Ferghana's cotton acreage share and 1915 output are from reference summaries resting on the oblast literature and have not been checked against a primary series; the period description of the cotton rush is quoted at second hand from a compilation and its original source has not been traced. The rationale for the Turkestan–Siberia railway is from the standard account of the line's planning.

Soviet-era production figures diverge between sources and between measures, and the divergence is not resolved here: one account gives Uzbek seed cotton rising from 300,000 tons in the 1950s to about three million by the mid-1980s, another gives raw cotton output rising from 2.95 to 5.16 million metric tons between 1960 and 1985, and the two are not obviously reconcilable. Uzbekistan's share of Soviet cotton is given as a range (two-thirds to ninety per cent) because the sources differ. Irrigation expansion figures for the Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs between 1960 and 1985, and the Aral Sea's contraction, follow the standard environmental literature. The 1980s cotton fraud is well documented but the sums attributed to it vary widely and none is adopted here. The accounting of the famines this arrangement produced is deferred to Module 11.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE SEVEN

THE PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICAL SCIENCE

Module 7 · Information and Suppression — an administration that compiled five hundred and ninety-four volumes of everything printed against it and was troubled by none of it, replaced by a state that could not permit a word, a description, or a number, and that answered an inconvenient census not by suppressing it as a secret but by annulling it as an error

The expectation, and the tsarist answer

The corpus's standing instruction for this module is to expect a censor and to find inattention — to treat indifference as the default hypothesis rather than the residual one, since an uninteresting fact is safer to a regime than a censored one and inattention leaves no documents behind. Run that test on tsarist Turkestan and it returns the expected null in an unusually vivid form, because the administration itself built the instrument that proves it.

Under Kaufman's direction the Turkestan administration commissioned the bibliographer V. I. Mezhov to assemble a standing collection of everything published about the region. The *Turkestanskii sbornik* ran to 594 volumes between 1867 and 1917, a comprehensive collection of materials on Central Asian administration compiled initially under the governor-general's direction. Newspaper articles, pamphlets, reports, hostile and friendly alike, cut out and bound, year after year, for half a century.

A regime that fears what is printed about it does not maintain a 594-volume library of it. It maintains a police file. The *sbornik* is not a suppression apparatus; it is an administrative convenience — the same impulse that produces a press-cuttings service, built by men who found the criticism interesting and not dangerous. Its existence is a measurement, and what it measures is how safe the administration felt.

The despatch that was published and did nothing

The sharpest test available is the Schuyler report, because it is an indictment of exceptional severity by a witness of exceptional standing, and it was published.

Recall its contents. A district prefect levying ninety thousand roubles of illegal taxes on a salary of two thousand four hundred and being reappointed elsewhere as a most useful officer. A judicial officer at Vernoe extorting confessions from Kazakh chiefs by torture. A second judge planting stolen property in the tent of a Kazakh sultan holding a Russian major's rank. Fourteen thousand camels requisitioned against a promise of payment and then talked out of the population as a gift. A province that had run deficits every year of its existence. Almost no schools, and a lithographic press forbidden by the governor-general. And the whole of it delivered to the American legation at St Petersburg and printed by the United States government as a public document.

Schuyler's material did not merely reach the metropole; it was discussed there. The St Petersburg newspaper *Golos* carried a piece on the financial position of the Turkestan region on 24 January 1875 and, three weeks later, on 11 February, a piece explicitly on Schuyler's despatch and the Turkestan budget. The indictment arrived, in Russian, in the Russian capital's press, within a year.

And what followed was an argument about money. The despatch's afterlife in the Russian record is a fiscal controversy — whether the province could be made to pay, whether the governor-generalship should be abolished and Turkestan returned to Orenburg, as Chernyaev had recommended to the finance minister. Kaufman remained governor-general until his death in 1882. The prefect of Kurama had already been reappointed. The torturing judge at Vernoe had already been transferred to Khujand as chief administrator of justice there.

This is the Empty Column pattern in its purest available form, and it is worth stating why the Russian case fits a proposition derived from liberal metropoles. The rule is that what a regime bothers to hide maps what its audience would punish, and that censorship is bought only where the audience's tolerance runs below the fact. Russia in 1875 had no parliament, a censored press, and no electorate — but it did have a ministerial audience, a court, an educated public and a newspaper trade, and the facts reached all four. The absence of any consequence is therefore a threshold measurement exactly as

it would be in London or Paris: it establishes that in the Russian metropolitan mind, torture and extortion in Turkestan were an administrative untidiness, and the interesting question about the province was whether it would ever break even.

The one thing that was worth hiding

Against that, the record contains a single clear act of homeward suppression, and its shape confirms the rule rather than breaking it.

The commandant of the Ura-Tyube district was removed and sent out of the province for having written a letter to St Petersburg for publication — though not at that time actually published — stating the truth about the disaffection and riots at Khujand, alleging that they were caused by the excessive taxation, which was not what the Russians had at first promised, and not by the vaccination measures, as had been given out.

Note precisely what was suppressed. Not the fact of the riots, which were public and had been put down with troops and executions. Not the corruption, which Schuyler documented and *Golos* discussed. What was suppressed was a specific counter-claim: that the official explanation was false, and that the real cause was a tax rise contrary to an undertaking given at the conquest. And the audience it was hidden from was not the Russian public but the ministry — the one body that could have called the administration to account for having broken its own promise.

The suppression map is a map of thresholds, and here the threshold is departmental. What the Russian public would not punish, the administration published, filed and bound in 594 volumes. What a ministry might have punished — a written allegation of bad faith about a fiscal undertaking — cost one officer his posting.

Which way the censorship faced

Where the tsarist state did suppress systematically, it faced inward, and its instruments were the ones the corpus has met elsewhere.

The most economical is the one already recorded: a lithographic press purchased at Samarkand to make books in the native languages cheaper, and

forbidden outright. That is not censorship of a publication; it is the removal of the means of publication, and it costs one signature.

Above it sat the seam held by untranslation, which the corpus first named in Buganda. Officials arriving in Turkestan knew nothing of the country, so the administration used as interpreters natives who barely understood Russian, Cossacks with a rough knowledge of the local languages, or Tatars — which means that anything a Central Asian wrote in Turki or Persian was, for the purpose of reaching the men who governed him, unpublished. Nothing had to be banned. The rulers simply could not read.

The administration's own vernacular publication ran the other way and is the counterpart instrument: an official gazette in the local language, carrying the administration's account of itself to a readership the administration otherwise ignored. Where the state does the printing, no censor is required, because there is nothing else to read.

The column fills

Then, within five years of the revolution, the corpus meets its first standing, professional, homeward-facing censorship apparatus in a colonial case.

Glavlit — the Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs — was created in 1922 and was responsible for censorship, and its constitution is the informative part. It was formed in the summer of 1922 by the Council of People's Commissars to take control over all aspects of censorship; the political police, then the GPU, were given a hand in running it, including a say in the appointment of its two assistant heads; a Politburo document of 1923 held that censorship should have a pedagogical slant, and the organisation's own leadership described it around 1924 as an instrument for counteracting the corrupting influence of bourgeois ideology.

Read the composition. A censorship organ jointly staffed by the education commissariat and the secret police, describing its own function as pedagogical. That is not a body built to conceal facts from a foreign public. It is a body built to manage what the state's own population may be permitted to think, and it is the institutional signature of an order whose legitimacy runs through a doctrine rather than through a floor.

What became unsayable

The specific thing that could not be said in Soviet Central Asia was not any particular atrocity. It was a description.

The doctrine of 1917 had declared colonialism a crime of the tsars and the European powers, and had staked the new state's claim on having abolished it. From that proposition it follows, without anybody deciding it, that the periphery of the new state cannot be a colony — not as a matter of concealment but as a matter of grammar. Facts answering to the description therefore have to be given other names, and the man who insists on the description is not revealing a secret. He is contradicting the state's account of what kind of state it is.

Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev is the case, and he is worth setting out with its complications intact. A Tatar Bolshevik and the party's leading authority on Muslim affairs, he had headed the Central Muslim Military Collegium recruiting Muslims to the Red Army during the civil war. By the end of 1922 he was in direct conflict with Stalin's nationality policy, which he attacked openly in party meetings, concerned above all with the plan for the new federal structure — which would leave Tatars and other Muslim groups without union-republic status — and with the persistence of Russian chauvinism and of a dominant Russian role in governing the Muslim republics. He was arrested on 4 May 1923, expelled from the party, and subjected to a hearing from 9 to 12 June; from jail he wrote a defence addressed to the Central Control Commission with copies to Stalin and Trotsky, entitled "Who Am I?", in which he reasserted his commitment to world socialist revolution, defended his criticisms of the party's nationalities policy and his belief that the revolution depended on the liberation of all colonies, and retracted his confession. He was the first Bolshevik politician to go from a disagreement with Stalin to a police cell; Zinoviev is reported to have said that this was the moment Stalin tasted blood. He was arrested again in 1928 and sent to a camp in the far north, released in 1934, arrested a third time in 1937 and shot in 1940. A conference on the national question in June 1923 established that Stalin's policies in this area were not to be challenged.

The revisionist reading should be carried alongside. Mark Baker, working from published and unpublished documents on the arrest, interrogation and

trial, argues that Sultan-Galiev was not Stalin's first victim in the sense usually meant: responding to the vagaries of Soviet nationality policy he did violate party discipline in a number of ways and was engaged in developing conspiratorial ties outside the party, and the leadership, Stalin included, treated him less severely than it could have. Both accounts can stand. A man can be genuinely in breach of party discipline and also be in a cell because of what he said about Russian dominance in the Muslim republics; the interesting fact for this module is which of his propositions the party found it necessary to close off by resolution, and it was the description of the arrangement.

The census that was annulled

The clearest instance of the new order's information machinery at work is not a censorship case at all, and that is the point.

In January 1937 the USSR conducted its first population census in eleven years. The information gathered was exceptionally thorough and complete.

It also asked a question no Soviet census had asked before or would ask again, and the question was inserted on Stalin's own instruction: whether the respondent was a believer. That is not a trap or an oversight. It is a governing theory putting its own prediction to a test, on a hundred million people, with a first-class instrument, at the height of the Terror — in villages where the mullah had already been taken and where rumour held that anyone answering yes would follow him.

55,277,049 people answered yes. They were 56.7 per cent of everyone over the age of sixteen who answered the question at all, twenty years after a state had set out to abolish religion by removing the material conditions that were said to produce it.

The population total came in at about 162 million, against 147 million in 1926 and far below the figure the leadership had publicly used, and that shortfall — the visible arithmetic of the famine years — is the reason usually given for what happened next. Both findings were unusable and the second could not be separated from the first.

The census was annulled and its results suppressed within days. Ivan Kraval, who headed the central statistical body, was arrested and executed; Olimpii Kvitkin, one of the key leaders of the operation, was arrested and died in custody; other statisticians were shot or sent to camps where few survived. A

new census was held two years later, redesigned so that certain answers could no longer appear — the religion question was simply not asked — and the official line was that the 1937 census had been faulty and therefore had to be replaced. The formal charge against its directors was crude violations of the principles of statistical science.

Set that out as a sequence, because the sequence is the argument. A theory made a falsifiable prediction. The state built an instrument capable of testing it and ran the test properly. The test returned a refutation. The refutation was reclassified as an error of method, the men who had produced it were prosecuted for incompetence, and the instrument was rebuilt so that the observation could not be made again. Two years, from the question to its deletion.

Two further details belong to this study specifically.

The first is that the accuracy of the annulled count is not in doubt, and is best attested precisely where this study needs it. The evidence cited for the census's thoroughness comes from Kazakhstan, where, despite the difficulties of collecting data, the enumeration was calculated to have missed less than one per cent of the population. The republic that had just lost a third of its titular nationality was counted almost exactly, and the count was destroyed.

The second is that the concealment ran inward as far as it could go. The state also disguised information from itself, for example by forbidding people employed in defence industries from giving accurate information to the enumerators about their place of work or trade speciality.

And the event the count would have made visible was not reportable in any register. The Kazakh famine of 1930–33 is now given at 1.3 to 2.3 million dead, the majority ethnic Kazakhs, with 665,000 to 1.1 million refugees, and the Kazakh share of the republic's population falling from about sixty per cent to about thirty-eight. That accounting belongs to Module 11. What belongs here is that between 1930 and 1991 there was no year in which a Soviet citizen could read that it had happened.

Reading information against the framework

Four findings, of which the second is the module's contribution.

The corpus's first non-empty column, and the threshold rule is confirmed by inversion rather than refuted. *The Empty Column* holds that a

regime buys censorship only where its audience's tolerance runs below the fact, and that across the liberal colonial cases the metropolitan tolerance stood above every fact, so the censor was a waste of money. Tsarist Turkestan fits that finding without adjustment, and supplies a new instrument for it: an administration so untroubled by what was printed about it that it bound the printing into 594 volumes and shelved it. The Soviet case fills the column — and it fills it for a reason the rule predicts. The audience of the new order had been told, in the founding appeal of December 1917 and again at Baku in 1920, that colonialism had been abolished and that the oppressed nationalities had been liberated; and that audience included the party, the international movement, and the colonised populations of Asia the state was actively recruiting. Against a promise of that size, the ordinary facts of colonial administration — which a tsarist governor could print at a shilling and threepence — became intolerable. **The censorship column measures the revisability of an order's governing claim, not the severity of its conduct.** The tempting reading is that a regime which promises more must hide more, and it is wrong; volume of promise does not track the size of a censor. Britain promised a great deal in Article 22 of the Covenant — the sacred trust of civilisation, tutelage, eventual standing alone — to an international audience with standing, and required no Glavlit, no annulled count and no prosecuted statisticians anywhere it applied. What Britain could do, and this state could not, was concede a failure: a commission of enquiry, a white paper, a timetable revised, *not yet ready*. Each concession cost a policy document. Here a concession would have cost the claim that the law had been demonstrated. **The corpus should therefore stop treating a full column as evidence of greater brutality, and start treating it as evidence that the order's governing claim cannot be qualified without collapsing.**

And the operation performed here is not censorship. It is annulment, and the distinction is the finding — and annulment turns out to be the same operation as the shooting of the cadres. Censorship concedes that a fact exists and forbids its circulation; the censored author is an informant who must be silenced. What was done to the 1937 census was different in kind. The count was not classified as a secret. It was declared to be *not a count* — the product of crude violations of the principles of statistical science — and the men who produced it were dealt with not as revealers but as saboteurs whose technical

work was defective. The state did not hide the number. It denied that the number had ever been established.

This is what a doctrine held as demonstrated fact must do with contrary evidence, and it is why the file in this case is not a censorship file but a file of corrections. A hypothesis meets a disconfirming measurement and revises; a demonstrated law meets a disconfirming measurement and concludes that the measurement was taken wrongly. The framework already distinguishes an order whose governing claims are held as revisable generalisations from one whose governing claims are held as certainties, and this module supplies the operational signature of the second: **where a doctrine cannot be refuted by evidence, the evidence is reclassified as a defect of method, and its producers are prosecuted for incompetence rather than for disclosure.** A study running this module on any order should therefore look not only for banned books and prosecuted journalists but for *withdrawn statistics, annulled surveys and disciplined technical staff*, which are the same mechanism operating one layer further in, and which will be filed under administration rather than under security.

And once it is stated that way, three episodes this study has treated in three different modules turn out to be one operation. The agricultural specialists who said the steppe could not be settled were denounced as bourgeois nationalists. The statisticians who counted a hundred million people correctly were prosecuted for crude violations of the principles of statistical science. Fayzulla Khojaev, head of the Uzbek government, was shot having confessed to opposing the delimitation and the cotton monoculture. Different departments, different years, different charges — and one mechanism running under all three: **where a governing claim cannot be in error, an outcome that contradicts it must be an error in a person.** The doctrine is not available for revision, so the fault has to be located somewhere, and the only location left is the man who produced the finding. That is why the failures of an unrevisable doctrine land on the machinery, and specifically on the people staffing it, rather than on a budget line — the question this study's central revision otherwise leaves open. It also explains a quantity nobody planned: **converting an epistemic problem into a personnel problem generates an unbounded demand for investigators**, because a doctrine can fail indefinitely and each failure requires a fresh person to have been responsible for it.

The suppression map moved from conduct to vocabulary. Under the Tsar a man could publish that officials were extorting, torturing and defrauding, and receive a budget debate; what cost an officer his posting was a written allegation that the state had broken a fiscal promise. Under the successor the conduct was not the offence at all — it was the description. Sultan-Galiev's propositions were that Russian chauvinism persisted and that Russians dominated the government of the Muslim republics, and the party's response was a cell in 1923, a resolution closing the question in June 1923, and a grave in 1940. The threshold rule holds; the threshold has simply relocated. **In an order legitimated by a doctrine about itself, the punishable act is not doing the thing but naming it**, which is why such an order's dissidents are so often people who agree with its purposes and disagree about its self-description.

And the latency figure, for the second entry in the corpus's table. *The Empty Column* found that the liberal order's audit machinery is real, runs on cost transfer rather than conscience, and lags by about a century — long enough for every beneficiary to die comfortable. Turkestan supplies the other reading. There was no audit machinery here at all: no court an injured party could enter, no press, no opposition, no rival power with standing, and a statistical service whose senior staff had been shot for counting. The archives opened when the state that had built them dissolved, which puts the lag on the famine at about sixty years and on the conquest at about a century and a quarter — and the opening was not a correction the order performed but a consequence of its ending. **An order with a slow audit and an order with none produce comparable lags; the difference is that the first eventually indicts itself and the second must be outlived.** That is a colder finding than the one the corpus had, and it should replace the assumption that the absence of a censor is always the better sign.

A note on sources. Eugene Schuyler's report of 7 March 1874, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* for 1874, is public-domain government material and supplies the account of corruption, torture and requisition summarised here, the interpreter problem, Kaufman's prohibition of the Samarkand lithographic press, and the removal of the Ura-Tyube commandant for writing to St Petersburg. The two *Golos* articles of 24 January and 11 February 1875 on the Turkestan finances and on Schuyler's despatch are known to this study only through a footnote in the scholarly literature on Kaufman's administration; the articles themselves have not been read, and the claim that they establish — that Schuyler's indictment was discussed in the Russian press within a year — rests on that citation alone

and should be verified before it is relied upon further. The *Turkestanskii sbornik*'s extent (594 volumes, 1867–1917, compiled under Kaufman's direction by V. I. Mezhov) is as the reference literature gives it.

Glavlit's creation in the summer of 1922, the GPU's role in its leadership, the 1923 Politburo formulation about a pedagogical slant, and the organisation's self-description around 1924 are drawn from published work on the origins of Soviet censorship, paraphrased and credited, alongside the Library of Congress account of the Russian archives.

The Sultan-Galiev material is deliberately given from more than one direction. The chronology — conflict with Stalin's nationality policy from late 1922, arrest on 4 May 1923, expulsion, the hearing of 9–12 June, the jail defence entitled "Who Am I?", re-arrest in 1928, release in 1934, third arrest in 1937 and execution on 28 January 1940 — follows the standard accounts, which differ slightly on dates. Zinoviev's remark about Stalin tasting blood is reported at second hand and should not be treated as documentary. The revisionist reading, that Sultan-Galiev did breach party discipline and had conspiratorial contacts and was treated less severely than he might have been, is Mark Baker's and is reported here because a study that used only the martyrological account would be doing what this method exists to prevent.

The 1937 census material follows the scholarly literature, principally the archival study of the census and its suppression in *The Historical Journal* and the specialist demographic work of Wheatcroft, Andreev, Darskii and Khar'kova, paraphrased and credited. The religion question — Stalin's personal insertion of it, the figure of 55,277,049 believers representing 56.7 per cent of those over sixteen who answered, and the deletion of the question from the 1939 replacement — is carried from the collection's own study of the census, which draws it from the literature summarising the archival work of Poliakov and Zhiromskaya and from Corley, Merridale and Harrison; the figure is widely reproduced and the underlying returns have not been examined here. Also from that literature: the date of 6 January 1937, the reported total of about 162 million against 147 million in 1926, the suppression within days, the arrest and execution of Ivan Kraval and the arrest and death in custody of Olimpii Kvitkin, the redesign of the 1939 census, and the evidence from Kazakhstan that the enumeration missed under one per cent of the population. The phrase "crude violations of the principles of statistical science" is reproduced from a popular account of the episode and should be collated with the original decree

text before it is quoted as documentary; the substance of the charge is not in doubt.

Kazakh famine figures are given as the standard reference ranges (1.3–2.3 million dead; 665,000–1.1 million refugees; the Kazakh share of the republic's population falling from around sixty to around thirty-eight per cent) and the full accounting, together with the live dispute over whether the events constitute genocide, is deferred to Module 11, where the competing readings will be reported as each side states them.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE EIGHT

HE HAD NEVER BEEN THERE

Module 8 · Elite Coordination and the Default — how a conqueror who could not marry in, could not share the creed, had abolished the only throne on offer and had shot the elite he built, held five republics for half a century by chartering the quarrels he found and reserving to himself the right to settle them

The question, put from the top

The man in the cotton field is not the problem. He is held by the floor, and the floor has been reconstructed in this study in some detail: thirty-six thousand troops under the Tsar, a hundred thousand under Frunze, a *mahalla* that policed itself for nothing, a residual removed in 1916 and removed again in 1930. He does not hold the arrangement up. He is what the arrangement stands on.

The question is about everybody else — the men *inside* the hierarchy, whose interests do not obviously coincide and who in many cases actively disliked one another. A Russian irrigation engineer in Tashkent, a Samarkand party boss, a Kazakh oblast secretary, a Ferghana kolkhoz chairman, a ministry official in Moscow costing the cotton plan, an NKVD colonel: these people wanted different things, competed for the same money, and in several documented cases denounced each other to the state. And yet the arrangement held, for decades, without anybody coordinating it — because each of them, in defending what he personally had, was thereby defending the structure that gave it to him.

That is the default, and it is a tendency and not a law. Some orders arrange it well and some badly. This module asks how this one arranged it, where the chain was weakest, and what happened when the weak link finally gave.

What the conqueror found in 1918 was not a people but a quarrel

Before anything else, the picture of the region that most accounts start from has to be corrected, because the correction is what makes the rest of the module intelligible.

The Bolsheviks did not arrive in Central Asia to find a united Muslim society they then broke up. They found a society at war with itself, and the leading historian of the period is emphatic about it. In Central Asia, on Adeeb Khalid's account, the Soviet Union was confronted not by a unified, cohesive local society but by a bitterly divided one; conflicts within Central Asian society were as important as conflicts between Europeans and Central Asians in the early Soviet period, and historians should rid themselves of the phantom of Central Asian Muslim unity and look at the region as an arena of multifaceted conflict. We should therefore be wary, he writes, of claims of a primordial unity of the people of Turkestan that was shattered by Soviet machinations.

The lines of that conflict have all appeared in this study already. Jadid reformers against the *ulama*, over the school and the alphabet. Bukhara against Khiva against Kokand, three dynasties that had fought each other for a century. Sedentary against nomadic, a division the imperial statute book had made into a legal category. Persian-speaking against Turkic-speaking in cities where both were spoken in the same street. Ferghana against Samarkand against Tashkent. The Manghits, who could not claim Chinggisid descent, against a steppe that recognised nothing else.

A conqueror walking into that does not need to invent a division. He needs only to decide which of the existing ones he will recognise.

The trap, and the honest version

The popular account of what happened next is that Stalin drew deliberately absurd borders to set the peoples against each other. That account has been substantially dismantled, and a study that repeated it would be taking the easiest available narrative over the evidence.

The work of Yuri Slezkine, Ronald Suny, Terry Martin, Arne Haugen, Francine Hirsch, Sergei Abashin and others has established that, far from being

a breaker of nations, Stalin was responsible for giving them territorial and institutional form as Commissar for Nationalities in the 1920s — not as a cynical divide-and-rule policy but as a response to the strength of nationalist movements that had emerged during the revolution and civil war, leading to a sincere if perhaps misguided attempt to create nation-states where none had existed, because both Lenin and Stalin believed that backward peoples could never attain socialism except within a nationalist framework. It was not a top-down process driven from Moscow: in the 1920s the Soviet regime in Central Asia was fragile and badly in need of local allies.

Khalid's own formulation is the sharpest: the creation of Uzbekistan was "the triumph of an indigenous national project," not sinister Soviet machinations, and Adrienne Edgar's study of Turkmenistan concurs — Moscow's role was undeniably important, but the crucial contribution of local elites in shaping Soviet nations has not received enough attention. Non-Russian minorities, if not always eagerly then begrudgingly, participated in the delimitation, a fact the divide-and-conquer narrative overlooks. And the framing principle long predated the redrawing: the idea that political and administrative boundaries inside the Soviet Union should coincide with linguistic boundaries had been established once the party decided, as early as 1919, that territorial autonomy would be the basis of the new state.

The paperwork bears this out. The Orgburo discussed the delimitation of the Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm republics on 31 January 1924; a conference concluded that it was necessary; and on 25 February the question went to the plenum of the Bukharan Communist Party, where Fayzulla Khojaev, chairman of the Bukharan council of commissars, addressed it and put forward his "Theses of the Central Committee of the Bukhara Communist Party — the main provisions on the issue of forming Uzbekistan." The Politburo resolved on 12 June 1924 to form an independent Turkmen republic from the Turkmen areas of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm, and an independent Uzbek republic from the Uzbek areas of Turkestan and Bukhara, with a Kara-Kirghiz autonomous oblast, a Tajik autonomous oblast inside the Uzbek republic, and the Kazakh districts of Turkestan joined to the Kazakh ASSR.

Hold two facts about that sequence at once. The Theses on forming Uzbekistan were proposed, in February 1924, by Fayzulla Khojaev. Fourteen years later, at the Trial of the Twenty-One, Khojaev's confession had him admit

that he had *opposed* the breaking-up of Turkestan into four republics. He was shot in March 1938.

The counter-evidence must also be reported, because the revisionist case disposes of the intention and not of the outcome. The 1989 census showed titular nationalities as minorities in their own republics — Kazakhs at 39.7 per cent in Kazakhstan — and on one account the process left over twenty per cent of Uzbeks outside Uzbekistan, producing irredentist grievances that surfaced after 1991. Whether or not anyone intended it, the map that emerged put large populations on the wrong side of lines that would later become international frontiers.

What the delimitation did to the elite

Now the finding, which is compatible with the revisionism and sharper than the folk account.

Whatever it did to the peoples, the delimitation did one specific thing to their leaderships: it converted a set of rival claimants with no forum into a set of **chartered claimants with a forum in Moscow**. Before 1924, a Bukharan and a Khivan and a Tashkent Jadid quarrelling over territory, water and precedence had no third party who could settle it and no institution in which the settlement would stick. After 1924, each of them had a republic with a border, a capital, an official language, a party organisation and a delegation — and every one of those things had been conferred by, and could be adjusted by, a body in Moscow.

The consequences ran for the whole life of the union. Borders were not settled in 1924; they were opened. In 1962 Ismail Yusupov replaced Kunaev as first secretary in Kazakhstan after Kunaev disagreed with Khrushchev's plan to incorporate lands in southern Kazakhstan into Uzbekistan, and during Yusupov's tenure, on his initiative, several regions of South Kazakhstan were duly transferred to the Uzbek SSR. Two years later Kunaev was back, and stayed for twenty-two years. A territorial question between two republics was decided by removing the first secretary who objected, and reversed by restoring him. That is not a border dispute between nations. It is a patronage dispute between clients, adjudicated by a patron.

State the mechanism plainly, because it is not the one the folk account describes and it is not innocent either. **A conqueror who charters existing**

rivalries and reserves the adjudication to himself has made himself necessary to men who dislike each other. He need not manufacture the quarrel — Khalid is right that the quarrel was there, and right that the national project was locally authored. What he does is give each party a stake worth defending, define the stakes so that one party's gain is another's loss, and keep the only office where the loss can be reversed. Every claimant then has a permanent reason to prefer that the arbiter continue to exist, and none of them has a reason to combine with the others, because the others are precisely who he is claiming against.

That is worth distinguishing from divide-and-rule as a Menu entry, because the two make different predictions. Divide-and-rule implies manufactured divisions and predicts that the divisions will fade if the ruler withdraws. **Adjudicate-and-rule** implies real divisions, chartered rather than created, and predicts that they will *outlive* the ruler and become the successor states' foreign policy. Central Asia after 1991 is the second, not the first.

The audit, link by link

The framework's instruction for this module is to run the chain explicitly and ask at every link whether this man, in defending his own position, thereby defends the whole. Run it on the mature Soviet arrangement — the settled order of roughly 1955 to 1985 — and the answer is yes at every link but one.

The centre. Moscow received the cotton, the geopolitical depth of a five-republic buffer against Iran, Afghanistan and China, and — not to be underrated, because the whole robe of Module 3 rested on it — a permanent exhibit for the colonised world it was recruiting: five Muslim republics with native governments, native-language universities and industrial statistics, presented as the answer to European empire. The arrangement paid the centre in three currencies at once.

The republican first secretary. He received a republic. Sharof Rashidov was first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan from 15 March 1959 until his death on 31 October 1983 — twenty-four years — and a candidate member of the Politburo from 1961; during his tenure the Uzbek SSR saw considerable economic growth and a very high degree of autonomy from the rest of the Soviet Union. Dinmukhamed Kunaev held the equivalent post in Kazakhstan from December 1964 to December 1986, having also held it from 1960 to 1962,

and was a full member of the Politburo from 1971 to 1987. The consideration was precise: deliver the plan, keep the republic quiet, and in exchange hold the patronage of an entire country for a generation, with a seat at the table that allocated the union's investment. For many in Uzbekistan, Rashidov was "their guy" — a top official of the USSR, accountable to Moscow, but with a general impression that he put Uzbekistan's concerns first.

Note what he was *not* given. No land: the settlement of 1886 had refused to enfeoff and no Soviet settlement restored it. No armed following: the republics had no armies, and the security organs answered to Moscow. He was given an office, a network and an immunity, and all three evaporated the moment he lost the office. That is the modern colonial co-optation with the military clause deleted, taken to its limit — a client with no retinue, no estate and no heritability, holding everything at the patron's pleasure and therefore with no capacity whatever to defect.

The Russian cadre. The engineers, the second-tier administrators, the industrial managers and the security officers received careers, postings and a standard of living. It is widely reported that the second secretary of each Central Asian republican party organisation was, by convention, a Slav appointed from outside — a dyarchy pairing a native figurehead with a Moscow supervisor. This study has not verified that convention against a scholarly source and flags it as reported rather than established; what is documented is that the appointment of first secretaries was made by the Politburo or the general secretary directly.

The regional and clan networks. Below the republican leadership sat the machines that actually distributed everything — the Samarkand and Bukhara networks against the Tashkent and Ferghana ones in Uzbekistan, the *zhuz*-derived networks in Kazakhstan — and each of them defended its share of the republic against the others, and thereby defended the republic, and thereby defended the arrangement that guaranteed the republic. This is the default at its purest: men whose entire political energy went into fighting each other, all of whom needed the structure they were fighting inside to continue existing.

The kolkhoz chairman and the raion boss. He received a local monopoly on distribution, the cover of the plan, and a share of whatever the reported figures made possible. His interest in the arrangement was immediate and personal.

And the man in the field. He received nothing, and is held by the floor, exactly as the framework says. The schoolchildren picking the cotton are not a link in this chain. They are what the chain is holding down.

So the audit returns a chain sound at every link from the kolkhoz to the Kremlin — and the weak link is the one at the top, which is where the framework says to expect it. Every party to this arrangement had a reason to keep it going except the centre, whose reasons were the cotton, the buffer and the exhibit, and all three were revaluable by a man in Moscow with a pen.

What the elite war left untouched

The default is measured not by harmony but by what survives an attack from people with every incentive and every resource to press it. Central Asia supplies the test in the 1980s, and it is a good one because the attack came from the top.

According to the Soviet leadership in 1983, Rashidov was a thief: accused of over-reporting cotton harvest figures and of pocketing money from state coffers. Officially he committed suicide on 31 October 1983, though some suggest his passage might have been assisted. He became the example of corruption for the entire Soviet Union and sparked the purge of republican leaders that followed, which saw the eventual removal of all the long-serving first party secretaries in Central Asia. Thousands of officials were prosecuted; the investigation ran for years; a first secretary was posthumously disgraced and his successor removed in turn.

Now ask what the war left standing. It did not touch the existence of the republics. It did not touch their borders. It did not touch the cotton plan — the very thing the fraud had been committed about, and the thing an honest reformer would have questioned first. It did not touch the principle that these were national republics with national languages and national academies. And it did not touch the rule that the man at the top of each of them would be one of its own.

Nobody in that quarrel — not Moscow, not the accused, not the prosecutors, not the successors — proposed abolishing Uzbekistan. The propositions that survived an attack pressed by the general secretary of the Soviet Union with the full apparatus of the procuracy behind him are the default, and they are a short list: *the republics exist, the borders are as drawn, the cotton is delivered, and the first secretary is a native.*

The proposition nobody had written down

Then, in December 1986, the centre broke the fourth item, and discovered it was there.

Kunaev was removed in December 1986 as part of Gorbachev's anti-corruption campaign. His replacement was Gennady Kolbin, an ethnic Russian with no previous connection to Kazakhstan. Kolbin had never visited or worked in Kazakhstan before his appointment. On 17 December 1986 thousands of demonstrators, predominantly young ethnic Kazakhs, took to the streets of Alma-Ata; they demanded a stake in the political process and protested at their perceived status as second-class citizens in their own country, objecting to Kolbin on the grounds that he was an ethnic Russian from outside the republic. The protest lasted several days, spread to other towns, and was suppressed by Soviet security forces. Tens of thousands participated, thousands were arrested, hundreds jailed, and an unknown number were killed.

Two things about this are decisive for the framework.

The first is what was demanded. Not independence. Not the end of the cotton plan. Not the return of the pasture taken by norm, or an accounting for the famine, or the reopening of the mosques. A Kazakh in the office. In 1989 Nazarbayev replaced Kolbin as first secretary, so the protesters eventually got their wish — a local leader — and he was positioned to take the helm of independent Kazakhstan when the union collapsed.

The corpus holds that a co-opted elite's maximal public demand names the boundary of the default and will always concede the conquest. This is that proposition at the highest resolution it has ever been observed. An entire republic went into the street, at real cost, over the nationality of one appointee — and in doing so conceded, without anybody noticing that a concession was being made, the republic's borders, its economic function, its language policy, its constitution and its membership of the union. The demand *was* the boundary. Everything not demanded was the default.

The second is what the episode reveals about how such rules exist. There was no statute requiring a native first secretary. There was no clause in the union constitution, no party resolution, nothing to cite. The rule existed as a settled expectation among everyone who had a position — and the only way anyone could have established that it existed was for the centre to break it and watch

what happened. **A default's load-bearing propositions are frequently unwritten, and are legible only in the wreckage of their breach.** A study looking for the constitution of an arrangement should therefore look less at its documents and more at the occasions on which somebody at the top did something obvious and the whole thing lurched.

The Menu, and the drift

Classify the case explicitly, and track the drift, because the drift is most of the story.

The conqueror could not co-opt by kinship: no Russian married into the Central Asian aristocracy, and no fictive kinship was on offer. He could not co-opt by faith: his creed condemned the local one by name. He could not assume the chair: the Chinggisid office had been abolished by his own predecessor between 1822 and 1848, and the caliphal one had been dissolved with the emirate in 1920. He had refused, in 1886, to enfeoff — vesting the land in the cultivator specifically in order to destroy the class a settlement would normally buy. And in 1937–38 he destroyed the native elite that indigenisation had built.

What was left was to construct a third elite from nothing and bind it with the only instruments remaining: **office, patronage and impunity, held at will.** That is Co-opt, in the modern colonial form, with the consideration reduced to political compliance and plan fulfilment, and with the grant reduced from land to tenure. The drift across the order's life is legible and should be recorded as such: from **Prevent** in the 1930s — purge the native cadre, allow no hereditary elite to form, rotate and shoot — to **Co-opt** from the later 1950s, when Moscow discovered that a republic run by a stable native machine for twenty-four years delivered more cotton and less trouble than one run by a rotating series of frightened men.

And the drift is the collapse's mechanism, exactly as the framework predicts it will be. The stable native machines that made the arrangement cheap after 1955 were the same machines that, by 1985, were falsifying the harvest, holding the patronage of whole countries, and capable of putting a republic into the street when the centre touched them. Moscow's answer in 1986 was to revert to the earlier item on the Menu — appoint an outsider — and the arrangement did not tolerate it, because thirty years of the later item had made the earlier one unaffordable.

Nineteen ninety-one

The last observation is the one the seed for this study flagged as potentially the framework's cleanest available demonstration, and it holds.

Islam Karimov became first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party in June 1989, president of the Uzbek SSR on 24 March 1990, declared independence on 31 August 1991, and was elected president on 29 December 1991 — and he had Rashidov rehabilitated shortly after independence. Nazarbayev, who had replaced Kolbin in 1989, took the helm of independent Kazakhstan and remained in power for decades. Saparmurat Niyazov returned to Turkmenistan as first secretary in 1985, was a Politburo member in 1990–91, and became the first president of independent Turkmenistan after the referendum of 27 October 1991. Kyrgyzstan is the partial exception and should be named as such: Askar Akayev, a physicist rather than a party boss, took the presidency, though he had risen through the same Soviet institutional world.

In the space of a few months the doctrine that had licensed everything in this study since 1917 — the abolition of colonialism, the liberation of the oppressed nationalities, the historical necessity of the whole arrangement — was withdrawn, denounced and discarded. And the arrangement of who held what did not move. The same men held the same offices in the same capitals inside the same borders, and went on growing the same crop.

Reading elite coordination against the framework

Four findings.

Adjudicate-and-rule, and it should go on the Menu as distinct from divide-and-rule. The corpus's existing entries assume the conqueror is managing a claimant class he has to seat, prevent, rotate, buy or bypass. Central Asia shows a sixth-and-a-half option available wherever the conquered order is already at war with itself: **charter the existing rivalries, define the stakes so that one party's gain is another's loss, and keep the only office where a loss can be reversed.** The conqueror manufactures nothing; the divisions are genuine and locally authored, and the leading scholarship on this case is right to insist on that. What he supplies is *finality* — the property that a settlement stays settled — and finality is the scarcest good in a society of rival claimants

with no third party. Every claimant then wants the arbiter to persist, and no claimant can combine with the others, because the others are exactly whom he is claiming against. The diagnostic that distinguishes this from divide-and-rule is what happens afterwards: manufactured divisions fade when the ruler withdraws, chartered ones become the successor states' foreign policy. Central Asia's borders did not dissolve in 1991. They became international frontiers with garrisons on them.

The maximal demand, observed at the highest resolution the corpus has. The proposition that a co-opted elite's largest public demand marks the boundary of the default and concedes the conquest has been tested here against a whole population in the street. In December 1986 the demand was the nationality of one appointee. It was not independence, not the borders, not the cotton, not the language, not the accounting for 1930. And the demand was granted in 1989 — which is the second half of the finding, because a demand a patron can grant is a demand that confirms the arrangement rather than threatening it. **The safest concession an arrangement can make is the one its own subordinates have been trained to ask for.**

Load-bearing propositions are unwritten and are legible only in breach. No document required a native first secretary. The rule existed as a shared expectation among everyone holding a position, and it was invisible until the centre broke it, at which point it was discovered by everybody at once. The instruction this yields for the module is practical: to find an arrangement's real constitution, do not read its constitution. **Find the occasions on which the apex did something routine and the structure lurched, and read the rule backwards out of the lurch.**

And the default is a structure of positions, not a set of beliefs — demonstrated by subtraction. This is the cleanest instance the corpus is ever likely to get, because the doctrine and the positions were separated experimentally and by accident. For seventy-four years every officeholder in Central Asia had been required to hold, profess and enforce a specific and demanding set of propositions about history, class and the destiny of nations. In 1991 those propositions were withdrawn by the centre that had imposed them, denounced by their own custodians, and abandoned within months. If the arrangement had been held together by belief, it should have fallen apart. Every single position-holder kept his position. The first secretaries became presidents, the oblast machines became provincial administrations, the cotton quota

became an export target, and the borders drawn to give socialist form to backward nations became the frontiers of sovereign states. **What holds an arrangement is not what the men in it believe; it is what each of them would lose if it stopped — and that quantity is unaffected by the withdrawal of the doctrine that explained why he had it.**

A note on sources. The revisionist historiography of the 1924 delimitation is the load-bearing element of this module and is reported as its authors state it: Adeeb Khalid's characterisation of pre-Soviet Central Asia as a bitterly divided society and an arena of multifaceted conflict, and of the creation of Uzbekistan as the triumph of an indigenous national project; Adrienne Edgar's parallel finding on Turkmenistan; and the broader body of work by Slezkine, Suny, Terry Martin, Arne Haugen, Francine Hirsch and Sergei Abashin, summarised here from Alexander Morrison's account of the debate and from the specialist literature, paraphrased and credited. This study has not read the archival material of the delimitation itself and does not adjudicate the remaining disagreements within that scholarship.

The procedural chronology — the Orgburo discussion of 31 January 1924, the Bukharan plenum of 25 February at which Fayzulla Khojaev presented his Theses on forming Uzbekistan, the Politburo resolution of 12 June 1924 and its territorial provisions, and the Sredazburo resolution following the Central Committee decision of 15 July — is taken from a published research paper working from the party records, and the underlying archival citations have not been independently checked. Khojaev's later confession that he had opposed the delimitation comes from the 1938 trial record as summarised in the reference literature and is treated, as throughout this study, as evidence of what the state required to be said rather than of what occurred.

The 1989 census figure for the Kazakh share of Kazakhstan's population, and the claim that over twenty per cent of Uzbeks were left outside Uzbekistan, are taken from a reference compilation whose sourcing this study has not traced; both are given as reported. They are included because the revisionist case concerns the intention behind the delimitation and does not dispose of its demographic outcome, and a module that reported only the intention would be incomplete.

Career dates for Rashidov, Kunaev, Yusupov, Kolbin, Nishonov, Karimov, Nazarbayev, Niyazov and Akayev follow the standard reference accounts. The transfer of southern Kazakh districts to the Uzbek SSR under Yusupov, and Kunaev's removal and restoration around it, follow the same accounts and rest in part on Kunaev's own memoirs, which are an interested source. Rashidov's

death on 31 October 1983 is officially recorded as suicide and the suggestion that it was assisted is reported in the journalism as a suggestion, not a finding. The scale of the cotton-affair prosecutions is well attested in outline but the numbers in circulation vary widely and none is adopted here.

The convention that the second secretary of each Central Asian republican party organisation was a Slav appointed from outside is widely reported but is flagged in the text as unverified against a scholarly source; readers should treat it as a reported convention until it is checked. Casualty and arrest figures for Zheltoqsan are given as the sources give them and remain contested in Kazakhstan itself, where an official commission formed after independence was dissolved before publishing findings; the number killed is not established, and no figure is asserted here.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE NINE

RUSSIAN IN SPIRIT

Module 9 · Plurality or Foreclosure — a colony governed by statute rather than constitution, whose six parliamentary seats were withdrawn in a manifesto that gave the true reason; and a successor whose written guarantees were the most generous in this collection and which contained no institution anywhere obliged to hear a man repeat them back

What is actually being tested

This module asks whether liberty was there, and the test is not what an order promised.

The proposition being examined runs as follows. Where organised violence, wealth and trusted information are all held by one coalition, there is no liberty whatever the language of the constitution, because there is nobody a claim can be made against. Where those things are genuinely divided — where factions that need protection from each other have to build institutions that will protect them — the residue of their quarrels hardens over time into procedures anyone can invoke: due process, a court that is obliged to hear you, a press somebody else owns, a franchise. Rights of that kind are rarely anyone's gift. They are usually the sediment of a fight between people who each needed a rule the other would also be bound by.

So the questions are concrete. What counterweights existed that the apex did not own? Was there any institution obliged to hear a claim? Who was inside and who outside, and where exactly was the line drawn? And when pressure came from below, did it release as reform, or store?

Central Asia is an unusually clean laboratory for this, because the same ground carried two orders in succession: one whose rights language was thin and whose exclusions were explicit, and one whose rights language was the most expansive in this collection and whose exclusions were not written down anywhere.

The colony was governed by statute, and the metropole by law

The first fact is jurisdictional and it settles a great deal.

Turkestan was not governed under the ordinary law of the Russian Empire. It was governed under the Statute of 12 June 1886, and under the emergency legislation on reinforced and extraordinary security of 1881, which gave the administration powers the metropolitan provinces did not routinely live under. The founding principle of the arrangement was stated in the project Schuyler summarised in 1874: the union of the civil and military powers in the same hands, with a governor-general who was at the same time commander-in-chief and who held, besides the ordinary powers of that office, the power in case of need to suspend the regulations or to make exceptions to them.

Read that last clause as a constitutional lawyer would. The governing document contains, inside itself, a provision permitting the governor to set the document aside. There is no arrangement of counterweights that survives such a clause, because every counterweight it might create is subject to it.

Nor was the empire's own machinery of local self-government extended. The *zemstvo* — the elected provincial assembly created by the reform of 1864, the one genuinely representative institution of imperial Russia — never reached Turkestan, and the omission was argued about at length. Advocates of general civil administration, and of extending the post-reform elected assemblies beyond European Russia, argued that this would improve the efficiency and justice of administration and assist assimilation to the Russian core; from the beginning of Alexander III's reign until after 1905 their efforts were generally stymied by fear of nationalism and revolution in the western provinces, and in Asia by the stigmatisation of the local population.

The consequence is the one Penati's title states outright: the *zemskii sbor*, the local levy calculated as a share of the land tax, was collected in a territory that had no *zemstvo* and no assembly of any kind to vote it. Taxation without representation, in the literal sense, as a settled administrative arrangement for half a century.

Six seats, and the manifesto that said why they went

Then, for two years, a window opened — and its opening and closing are the sharpest thing in the tsarist half of this module.

The revolution of 1905 forced the creation of an elected national parliament, and the franchise reached Turkestan because Turkestan was part of the empire that had conceded it. In the Duma established as a consequence of 1905, the indigenous inhabitants of Turkestan were allotted six representatives. Subsequent to the second Duma in 1907, Central Asians were denied all representation.

The instrument was the electoral law of 3 June 1907. Issued after the dissolution of the Second Duma and without parliamentary consent, it curtailed representation for peasants, urban workers and non-Russian ethnic groups while amplifying the influence of large landowners and conservative elements. And the manifesto by which Nicholas II announced it did something that the framework predicts and that is nonetheless startling to read: it gave the true reason.

Leaving in force all the rights given to Our subjects by the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, and by the fundamental laws, We have made a decision to change only the means by which the people's elected representatives are summoned to the State Duma, so that every part of the people can have its own chosen men in the Duma. Since it was created to strengthen the Russian state, the State Duma should also be Russian in spirit.

Nobody was deceived. The Duma existed to strengthen the Russian state; the people being removed from it were not Russian; therefore they were removed. The framework holds that inside a constitutional order exclusion is administered by exception rather than by denial, and that the justification offered will be *true*, because the state has manufactured the disqualification it then cites. Here the exclusion is not even administered by exception. It is stated as a premise, in the sovereign's own manifesto, in a sentence that also reaffirms that all the rights granted in 1905 remain in force.

The same window and the same closing can be watched in the press. From 1905 a Jadid press appeared in Turkestan — newspapers in Turki, arguing about schools, the alphabet, the clergy and the administration — and it was substantially closed again after 1908. Nothing about that flowering was

addressed to Central Asians as such. It arrived because a revolution in St Petersburg had loosened the censorship of an empire, and it ended when the same empire tightened it. The framework's proposition is that an externally opened window opens over a *jurisdiction* rather than a people, and 1905–08 is that proposition exactly: the liberties reached Turkestan the way weather reaches a field.

What counterweights actually existed

Against all that, something did exist, and a study that reported only the foreclosure would be dishonest.

The sharia court survived, and it was a genuine forum. The *qazis*, judging by the Sharia, were allowed to remain in the towns; they were made elective by delegates from the population, and their importance in the eyes of the natives was much diminished — but they remained, and for civil matters and lesser offences a Muslim of Turkestan took his dispute to a judge applying a law the Russian state had not written and could not readily rewrite. Among the nomads the *biys* did the same under customary law. This is not nothing. It is an institution obliged to hear a claim, applying rules the ruler did not author.

The endowments survived, and they were an independent income. The *waqf* sector financed the colleges, the teachers and a substantial part of the religious establishment out of shops, markets and land, without reference to any imperial budget. A class with its own revenue is the classic material of a counterweight — which is precisely why the administration went after the paperwork rather than the property. In Turkestan the colonial state recognised only those *waqfs* bearing a khan's stamp, thereby invalidating numerous local endowments.

And the clergy could petition, and be refused. On one or two occasions they appealed to the Russian authorities to prohibit practices they held contrary to the Koran, and the Russians refused to interfere. A body that can address the state and receive an answer, even a refusal, is in a different position from one that cannot.

Now the important qualification, because it changes what these counterweights were. None of them was the residue of a quarrel between factions inside the ruling coalition. There was no such quarrel. They survived because destroying them would have cost money the province did not have, and

because Kaufman held a theory that Islam left unsupported would wither of itself. That is a distinct provenance and it should be named: **these were rights that were the residue of the conqueror's parsimony.** Their character follows from their origin. They were civil rather than political — a *qazi* could settle an inheritance and could not review an administrative act. They were narrow. And they were revocable the moment the calculation changed, which is what happened after 1898, when the policy of non-interference was judged too permissive and the courts came under closer supervision.

And the inside had rings. A Russian settler in Turkestan had Russian courts, could not be tried by a *qazi*, and paid the excise that was the colony's fastest-growing revenue. But he lived under a military administration, in a territory without a *zemstvo*, under a governor who could suspend the regulations. He was inside relative to the native and outside relative to a man in Tula. The line was not one line. It was at least three: metropolitan Russian, colonial Russian, native — and the manifesto of 1907 drew the sharpest of them in a single clause.

Maximal rights, and no forum anywhere

The successor order inverts every term of this and confirms the proposition more completely than any case in the collection.

The Constitution of 1936 contains the most generous rights language this study has encountered. It guarantees each union republic the right freely to secede from the USSR. It declares the equality of citizens irrespective of nationality or race. It guarantees freedom of conscience, and the separation of church from state and school from church. And it guarantees, in law, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

The Uzbek and Kazakh republics were, on paper, sovereign nations in a voluntary union, with the right to leave it, whose citizens held speech, press and assembly as constitutional guarantees.

Now apply the test the framework insists on, which is not whether a right is written but whether an institution is obliged to hear a man repeating it back. There was no such institution. The courts were staffed and directed through the party apparatus; the procuracy answered upward; the Supreme Soviets ratified; the press was licensed by an organ jointly run with the political police; the

elections offered one candidate; and the party was constitutionally described as the leading core of all organisations, state and public alike. A citizen of the Uzbek SSR who wished to invoke his republic's right of secession, or his own right of assembly, had nowhere to invoke it and nobody who was required to answer.

And the three monopolies were fused as completely as anywhere in the corpus. Organised violence: the army, the internal troops, the MVD and the KGB, all answering to Moscow, with no republican force of any kind. Wealth: all land, all industry, all trade, all employment, held by the state — a man dismissed from his post was not merely unemployed but unemployable. Trusted information: Glavlit, the party's monopoly of interpretation, an annulled census and a shot statistical service. There was no third party anywhere in the arrangement, at any level, that a claim could be lodged with.

The framework's proposition is that where all three sit in one hand there is no liberty regardless of rhetoric. Central Asia between 1936 and 1985 is that proposition at the limit, and it adds a corollary the corpus should carry. The 1936 Constitution was promulgated in December of the year before the census was annulled, and eighteen months before the head of the Uzbek government was shot for a funeral and two opinions. **The volume of an order's rights language is not merely a poor indicator of its liberty; in this case it varied inversely with it**, because a document that has to be believed in place of an institution has to say a great deal more than one that merely records what an institution already does.

The residue that did exist, and what kind of thing it was

Something nonetheless survived, and it is instructive precisely because it fell short of being a right.

The clearest instance is the return, after a hundred and fifty-five years, of Catherine's instrument. The persecution of religion was halted in 1941; once Germany invaded, the regime mobilised all sources of support for the war effort, and in 1943 the state established the Spiritual Administration for the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan — SADUM — with the aim of both administering and controlling Islamic religious activity. It was established in Tashkent on 18 October 1943, functioning as a muftiate to administer registered mosques, certify imams and propagate a state-loyal Islam while

suppressing independent clerical networks; by the late 1940s roughly a thousand mosques were operating across Central Asia. A licensed clergy, appointed with the state's approval, whose sermons and rulings were monitored, established in wartime to mobilise a Muslim population — the 1788 arrangement, rebuilt by an officially atheist state, for the same reason and by the same method.

Its capacity was small. The registered clergy of the entire Soviet Union numbered certainly fewer than two thousand. And it was reversible: Khrushchev's atheist campaigns closed hundreds of mosques, curtailed religious publications and prosecuted unregistered clerics under anti-parasite laws, reducing the official total to fewer than five hundred by the early 1960s, before a partial recovery later.

But underneath the licensed sphere there was an unlicensed one, and it was large enough to force the state's hand — which is the one place in the whole Soviet half of this study where pressure from below produced a concession. Islam's vitality and the large number of unregistered places of worship in Central Asia participated in forcing the Soviet authorities, notably through SADUM's intermediation, to compromise on anti-religious policy, including by registering more mosques in the 1980s. The boundaries between registered and unregistered clergy were permeable; the majority of the non-registered scholars did not oppose the Soviet system, paid their taxes and maintained relations with official institutions.

Look carefully at what that is and is not. It is a genuine exercise of collective weight: a practice so widespread that policing it cost more than conceding it, and the state conceded. It is not a right. Nobody could invoke it; no institution was obliged to hear anyone; and when Khrushchev reversed the settlement of the 1940s, no claim was available and nobody could say a rule had been broken. **The difference between a right and a tolerance is not whether the practice is permitted. It is whether its withdrawal creates an obligation to answer** — and that is exactly the forum test, seen from the other side.

The one movement that worked

Under glasnost the window opened again from outside, and the study should ask, as it did of 1905, whether it opened over a people or over a jurisdiction, and what happened when it did.

Central Asia produced no dissident movement comparable to those of the Baltic republics, Ukraine or Armenia. What it produced instead, at the very end, was one mass campaign that succeeded completely, and the reasons for its success are the module's most useful evidence.

Between 1949 and 1989 the USSR conducted more than 450 nuclear tests at the Polygon near Semipalatinsk, with severe consequences for the health of local populations, and for most of the Soviet period information about the testing was classified. In 1989, in the climate of open debate facilitated by glasnost, the extent of the testing came into public discussion in the republic, and the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement was formed in February 1989 under the Kazakh poet Olzhas Suleimenov to campaign for an end to testing and the closure of the site. On 26 February 1989 Suleimenov, a candidate for the Congress of People's Deputies, interrupted a televised reading of his poetry to speak about the testing; the meeting that followed adopted a declaration, "High Time," calling for the closure of the facility, an end to nuclear weapon production, citizen control of nuclear waste, a map of radiation damage across the Soviet Union, and public acknowledgement of the victims; circulated as a petition it received over a million signatures within days, and on 1 August 1989 the Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution, authored by Suleimenov, calling for a moratorium. The movement was successful and the testing facilities were officially closed in 1991.

Now the mechanism, which matters more than the outcome. Four conditions held here that held nowhere else. The harm was physical, measurable and unarguable, so no interpretive quarrel was possible. The constituency was concentrated and identifiable. The demand could be granted without conceding anything structural — closing a test site does not touch the borders, the plan, the party or the union. And, decisively, the protests had the support of the republic's second-in-command, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who was seeking to entrench his own power and to elicit greater autonomy for the Kazakh SSR.

That last is the finding. The one popular campaign in seventy years that obtained what it asked for was a campaign that a faction inside the apex found useful. The million signatures were real and they mattered — they changed what the arrangement would cost — but the proximate agent was a man positioning himself for the succession, and the campaign's leader sat in the Congress of People's Deputies. This is the framework's standing proposition about structural change stated in a single episode, and it should be stated with

both halves intact: popular pressure reliably changes the price of a policy, which is a real form of power, and it is not authorship.

As to why there was no dissident movement of the ordinary kind, the study can offer a hypothesis and should not pretend to more. The intelligentsia that might have led one had been destroyed in 1937–38 and its replacements owed everything to the machine described in the previous module; there was no external window of the kind the Baltic republics had in their diasporas or Armenia in its church; the machines paid well enough at the top to make dissent expensive and pointless; and — the sharpest possibility — the co-opted elite's maximal demand was already being met, since the first secretary was a native and the republic had its name, its academy and its language. An order that has conceded the thing its subordinates would have asked for does not need to suppress a movement, because the movement does not form.

Reading liberty against the framework

Five findings.

The central proposition is confirmed at the limit, and with a corollary about rhetoric. Three monopolies in one coalition's hand — army and security answering to Moscow, all property state-owned, all interpretation licensed — produced no liberty of any kind, in a state whose constitution guaranteed the press, assembly, conscience and the right of a republic to secede. The corollary the case adds is that the two quantities moved in opposite directions: the most generous rights text in this collection was promulgated in the same eighteen months that produced the annulled census and the shooting of the Uzbek leadership. **A document that must be believed in place of an institution has to promise far more than one that merely records what an institution already does, so the volume of rights language is evidence about the absence of the forum rather than about the presence of the right.**

Rights can be the residue of parsimony as well as of a quarrel. The corpus's account of where rights come from is the sediment of fights between factions that each need a rule binding the other. Turkestan under the Tsar had no such fight and nonetheless retained a real forum — the *qazi* court, applying a law the ruler had not written — because abolishing it would have cost money the province had never had, and because the governor-general believed the whole edifice would collapse on its own. This is a third provenance and it

should go on the card, because it predicts the character of the rights it produces. Rights that are the residue of parsimony are **civil rather than political** (a *qazi* could divide an estate and could not review an administrative act), **narrow**, and **revocable the moment the calculation changes** — which is precisely what happened after Andijan in 1898. A study finding a surviving native institution under a conqueror should therefore ask whether it survived because somebody defended it or because nobody could afford to remove it, and expect very different durability in the two cases.

Tolerance is not a right, and the forum is the whole of the difference. The unregistered Islamic sphere of the Soviet period was large enough to compel a concession — the state registered more mosques in the 1980s because policing the alternative cost more. That is collective weight working, and it should be credited. It produced nothing anybody could invoke, and Khrushchev had reversed the previous settlement without anyone being able to say that a rule had been broken. The operative test is not whether a practice is permitted but **whether its withdrawal creates an obligation to answer.**

The inside and the outside are drawn by membership, not by race, and the boundary moves. Under the Tsar there were three rings — metropolitan Russian, colonial Russian, native — and the settler in Tashkent was inside relative to his neighbour and outside relative to a man in Tula, since he too lived under a governor empowered to suspend the regulations. Under the successor the ring was not ethnic at all but positional: party member and non-member, registered clergy and unregistered, the man with a post and the man without. That is why a native first secretary was *inside* while a Russian appointed over his head in 1986 was experienced as an intrusion. **The line an arrangement draws is the line of its own membership, and where the membership is defined by office rather than by descent, the ethnic reading of the boundary will mislead in both directions.**

And the externally opened window opens over a jurisdiction, confirmed twice on one territory eighty years apart. The liberties of 1905 reached Turkestan because Turkestan was inside the empire that conceded them, and were withdrawn in 1907 by an electoral law that named the reason in the sovereign's own manifesto. Glasnost reached Kazakhstan because Kazakhstan was inside the union that adopted it. In neither case was the opening addressed to the population, and in neither case did the population's own weight open it.

What the population's weight did, in 1989, was determine what got through — and it got through because a faction at the top wanted it to.

A note on sources. Eugene Schuyler's report of 7 March 1874, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* for 1874, is public-domain government material and supplies the description of military-popular administration, the governor-general's power to suspend the regulations or make exceptions to them, the retention of the *qazi* courts as elective offices, and the clergy's petition and its refusal.

Nicholas II's manifesto of 3 June 1907 is public-domain primary material and is quoted from a published English rendering; the Russian original should be consulted before further weight is placed on the exact wording, and in particular the rendering of the final clause. The characterisation of the electoral law's effect on non-Russian representation follows the standard reference accounts. The figure of six Duma seats for the indigenous inhabitants of Turkestan and their removal after 1907 is from a compilation resting on Library of Congress country-study material and has not been checked against the electoral law itself.

The absence of the *zemstvo* from Turkestan and the debate over extending general civil administration follow Alexander Morrison's work on military-popular administration, paraphrased and credited; the *zemskii sbor* material is Beatrice Penati's. The recognition of only those *waqfs* bearing a khan's stamp is from the recent historiographical survey of Islamic law under Russian rule.

The provisions of the 1936 Constitution are described here from the standard accounts rather than quoted, and the article numbers commonly given — 17 for the right of secession, 123 for equality irrespective of nationality and race, 124 for freedom of conscience, 125 for freedom of speech, press, assembly and demonstration — should be collated against the printed text before any of them is cited as such. The description of the party's constitutional position follows the 1936 text as summarised in the reference literature.

SADUM's foundation in Tashkent in October 1943, its function, and the fluctuating count of registered mosques follow Adeeb Khalid's account, Eren Tasar's study of SADUM and CARC, and the reference literature, paraphrased and credited. The mosque figures diverge between sources — roughly a thousand by the late 1940s, fewer than five hundred by the early 1960s, and around fifteen hundred by the late 1970s — and the comparison figure of 26,000 mosques in 1912 that appears in one reference summary has not been

traced to a source and is not relied upon here. The estimate of fewer than two thousand registered clergy across the USSR is Alexandre Bennigsen's. Vassily Klimentov's findings on the permeability of the registered and unregistered spheres, on the majority of unregistered scholars not opposing the system, and on the pressure that produced further registrations in the 1980s are paraphrased and credited.

The Nevada-Semipalatinsk chronology — Suleimenov's televised address of 26 February 1989, the "High Time" declaration and its five demands, the million signatures, the Supreme Soviet resolution of 1 August 1989, the halt to testing and the closure of the site in 1991, and the figure of more than 450 tests between 1949 and 1989 — follows the movement literature and the specialist work on the Polygon. Nazarbayev's support for the movement and his motives are reported as the journalism states them; a claim about a politician's purposes is an interpretation and is flagged as one. The explanation offered for the absence of a Central Asian dissident movement is presented in the text as a hypothesis and is not established by anything cited here.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE TEN

NO ARMED FORCE OF THEIR OWN

Module 10 · Change and Collapse — a territory that rose against an intact floor and was destroyed, watched the order that destroyed it fall fourteen months later for reasons four thousand miles away, lost a third of a nationality without rebelling, and in 1991 voted by ninety-five per cent to remain in a union that dissolved anyway because the men paying for it had done the sums

The proposition, and a territory that tests it four times

Structural change does not come from below. The common man commands no organised force, a durable order is an armed settlement, and an armed settlement is altered only by those who command arms. A rising against an intact floor is crushed with a regularity approaching a law. When orders change it is because the floor cracked first — because the elite that holds it fractured, or exhausted itself, or was conquered by a rival elite, or bred more claimants than it could seat, or, in the version this study will need most, sat down with the accounts and decided the holding was no longer worth its price.

The people are present at every one of those openings — as soldiers, as the crowd, as the weight one broken faction swings — and never as the author of the opening.

Central Asia tests that proposition four times in seventy-five years, on one territory, with the same population, and each test is unusually clean because the crack, when it came, was almost always somewhere else.

Nineteen sixteen: the rising that lost

The first test has already been laid out in this study and needs only to be read against the proposition.

In the summer of 1916 the largest popular rising in the region's modern history broke out across Turkestan and the Steppe. It was general, it was armed,

it took towns, it killed Russian officials and settlers in the thousands, it destroyed conscription lists and railway track, it proclaimed a holy war, and in places it elected its own khans and beks. In November a mounted force of some fifteen thousand surrounded Turgai.

It changed nothing. The punitive expeditions killed on the order of ten times as many Kazakhs and Kyrgyz as settlers had died; a quarter of a million people crossed into China and between a fifth and a third of them died on the passes; and the governor-general responded by ordering land seized wherever Russian blood had been shed and proposing an ethnically cleared zone for Russian settlement around Issyk-Kul. The tsarist administration in Turkestan emerged from the largest rising it ever faced not weakened but with a programme for further expropriation.

That is what an uprising against an intact floor does. It is not that the grievance was insufficient — the grievance was the removal of the last thing the arrangement had left them. It is that grievance is very nearly a constant, and a constant cannot explain a rare event.

Nineteen seventeen: the floor exhausted, in Galicia

Fourteen months later the government that had done all this ceased to exist, and Central Asia had nothing to do with it.

The Tsarist state fell because its army had been destroyed by Germany. The floor of force did not crack in Ferghana or Semirechye; it bled out in three years of catastrophic war against a stronger industrial power, and when it was gone the regime that had rested on it fell to whoever was standing nearest the vacuum in Petrograd. The peasants of Russia had always had the courage they were credited with in February, and had always been ridden down. What was different in 1917 was not the peasants.

Set the two years side by side and the region provides the cleanest natural experiment in this collection. In 1916 a population rose against the order with everything it had and was destroyed. In 1917 the same population did essentially nothing, and the order fell. Same people, same grievance, same decade. The variable was the floor, and the floor was four thousand miles away in Galicia.

The counter-elite that had no army

What happened next in Central Asia is the sharpest illustration in the corpus of what a crack in the floor actually offers, and to whom.

When the imperial administration in Tashkent collapsed in the spring of 1917, two bodies formed to claim the vacancy. One was the Tashkent Soviet — Russian railway workers, soldiers and settlers, organised, armed, and constituted so as to exclude the Muslim majority from leadership. The other was the congress of Muslims that met at Kokand in November and proclaimed an autonomy: Jadid reformers, lawyers, teachers, merchants, a provisional government with a council, with seats reserved for Russians, seeking representative self-government within a reformed Russia.

The Kokand government's fatal defect is stated in one clause. Neither the Kokand autonomy nor Alash Orda lasted long: both suffered from what, in the turbulent years of 1917–18, was a fatal weakness — they did not control an armed force of their own. In February 1918 the Tashkent Soviet launched an attack on Kokand, in which former Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war and members of the Armenian Dashnak party participated alongside Russian workers, soldiers and settlers. The Soviet shelled and invaded the city; the autonomy's disorganised defence collapsed; a delegation surrendered on 22 February 1918. Somewhere between five and fourteen thousand people were killed, and the seventy-eight-day-old government of the Muslims of Turkestan was finished.

Take the structure of that seriously, because it corrects a common reading of colonial collapse. The crack in the tsarist floor was real and it was general. But a crack is only an opportunity for whoever is already organised, and in a colony with a settler population the people who are already organised are, very often, the settlers. Russian railwaymen had unions, weapons and a soviet; the Jadids had a programme, a newspaper and a public loan. The gap that opened in 1917 was walked into, in Turkestan, by the colonists — and the first use they made of it was to destroy the natives' claim on the same vacancy.

The counter-elite that did have an army, and still lost

The corrective case follows immediately, and it is the corpus's purest instance of a surplus elite from one wrecked order leading a rising in another.

The basmachi resistance that ran from 1918 into the mid-1920s did have arms, did have territory, and for a season did have a leader of the first rank. Enver Pasha had been one of the three men who governed the Ottoman Empire through the World War — a war minister of a great power, now a man without a state, arriving in a country not his own to lead its rebellion. That is elite overproduction in its most literal form: not a thwarted provincial advocate but a discarded minister of a destroyed empire, with the formation, the connections and the sense of a promised place denied, mobilising a local population as the fuel of his own war.

He lost, and the reason is the one the proposition predicts. The floor he faced was not cracked but reconstituting: Soviet forces deployed approximately a hundred thousand troops under Frunze, with some estimates running higher; Basmachi strength fell from about twenty-six thousand fighters in May 1922 to six thousand seven hundred by October. Enver was killed in eastern Bukhara in the summer of 1922. The rising had everything the romantic account says a rising needs — genuine grievance, mass support in places, religious sanction, an experienced commander, arms — and it met an organised army under unified command, and it was destroyed.

Nineteen thirty: the catastrophe that produced no rising at all

Then comes the fact that is hardest for every account of change except this one.

Between 1930 and 1933 collectivisation and forced sedentarisation destroyed the Kazakh pastoral economy, and the resulting famine killed, on the standard reference ranges, between 1.3 and 2.3 million people — something on the order of two-fifths of the Kazakh nation — and drove between 665,000 and 1.1 million more across the borders. It is the largest catastrophe in the region's recorded history.

It produced no rising of any consequence. There was scattered resistance, there was slaughter of livestock, and above all there was flight. There was no

general revolt, no counter-elite, no march on a city, and nothing that threatened the arrangement for a day.

This should be stated as a rule rather than left as an observation, because the romantic account systematically expects the opposite. **Starvation demobilises.** A population that has lost its herds is a population without transport, without food reserves, without the physical capacity for sustained collective action, and with a set of immediate individual options — sell the last animal, walk to a town, cross the border — every one of which is more rational than joining a rising against an army. The framework should not expect a famine to crack a floor. It should expect a famine to fill the mortality tables and the emigration returns and leave the floor exactly where it was, and the years 1930 to 1933 in Kazakhstan are that expectation confirmed at the largest available scale.

Nineteen eighty-six and nineteen eighty-nine: the two openings from above

The next two occasions on which large numbers of Central Asians acted collectively both begin at the top, and both have been established earlier in this study.

In December 1986 Moscow removed a first secretary of twenty-two years' standing and installed an outsider who had never worked in the republic, and thousands came into the streets of Alma-Ata for four days. The crowd was real and it was punished. But the sequence begins with a decision in the Politburo and a displaced faction in Kazakhstan, and it ends in 1989 with the office restored to a native — which is to say that the opening was cut from above, the crowd poured through it, and the settlement it produced was one the apex could grant without conceding anything.

In February 1989 a poet interrupted a televised reading to speak about the Semipalatinsk test site, and within days over a million people had signed a petition; by August the Supreme Soviet had passed a moratorium resolution, and by 1991 the site was closed. That campaign obtained precisely what it asked for — and it did so with the backing of the republic's second-in-command, who was manoeuvring for the succession and for greater autonomy. The million signatures changed what refusal would cost. They were not what moved the lever.

Nineteen ninety-one: the accountants

And then the order ended, and the manner of its ending is the reason the seed for this study flagged 1991 as the framework's cleanest available demonstration.

Begin with what the population said when asked. On 17 March 1991 the union-wide referendum returned 76.4 per cent in favour of preserving the USSR as a renewed federation, on an eighty per cent turnout, with six republics boycotting. In Central Asia the margins were far above that. In the Uzbek SSR 95 per cent voted to preserve the union, and 95 per cent also voted, on a separate question asked only there, that the republic should remain part of a renewed union as a sovereign republic with equal rights. Turkmenistan returned nearly 98 per cent and Tajikistan 96 per cent. The conduct of the vote was not above criticism — unsealed ballot boxes and stuffing claims were noted in Alma-Ata, and Uzbekistan's Birlik movement alleged distribution of multiple ballots and inducements — and the numbers should be read as a state-managed plebiscite rather than a clean poll. But nothing in the criticism supports the opposite reading. No serious account holds that Central Asia was straining to leave in March 1991.

What followed was decided elsewhere and by other people. The August coup failed — and the Uzbek leadership had endorsed it. Independence was declared in Tashkent on 31 August. On 8 December the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus met at Belovezha and declared the union dissolved, without the Central Asian republics in the room. On 21 December the Alma-Ata Protocol was signed, at which point Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan formally established the Commonwealth of Independent States. And then the final detail, which is almost unbelievable when set beside the March figures: Uzbekistan held an independence referendum on 29 December 1991, three days after the Soviet Union had ceased to exist — the only republic to hold such a referendum after the disintegration of the union. The result was 98 per cent in favour of an independence there was by then no alternative to.

Now the mechanism, which is fiscal and is stated plainly in the economic literature. Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics were the primary recipients of large net transfers from the Soviet central budget, amounting in some cases to about ten per cent of their GNP, while Russia was the single

largest net donor, paying more into the union budget than it received both in rouble terms and as a share of GNP. With the dissolution of the central budget in November 1991 these transfers were discontinued, causing a large negative income shock in the recipient republics. And the political reading of that arithmetic by the men who acted on it is on the record: the dissolution was heavily influenced by the steps taken by the new leadership of the Russian republic in 1991, dictated by the logic of shedding ballast — amid an acute economic crisis the Russian leadership was not interested in taking on obligations toward the other republics, and viewed the Central Asian republics as underdeveloped regions, hopeless recipients of budget transfers.

The consequences arrived immediately and were enormous. The World Bank estimates that between 1990 and 1996 the economies of the Central Asian states declined by between twenty and sixty per cent of GDP, as they lost subsidies for budgets, enterprises and households, inputs for their industries, markets for their products, transport routes and their communications with the outside world.

So the sequence is complete, and it is the framework's ordinary sequence run at the scale of a union. The colony did not secede. It voted to stay. The metropole let it go, and let it go because an elite in the capital, facing an acute fiscal crisis, repriced the holding and concluded that the transfers were no longer worth making. The most consequential actor in the ending of this conquest, as in a good many others, was an accountant.

What the population said about its two conquerors

The seed for this study proposed that where a conquest passes from one power to another, the conquered population's comparison of its conquerors is the sharpest evidence available. The evidence exists here and it is uncomfortable, and it is set out without a conclusion attached.

On one side there is the material this study has already counted: the conquest of the 1860s to 1880s and its massacres, the norm-and-surplus expropriation, the 1916 revolt and the Ürkün, the Kokand killings of 1918, the basmachi war, the *hujum* and the two and a half thousand women killed by their own families, the annulled census, the shot leadership, the famine, the Aral.

On the other side there is what people have said. A Kyrgyz man in his twenties, speaking to a journalist in 2016 about the Ürkün, put it as "The Tsar

wanted to kill everyone. We were saved by Lenin" — one voice, reported in an article about the difficulty of remembering 1916, and not evidence of general opinion, but a voice that had been formed somewhere. A religious teacher who led underground Islamic study circles in Uzbekistan from the 1970s held that under Soviet rule Islam in Central Asia had remained intact, for Muslims could cultivate their faith, perform rituals and transmit their own culture. Karimov, having taken power in an independent Uzbekistan, had Rashidov rehabilitated shortly after independence. And ninety-five per cent of Uzbek voters, in March 1991, said they wished to remain in the union.

Against which: the same order had killed two-fifths of the Kazakh nation within living memory of many of those voters, and the census that would have shown it had been destroyed and its authors shot, so that a large part of what a Central Asian in 1991 could compare was a comparison the state had spent sixty years arranging.

Both columns are on the page. The reader has the arithmetic.

Collapse, continuation, or naturalisation

The framework asks, finally, whether the order collapsed, continued, or naturalised, and notes that where it naturalises its apparatus survives because nobody had occasion to abolish it.

Nothing in Central Asia was abolished. The republican first secretaries became the presidents. The borders drawn to give socialist form to backward nations became international frontiers with customs posts on them. The republican party machines became presidential administrations. The state-licensed muftiate that had been built in 1943 to manage Islam for an atheist state became the state-licensed muftiate that manages Islam for the independent republics. The *mahalla*, which the tsarist state had free-ridden on and the Soviet state had tried to convert, became in independent Uzbekistan a formal unit of local administration. The cotton procurement quota became an export target, collected by the same means. And the one institution that had never existed — a forum in which a citizen could make a claim that somebody was obliged to hear — did not come into existence either.

The order did not collapse. It changed its name, discarded the doctrine that had explained it, and continued.

Reading collapse against the framework

Five findings.

The four cracks are all visible on one territory, and none of them opened from below. 1916 is the rising against an intact floor, and it produced a programme of further expropriation. 1917 is exhaustion, and the exhaustion happened in Galicia. 1918–24 is a crack in a colonial floor walked into by whoever was already organised. 1991 is a repricing at the centre. In every case the population of Central Asia was present — as the dead, as the crowd, as the fuel — and in no case was it the author. A study wanting to test the proposition against a hard case will not find a better one, because the same people rose in 1916 and were destroyed, and did nothing in 1917 and were freed of the same government.

When a colonial floor cracks, the gap is entered by whoever is already organised — and under a settler order that is usually the settlers. This is the module's contribution and it refines the corpus's account of the counter-elite. The framework predicts that a crack is exploited by a counter-elite rather than by the mass, and that is right. What the colonial case adds is *which* counter-elite. In Turkestan in 1917 the native counter-elite was the most impressive material in the region — the Jadids, with a programme, a press, a public loan and a plan of representative government — and it was destroyed inside three months by a body of Russian railwaymen and soldiers, because the natives had a programme and the settlers had a soviet and rifles. **A colonial order organises its own colonists — in unions, garrisons, railway depots and reserve regiments — while systematically declining to organise the conquered; so when its floor cracks, it has already selected which of its subject populations will inherit the gap.** The exclusion of Muslims from the Tashkent Soviet was not an aberration of 1917. It was the fifty-year formation policy of Module 4 delivering its result.

A metabolic catastrophe demobilises rather than mobilises, and the corpus should say so. The famine of 1930–33 killed on the order of two-fifths of a nation and produced no rising. Hunger removes the herds that are transport, the reserves that are logistics, and the bodies that are the rising; and it presents each household with individual options — sell, walk, cross the border — that dominate collective ones. The framework should therefore predict, of

any order that inflicts a subsistence catastrophe on a population it still holds by force, that the catastrophe will appear in the mortality tables and the emigration returns and will not appear in the political record at all. **Famines do not crack floors. They are what a cracked coordination does to a population whose floor is intact.**

A colony can be released rather than lost, and the released colony may not want it. The framework instructs a study to establish what repriced the holding, and notes that the reasons for holding a place can expire while the price of holding it multiplies. Central Asia is the extreme case: the population voted by ninety-five per cent and more to remain; the union was dissolved by three presidents in a forest without them; the transfers, worth up to a tenth of a recipient's GNP, stopped in November 1991; the economies contracted by between twenty and sixty per cent within five years; and one republic held its independence referendum three days after there was no longer anything to be independent of. **Where the metropole has been paying rather than extracting, the ending will be initiated by the metropole and resisted by the colony, and the decisive document will be a budget.** The corpus should carry this alongside its existing finding that the empty column measures a public's indifference: here the emptying column measured a treasury's.

And the order naturalised rather than collapsing. Every instrument survived — the borders, the machines, the muftiate, the *mahalla*, the cotton, the men — because the doctrine that had explained them was withdrawn without anybody having reason to dismantle the things it had explained. The framework's proposition that a naturalised order's apparatus survives because nobody had occasion to abolish it is confirmed at the scale of five states, and it supplies the setting for the last two modules: what has to be counted is not the cost of a collapse, because there was no collapse, but the cost of a hundred and twenty-six years of an arrangement that is, in most of its working parts, still standing.

A note on sources. The 1916 revolt, the Ürkün, the Kokand killings of February 1918, the basmachi war and Enver Pasha's death, the *hujum* and its reprisals, the annulled census of 1937, the purge of the Uzbek leadership and the Kazakh famine are established in earlier modules of this study and are sourced there; this module restates them without re-establishing them, and the ranges and contested figures given earlier apply here unchanged.

The judgement that the Kokand Autonomy and Alash Orda fell because they controlled no armed force of their own, and the composition of the force that destroyed Kokand, are from the Eurasianet assessment of the centenary of the revolution, paraphrased and credited. The Soviet troop figures for the basmachi campaign and the decline in basmachi strength during 1922 are as given in the reference literature and vary widely between sources.

The 1991 referendum results are as reported: 76.4 per cent union-wide on an eighty per cent turnout; 95 per cent in the Uzbek SSR on both the union and the republican question; approximately 98 per cent in Turkmenistan and 96 per cent in Tajikistan. These are official figures from a state-managed plebiscite and are treated as such. The allegations of irregularity — unsealed boxes in Alma-Ata, multiple ballots and inducements alleged by Birlik in Uzbekistan — are reported alongside them, as is the fact that international observers found no systemic fraud in monitored precincts. Nothing here establishes what Central Asians would have voted in a free ballot; what it establishes is that no organised force in the region was pressing to leave.

The chronology of the dissolution — the August coup and the Uzbek leadership's endorsement of it, the declaration of independence on 31 August, the Belovezha Accords of 8 December, the Alma-Ata Protocol of 21 December and its eleven signatories, and Uzbekistan's independence referendum of 29 December — follows the standard reference accounts.

The fiscal argument rests on the published economic literature on direct transfers between the Soviet central budget and the republics, paraphrased and credited, which finds the Central Asian republics to have been net recipients of transfers reaching about ten per cent of GNP in some cases and Russia the largest net donor; and on the World Bank estimates of a twenty to sixty per cent contraction in Central Asian GDP between 1990 and 1996 as reported in the policy literature. The characterisation of the Russian leadership's motive as shedding ballast, and its view of the Central Asian republics as hopeless recipients of transfers, is an interpretation offered in a recent Russian-language analytical review and is reported as an interpretation rather than as an established fact about anyone's intentions.

The remark "The Tsar wanted to kill everyone. We were saved by Lenin" is a single quotation from a single unnamed young man in a journalistic article about the memory of 1916, and is used here as one voice and not as evidence of general opinion. Muhammadjan Hindustani's assessment of Islam's survival

under Soviet rule is quoted at second hand from the scholarly literature on the KGB and Soviet Muslims. Karimov's rehabilitation of Rashidov is reported in the journalism cited in Module 8.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE ELEVEN

FORTY-ONE ANIMALS, AND THEN TWO

Module 11 · The Grim Accounting — both columns, on every side: the dead of the sword, the dead of a coordination abolished by decree and called in twice on the same people, the debt that was refinanced rather than paid and fell due in 1991, and the schools, hospitals and literacy that were also real

Two columns, and the second is larger

A conquest is counted in two columns and the corpus's usual error is to count only the first.

The first is the sword: the dead of the conquest, the punitive expedition, the suppressed rising, the purge. These are the deaths that produce documents. Somebody ordered them, somebody carried them out, somebody wrote a return, and even where the numbers are contested there is at least a controversy to be contested.

The second is metabolic, and it produces almost no documents at all. A complex society raises its population above what the land would carry unaided, by coordination: irrigation maintained collectively, herds moved on a schedule, granaries, seasonal reciprocity, a division of labour that lets more people live on the same ground than could live there without it. That surplus population is a standing loan against the coordination. Break the coordination and the loan is called — not by anyone, and not on any moral schedule, but by arithmetic, within about a growing season or two of the breaking.

Central Asia is the case in this collection that fires the second column hardest, and it fires it twice on the same mechanism, which turns out to be the most useful fact in the module.

The sword column

Set it out in full, with the ranges the record supports and the sources named, and without pretending to precision the evidence does not carry.

The conquest, 1839–1885. No serious total exists. Russian returns record their own losses precisely and their opponents' by estimate: forty-one dead at Tashkent in 1865; about five hundred killed and wounded across the campaign of 1866 against more than twelve thousand of their opponents; some six thousand Bukharans killed at Jizzakh with three thousand taken. The largest single event is Geok Tepe in January 1881 — roughly 6,500 killed inside the fortress and 8,000 in the pursuit on the most reproduced figures, with totals from 14,000 to 20,000 in circulation, against Russian losses across the whole 1880–81 campaign of 290 killed, 883 wounded and 645 dead of disease. A defensible order of magnitude for the whole conquest is in the tens of thousands, and it should be given as that and no more precisely.

1916. Roughly 3,500 settlers killed in Semirechye; on the assessment of the specialists, at least ten times that number of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz killed in the punitive expeditions; and the Ürkün, in which around a quarter of a million people crossed into China and estimates of the dead run from 100,000 at the lowest to above 250,000, with most scholarly accounts at or above 150,000. The characterisation of these events as genocide is asserted by Kyrgyz historians and politicians and disputed by others and by Russia, and this study reports the dispute without settling it.

1918. The destruction of the Kokand Autonomy: five thousand on one account, ten thousand on another, fourteen thousand on a third, with the city sacked.

1918–1924. The basmachi war. No reliable total exists. The largest figure in circulation — some 700,000 Turkestani dead by the end of 1923 — is Baymirza Hayit's, an émigré historian writing within a political tradition with a position on the question, and it is not corroborated by an independent count. It is recorded here as a claim and is not adopted.

1927–1930. The reprisals of the unveiling campaign: approximately 2,500 women murdered in connection with unveiling, killed by husbands, in-laws and neighbours. These deaths appear in no state casualty return, because no organ of the state killed anybody.

1937–1938. The purge of the native cadres. Fayzulla Khojaev and Akmal Ikramov shot; the Uzbek leadership removed in eighteen months; the claim that over ninety per cent of Uzbek party and government officials were executed or imprisoned by 1939 circulates widely and is not traced to a count in any source this study has seen.

And the deportations into the territory, which belong in the accounting even though they are not a cost paid by its own population. Kazakhstan became one of the union's principal destinations for deported nationalities and for the camp system — the Koreans of the Far East in 1937, the Volga Germans in 1941, the Chechens and Ingush in 1944, among others — and the mortality of those deportations was borne on Kazakh ground by people who had not lived there.

What the second column is a debt against

Before the metabolic figures, the mechanism has to be stated exactly, because everything turns on it and because the standard description gets it wrong.

Kazakh pastoralism was not a way of life that happened to involve moving. It was a machine for extracting a living from country that could not support a settled population at anything like the same density. Herds went between four named seasonal pastures — *qystau* for winter, *kokteu* for spring, *jailau* for summer, *kuzdeu* for autumn — along customary routes, so that each pasture was grazed in the season it could bear and rested in the seasons it could not. The animals converted grass that no human could eat into milk, meat, felt, fuel and transport. The population the steppe carried was a function of that circuit, not of the acreage.

Which means two things. First, the animals were not wealth in the ordinary sense; they were the food supply, the transport system and the capital stock at once, and a household without them was not poor but stranded. Second, any policy that stops the movement or removes the animals does not reduce the standard of living. It removes the mechanism by which the land feeds people, and the note falls due in the following winter.

The note called the first time, 1917–1922

The first calling is less famous than the second and it establishes the pattern.

In 1917 there were 29.7 million head of livestock in the territory of the future Kazakh republic; by 1920 there were 9.7 million; by 1921, 6.2 million — an eighty-three per cent decline, with widespread slaughter for immediate consumption as pastures failed, and approximately 200,000 Kazakhs migrating beyond the republic's borders toward Siberia, China and neighbouring territories. The causes were cumulative and all of them ran through the arrangement this study has been describing: the requisitions of 1916, the punitive expeditions, the flight, the collapse of the railway that carried grain south in exchange for cotton, and then the requisitioning of war communism laid on a population already stripped.

The mortality is given as 400,000 to 2 million, on the order of nineteen to thirty-three per cent of the Kazakh population, and the range is that wide because nobody was counting. Famine affected the Kazakhs of the Jetisu and Syr Darya regions of the Turkestan Republic between 1917 and 1919; Mustafa Shokay wrote in his notes that 1,114,000 people died of famine there; and after several months of relief work organised on Turar Ryskulov's initiative, with some 11,000 volunteers from the youth of Turkestan, around a million lives were saved by the spring of 1919. The last figure is a relief organiser's estimate of lives saved and should be treated as such, but the shape it describes — a catastrophe partially arrested by an emergency effort — is not in dispute.

The control experiment nobody designed

Then something happened that is the strongest single piece of evidence for the metabolic hypothesis in this collection, and it happened by accident.

The herd was 6.2 million head in 1921. By 1928 Kazakhstan's livestock stood at approximately 40.5 million head.

Seven years, and the pastoral system rebuilt its capital stock more than sixfold — past its 1917 level and to the largest livestock base in the Soviet Union. Nobody planned it, nobody subsidised it, and the New Economic Policy years amounted, for the steppe, to being left alone. That recovery is a measurement, and what it measures is the productivity of the coordination itself. A mechanism that can restore a destroyed capital stock sixfold in seven years, on marginal land, without external investment, is not a picturesque survival. It is a working technology, and one that had been described for sixty years in Russian official prose as the absence of civilisation.

The framework should treat this as a general instrument. **The recovery rate of a coordination mechanism after a shock is the measure of what the coordination was doing** — and it is the one measurement available to a study that cannot otherwise price a native system against the conqueror's description of it. Where a conquered order rebuilds fast when left alone, the conqueror's account of it as backwardness is refuted by arithmetic rather than by argument.

The note called the second time, on purpose

And then the same mechanism was destroyed again, deliberately, from a higher base, and the second calling is the largest event in this study.

The policy was sedentarisation and collectivisation, directed in Kazakhstan by the republic's first secretary, Filipp Goloshchekin — and Module 2 has set out what it was for. The doctrine required a peasantry and an exploiting class above it, and the steppe contained neither, so both were manufactured: the *bai* by decree, with the membership settled locally under a quota, and the peasant by settling the nomad. What is counted below is the price of manufacturing the second one. Sedentarisation campaigns begun tentatively in 1927–28 intensified in 1930, forcing Kazakh households into fixed settlements ill-equipped for survival without their herds, while collectivisation from 1929 triggered mass slaughter of animals to evade confiscation and officials requisitioned up to 68.5 per cent of available livestock in 1931; herds fell by over eighty per cent, from approximately 40.5 million head to around four to five million by 1933. The purpose was not obscure: procurement targets for grain and meat were set to fund industrialisation by export and to meet the needs of industrialising centres in Russia, and the Kazakh herds — the largest livestock base in the Soviet Union — were to be collectivised into state and collective farms as the basis of a meat-packing industry to rival Chicago.

The single figure that states the whole of it is a household average. On the eve of the famine in 1929 the average Kazakh household owned forty-one animals; by 1933 that number had fallen to 2.2.

Forty-one animals is a herding household. Two point two animals is not a poorer herding household; it is a household that has ceased to be one, with no transport, no milk, no fuel, no reserve, and nothing to trade for grain. The arithmetic of the famine is contained in the change between those two numbers, and it required no further decision by anybody.

The mortality: an estimated 1.3 to 2.3 million dead, the majority ethnic Kazakhs, with 665,000 to 1.1 million refugees, and the Kazakh share of the republic's population falling from about sixty per cent to about thirty-eight. The figure the specialist literature converges on is not much fewer than 1.5 million Kazakhs dead — more than a third of the Kazakhs, with the loss of ninety per cent of their animals, in what was the most severe famine anywhere in the Soviet Union; Cameron gives more than 1.5 million perished, a quarter of Kazakhstan's total population. Upper estimates of 38 to 42 per cent of the Kazakh nation are in circulation and should be treated as the top of the range rather than the consensus.

Three aggravating facts belong in the column and are established in the scholarship. A drought in 1931 made the famine worse, and Slavic settlers suffered to a much lesser degree. State food aid disproportionately favoured Slavic peasants, intensifying hardship for the nomadic Kazakhs. And up to the worst period of the famine Moscow continued to send more settlers to Kazakhstan, increasing an already savage competition for food and land, while as many as two hundred thousand people fled across the border to Siberia or Xinjiang despite the risk of arrest or execution.

The dispute, as each side states it

Whether these events constitute genocide is a live political question in Kazakhstan, in Russia and in the scholarship, and this study reports the positions rather than adjudicating between them.

The two standard English-language monographs — Sarah Cameron's *The Hungry Steppe* and Robert Kindler's *Stalin's Nomads*, both published in 2018 — agree on the scale and differ in emphasis, Cameron integrating environmental factors and Kindler concentrating on the societal violence. On the legal question, both authors refute the applicability of the United Nations genocide definition while suggesting that Lemkin's broader interpretation could apply to the policies pursued against the Kazakhs. Cameron's own argument about why the question is framed unhelpfully is worth recording: that the case should make us rethink why we place so much emphasis on those instances that fit the legal definition of genocide and miss others, such as the Kazakh case, which also stemmed from a political process and were no less destructive to human life.

And one evidentiary point cuts against the strongest version of the intentionalist reading, and is reported because a study that suppressed it would be arguing rather than counting. It is difficult to incriminate Stalin personally in this case, because no available source — including the correspondence between Stalin and Goloshchekin — contains explicit instructions referring to the Kazakh population as such, which was the case during the three most critical months of the Ukrainian famine between November 1932 and January 1933. What is documented is a requisition plan set at a level that could not be met without destroying the herds, imposed by men who had been told repeatedly what was happening, and maintained.

Kazakhstan commemorates the victims on 31 May. The Russian Federation's position, and several scholarly traditions, differ from the Kazakh state's. The competing readings are named; the arithmetic above is the same on every reading.

The note that was refinanced

There is a third metabolic debt in this case, and it is the one the framework has not previously had a name for, because it has not yet been paid.

The oasis south was subjected to the same operation as the steppe — its food-producing coordination was dismantled — but the note was never called, because the metropole railed grain in over the same line that carried the cotton out. Ferghana went from a tenth to two-fifths of its arable under fibre before 1917 and much further afterwards; by the late Soviet period cotton took around seventy per cent of Uzbekistan's irrigated land. A region that had fed itself for a thousand years was converted into one that bought its bread, and the bill was carried on the union's account.

Two consequences follow, and both are metabolic.

The first is the Aral Sea. Between 1960 and 1985 irrigated land in the Uzbek SSR rose by a third and in the Turkmen SSR by 123 per cent, with virtually all the newly watered land devoted to cotton and the increases coming mainly from bringing new ground into production, so that yet more water was taken from the feeder streams — and those streams were the sea's only inflow. A body of water once the fourth largest inland sea in the world, at some 66,000 square kilometres, fell in less than a generation to about a tenth of its former volume. The fishery is gone, the exposed bed produces salt and pesticide storms, and the

health consequences in Karakalpakstan and the lower Amu Darya are severe and continuing. That is a coordination destroyed — a river system that had supported human settlement for millennia — with the note deferred because the food comes by rail.

The second is 1991. When the transfers stopped, the deferral stopped. The Central Asian republics had been primary recipients of net transfers from the Soviet central budget, in some cases about ten per cent of GNP; with the dissolution of the central budget in November 1991 these transfers were discontinued, causing a large negative income shock. Between 1990 and 1996 the economies of the Central Asian states declined by between twenty and sixty per cent of GDP, and in the worst case Tajik GDP fell by roughly sixty per cent from its 1990 level, with eighty to ninety per cent of the population below the poverty line at the depth of the crisis.

A metabolic debt can be refinanced rather than paid. Where a conqueror destroys a region's food coordination and then supplies the food himself, no famine appears, and the arrangement can run for decades looking like development. What has happened is that the note has been transferred to the creditor's books. It falls due not when the coordination is destroyed but when the creditor stops lending — which may be sixty years later, and may be for reasons having nothing to do with the debtor.

What was built, at full weight

The other side of the accounting is real and must be entered without hedging, because a study that counted only the graves would be doing the thing this method exists to prevent.

Under the tsarist administration almost nothing was built for the conquered: twelve thousand six hundred roubles on schools in a year of seven and a half million expenditure, two small Kazakh schools in a province the size of France and Italy together, and a lithographic press forbidden by the governor-general. Railways were built, and they were built to move soldiers and then cotton.

Under the successor a great deal was built, and it reached people the previous order had not attempted to reach. School enrolment in Uzbekistan is reported as rising from under ten per cent in 1924 to over half by 1930, and literacy on the official series from 78.7 per cent in 1939 to 99.7 per cent by 1970. Universities, academies of sciences, publishing houses, theatres and hospitals

were established in every republic. Medicine reached the villages; infant mortality fell and life expectancy rose across the Soviet decades. Women were educated, employed and admitted to professions from which the previous order had excluded them entirely — and that fact sits, without contradiction and without cancellation, beside the two and a half thousand women killed in the campaign that opened the door.

These are official figures produced by a state with strong reasons to produce them, and they should be read as directional rather than exact. The direction is nonetheless real. A child born in Ferghana in 1900 could not read, had no school to go to, and had a substantial chance of dying before five. A child born there in 1960 could read, had a school, a clinic and an electric light, and a much better chance of surviving. The same order did both things described in this module, and neither cancels the other.

Who wrote every number

The framework requires a study to say who produced the figures it is using, and in this case the answer is the most damaging single fact in the accounting.

The state that caused the largest event in this module destroyed the instrument that would have measured it. The census of January 1937 was thorough — the evidence for its quality comes from Kazakhstan, where despite the difficulties of collection it was calculated to have missed less than one per cent of the population — and it was annulled within days, its senior organisers shot or dead in custody, and its replacement redesigned so that certain answers could no longer appear.

The consequence is permanent and it is not a matter of concealment. A regime that suppresses a document withholds information that continues to exist. A regime that annuls a census, disperses its returns and shoots its statisticians has degraded the capacity of anyone, ever, to count what happened — which is why the range for the Kazakh famine is 1.3 to 2.3 million, why the range for 1919–22 is 400,000 to 2 million, and why the basmachi war has no total at all. **The corpus should record this as a distinct category of harm: the destruction of the means of accounting, which makes every subsequent reckoning approximate and every dispute about it unresolvable.**

And the omissions have to be entered as items rather than left as gaps. The two and a half thousand women killed by their own families appear in no

casualty return. The deaths on the passes in 1916 were counted by nobody at the time and are now inferred from bones. The schools the tsarist administration did not build, the capital it did not invest and the revenue it declined to raise leave no trace in any instrument this framework owns, because every one of those instruments registers commissions. Where an order is cheap, the accounting must be conducted in omissions, or the parsimonious order will be scored as the benign one.

Reading the accounting against the framework

Five findings.

The metabolic thesis is confirmed at the largest scale available, and the mechanism is dated to the month. A coordination that had carried a population on land which could not otherwise carry it was abolished by decree beginning in 1929; the herd fell by over eighty per cent within four years; the average household went from forty-one animals to 2.2; and between 1.3 and 2.3 million people died, more than a third of the Kazakh nation. The note was not eroded by a price or a treaty. It was called by an administrative instrument, and it came due within thirty-six months.

And the note was called twice on the same mechanism, which supplies the proof the corpus needed. Between 1917 and 1921 the herd fell from 29.7 to 6.2 million and several hundred thousand to two million people died. Between 1921 and 1928, left substantially alone, the same system rebuilt the herd to 40.5 million — more than sixfold, past its pre-war level, to the largest livestock base in the union. Then it was destroyed again. That recovery is the control experiment nobody designed, and it establishes what no argument could: **the recovery rate of a coordination mechanism after a shock measures what the coordination was doing, and a mechanism that rebuilds a destroyed capital stock sixfold in seven years on marginal ground is a technology and not a backwardness.** A study that cannot otherwise price a conquered order against its conqueror's description of it should look for the recovery.

A metabolic debt can be refinanced rather than paid, and this is a new entry. The oasis south had its food coordination dismantled as thoroughly as the steppe, and produced no comparable famine, because the metropole shipped the grain in on the line that took the cotton out. The debt did not

disappear; it moved onto the creditor's books, where it looked like development for sixty years. It fell due in November 1991, when the transfers stopped for reasons internal to the creditor, and the economies of the region contracted by between twenty and sixty per cent within five years. The framework should therefore ask, of every specialised colonial economy: **not whether a famine occurred, but who is currently carrying the note — because a region that is being fed by its extractor has not escaped the metabolic accounting, it has borrowed against it, and the terms of the loan are set entirely by the lender.**

Where an order is cheap, count the omissions; where an order is violent, count the deaths it did not inflict. The tsarist administration's harm to Central Asia is substantially invisible to every instrument in this framework, because it consists of things not done: schools not built, a press forbidden, revenue not raised, a population left in the hands of the belief system it already had. The Soviet order's harm is partly invisible for the opposite reason: the two and a half thousand women of 1927–30 were killed by their husbands and neighbours in a campaign the state initiated, and appear in no state return anywhere. **Both blindnesses are properties of the instruments and not of the record**, and a corpus that does not correct for them will rate the parsimonious order as benign and will undercount the violent one by exactly the number of deaths it successfully outsourced.

And the destruction of the means of accounting is itself a cost. Every range in this module is wide, and several of them are wide by a factor of two or more, because the state annulled its own census, dispersed its returns and shot its statisticians. That is not concealment, which withholds a fact that survives. It is the permanent degradation of the capacity to count — which is why the dispute over whether these events were genocide cannot be resolved on the numbers, and why it will go on being conducted, in three countries, on figures nobody can close. The order that did this has thereby ensured that its own accounting can never be completed, and a framework that counts costs should count that as one.

A note on sources. The sword-column figures for the conquest, 1916, 1918 and the purges are established in earlier modules of this study and are sourced there; the ranges and cautions given there apply here unchanged, including the treatment of Baymirza Hayit's figure of 700,000 as an uncorroborated claim and the refusal to adopt a total for the basmachi war.

The livestock series for 1917–1921 (29.7 million head in 1917, 9.7 million in 1920, 6.2 million in 1921) is from Kazakh scholarship as reported in a recent institutional history, and the corresponding eighty-three per cent decline and the figure of approximately 200,000 emigrants are from reference compilations resting on the same literature. Mustafa Shokay's figure of 1,114,000 dead in the Turkestan Republic is his own contemporary note and is an interested estimate by a political actor; Ryskulov's relief effort and the figure of a million lives saved come from the same institutional history and are likewise an interested estimate. The mortality range of 400,000 to 2 million for 1919–22 is as the reference literature gives it and is very wide.

The figure of approximately 40.5 million head at the end of the 1920s appears in both the Sciences Po case study by Isabelle Ohayon and the reference literature; the fall to four to five million by 1933, the requisition of up to 68.5 per cent of available livestock in 1931, and the sedentarisation chronology follow the same sources. The household average of forty-one animals in 1929 falling to 2.2 in 1933 is Robert Kindler's, cited at second hand from a review essay and not collated against *Stalin's Nomads* itself; it should be checked before it is quoted verbatim elsewhere, though the magnitude is consistent with the aggregate series.

Mortality figures for 1930–33 are given as a range with their sources distinguished: 1.3 to 2.3 million in the reference compilations; "not much fewer than 1.5 million" and "more than one-third of the Kazakhs" in Niccolò Pianciola's review of Cameron and Kindler for the *American Historical Review*; "more than 1.5 million... a quarter of Kazakhstan's population" in Cameron's own framing. The upper figures of 38 to 42 per cent of the Kazakh nation appear in reference compilations and are flagged as the top of the range. The aggravating findings — the 1931 drought, the lesser suffering of Slavic settlers, the skewing of food aid, and the continued despatch of settlers during the famine — are Cameron's and Kindler's, paraphrased and credited.

On the genocide question, both Cameron and Kindler are reported as declining to apply the United Nations definition while noting that Lemkin's broader conception might apply; Cameron's argument about the limits of the legal frame is quoted from an interview. The observation that no available source contains explicit instructions from Stalin referring to the Kazakh population as such, by contrast with the Ukrainian case in late 1932, is from Isabelle Ohayon's case study citing Nicolas Werth, and is included because

omitting it would make the module an argument rather than an accounting. The positions of the Kazakh and Russian states on the question are noted and not adjudicated.

Aral Sea and irrigation figures follow the standard environmental literature as cited in Module 6. Transfer and contraction figures follow the economic literature and World Bank estimates as cited in Module 10. Soviet-era enrolment and literacy series are official figures and are given as directional; no attempt is made here to reconstruct life-expectancy or infant-mortality series, which are asserted qualitatively and should be quantified by anyone building further on this module. The account of the 1937 census and its annulment is sourced in Module 7.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE TWELVE

THE OBSTACLE WAS SOMEBODY ELSE'S EMPIRE

Module 12 · Convergence and Divergence — what this case confirms, what it breaks, the one revision it demands of the framework, and the strongest case that can be made against the whole of the foregoing, stated by the scholars who actually make it and answered without flinching

What the case confirms

Take the confirmations first and briefly, because they are the least interesting part of a study.

The floor came first and the belief was laid over it afterwards, or in the tsarist case was not laid at all. The conquest was a line in the accounts before it was anything else, and its pacing was set by camels and by a treasury spending up to a third of its expenditure on debt. A rising against an intact floor lost, comprehensively, in 1916 and again in 1918 and again in 1922. Structural change came from cracks in the floor opened somewhere else — in Galicia in 1917, in a forest outside Minsk in 1991. Preserving the conquered order's fiscal machinery was the cheapest extraction available and Russia took it for twenty years. Surveillance was the tell of a belief that never took, and its absence under the Tsar measured the presence of a belief that was not Russia's. The co-opted elite's maximal public demand named the boundary of the default and conceded the conquest, and in December 1986 it was the nationality of a single appointee. The metabolic note came due within thirty-six months of the coordination being abolished by decree.

None of that required adjustment. A framework built on British, French, Japanese and classical cases ran on the Russian and Soviet material without bending, which was the first thing the study was for.

What it broke, and the revisions

The breaks are more useful and they should be gathered in one place, because they were made one at a time across twelve modules and their sum is a different thing from any of them.

A fourth settlement fiction. Vacancy declares occupied land empty; recognition declares un-owned land long-owned; divisibility declares a collective holding partible. The Kazakh steppe required a fourth, because the land was visibly used by a population the state had been counting for a century, the use was mobile so there was nothing to partition, and there was no native landed class left to bind. The instrument built instead concedes the occupation in full and then quantifies it: a norm of need fixed by survey, and the difference between the use and the norm declared *izlishki*, surplus, and transferred. Its warrant is measurement, its instrument is a statistical expedition, and its structural failure is that a norm measures a stock while a pastoral economy runs on a sequence.

Adjudicate-and-rule, distinct from divide-and-rule. The delimitation of 1924 did not manufacture the divisions of Central Asia; the leading scholarship is right that the quarrel was old and the national project locally authored. What it did was convert rival claimants with no forum into chartered claimants with a forum in Moscow, and the good the arbiter supplied was *finality*. The diagnostic that separates the two: manufactured divisions fade when the ruler withdraws; chartered ones become the successor states' foreign policy.

The residual can be an exemption. The framework looks for a thing the subject still holds. Turkestan's subjects held a legal disability they read as a protection — not citizens, no zemstvo, no representation after 1907, and not required to fight. The conqueror could not revoke the disability without revoking the protection, and could not revoke the protection without offering the citizenship he had spent fifty years withholding. He revoked it by telegraph on 25 June 1916 and the arrangement broke in three weeks.

Attacking a formation converts it from custom into flag. The *paranji* before 1927 was a garment worn in some places and not others. After 8 March 1927 it was a national emblem, bought in replacement after each public burning, and defended by a population without a state at the cost of some two and a half thousand women's lives.

Annulment is not censorship. Censorship concedes a fact and forbids its circulation. What was done to the census of January 1937 was to declare that it was not a count, and to prosecute its authors for crude violations of the principles of statistical science. A study running the information module anywhere should look for withdrawn statistics, annulled surveys and disciplined technical staff, filed under administration rather than security.

Rights can be the residue of parsimony, and tolerance is not a right. The *qazi* court survived under the Tsar because abolishing it cost money nobody had — a third provenance alongside the sediment of faction quarrels, and one that produces narrow, civil, revocable rights. And the unregistered mosques of the Soviet period, large enough to force a concession in the 1980s, produced no claim anyone was obliged to hear. The test is whether withdrawal creates an obligation to answer.

Famine demobilises. The catastrophe of 1930–33 killed more than a third of a nation and produced no rising, because hunger removes the transport, the reserves and the bodies, and hands each household individual options that dominate collective ones.

A metabolic debt can be refinanced. The oasis south had its food coordination dismantled as thoroughly as the steppe and produced no famine, because the grain came in by rail. The note moved onto the creditor's books, looked like development for sixty years, and fell due in November 1991 when the creditor stopped lending for reasons internal to himself.

A fifth settlement fiction, and the successor's own. Where vacancy, recognition, divisibility and the norm all declare something about ground, the manufactured category declares that a required social class exists so that the operation prescribed for it can be performed. It attaches to a person rather than a parcel, is filled locally against a quota set centrally, and can therefore never run short. And because what it misdescribes is a relation rather than a thing, the operation prescribed destroys the relation: settling a nomad to make him the peasant the sequence requires does not misdescribe a herding circuit, it stops it.

A doctrine that treats belief as a trick underprices the cost of attacking it. The theory held religion to be superstructure maintained by a clerical interest, so the *hujum* was designed as the removal of a coercion and budgeted as ceremonies and legal reform. What it met was a formation that had taken, defended as self-defence, by people nobody was paying, inside every household

at once. The error is unlearnable from within the theory, since the resistance reads as surviving clerical influence and argues for pushing harder.

Annulment and the shooting of the cadres are one operation. Where the governing claim cannot be in error, a contradicting outcome must be an error in a person. The specialists who said the steppe could not be settled became bourgeois nationalists; the statisticians who counted correctly became incompetents; the head of the Uzbek government was shot for having held views. An epistemic problem converted into a personnel problem, generating an unbounded demand for investigators.

And the recovery rate is a measurement. Between 1921 and 1928, left alone, the Kazakh pastoral system rebuilt a destroyed herd from 6.2 million head to 40.5 million. That is the one instrument available for pricing a conquered order against its conqueror's description of it, and it refutes sixty years of official prose by arithmetic rather than by argument.

The one revision

Those are twelve findings and the card cannot carry twelve. Under them there is a single mechanism that this case, and probably only this case, could have isolated, because it required the same terrain and the same population to be held twice by two states of one nation with opposite doctrines.

What sets the cost of holding a conquest is not the size of the conqueror's promise but whether the promise can be revised.

The obvious version of that proposition is that the cost is set by what the conqueror has *promised*, and it is very nearly right — the two states of this case differ enormously in what they promised, and the second one's apparatus is larger at every point. But it fails on a case the corpus already holds. Britain promised a great deal in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League — a sacred trust of civilisation, tutelage, peoples not yet able to stand by themselves, eventual independence — and made the promise to an international body with standing to ask about it. It required no annulled census, no Glavlit, no shot statisticians and no destroyed native cadre anywhere it applied. Volume of promise does not track cost.

What separates the two is what each state could do when the promise was not kept. Britain could concede: a commission of enquiry, a white paper, a mandate extended, *not yet ready*. Each concession cost a policy document and

left the promise standing, because the promise had been made in the grammar of a policy. The Soviet claim was made in the grammar of a demonstrated law, and a law cannot be adjusted without conceding that it was not demonstrated. So every failure had to be absorbed somewhere that was not the doctrine.

Run that through the study and every module supplies a term.

The tsarist state promised Central Asians nothing. It built no school worth the name, forbade a printing press, appointed no mufti, sent no missionary, made no claim to Muslims that Muslims were asked to honour, and addressed everything it said about them to European chancelleries and to its own readers. And it held five million people with thirty-six thousand soldiers — a figure a well-informed contemporary called more than twice what was needed — with no pass law, no register, no political police, and a censorship file so empty that the administration bound five hundred and ninety-four volumes of what was printed against it and shelved them.

The Soviet state promised them everything: liberation from colonialism, national republics, their own language, their own cadres, literacy, the emancipation of their women, and beliefs and customs declared free and inviolable. And every item of the apparatus grew in proportion. It needed a hundred thousand troops rather than thirty-six thousand to retake the same ground, and could not finish in four years. It needed schools, presses, alphabets, academies and a muftiate, because a state that has promised liberation must produce visibly liberated people. It needed Glavlit, because a state that has abolished colonialism cannot let its periphery be described as a colony. It needed to annul a census, because a state whose doctrine is a demonstrated law cannot let a count contradict it. It needed to shoot the cadres it had built, because a native leadership that had opinions about the delimitation and the cotton plan was a leadership that could contradict the plan in the plan's own vocabulary.

In this case the two variables move together, which is why the case can isolate the mechanism and also why it is easy to misread. The state that promised more was also the state that could not revise, and the apparatus grew for both reasons at once. What separates them is the counter-case: an order can promise on the largest possible scale and still hold the promise cheaply, provided it retains the right to say *not yet*.

Set the two ledgers beside each other and the arithmetic is not about cruelty. Both administrations killed. The tsarist one killed some fourteen thousand people at Geok Tepe in a day and drove a quarter of a million across the Tien

Shan in the snow. The point is narrower and harder: **the second order was more expensive at every single point of the apparatus, and it was more expensive because of the grammar in which it had spoken.** A claim held as a law creates a standing obligation to produce evidence of its own fulfilment, and the machinery for producing that evidence — the schools, the cadres, the republics, the statistics, and the apparatus for correcting statistics that come out wrong — is that grammar's running cost.

Where a governing claim cannot be revised, the cost of its failures does not disappear; it is transferred from the doctrine to the machinery. In this case it was absorbed by the troop level, the censorship organ, the statistical service and the men who ran the republics.

And the study can now say why it lands on the machinery rather than on a budget, because Module 7 found the mechanism and it is not a metaphor. If the claim cannot be in error, then a result contradicting it must be an error in a person — which converts an epistemic problem into a personnel problem. The specialists who said the steppe could not be settled were reclassified as bourgeois nationalists; the statisticians who counted correctly were prosecuted for violating the principles of statistical science; the head of the Uzbek government was shot having confessed to holding views about the delimitation and the cotton plan. One operation, three departments. **The cost of an unrevisable claim is paid in people, because a person is the only thing left that the error can be located in** — and the demand is unbounded, since a doctrine can fail indefinitely and every failure requires a fresh someone to have been responsible.

The revision is stated in a form that can be tested elsewhere, which is what a revision is for, and the collection has since tested it once. The Baltic study runs the same instruments over a Soviet acquisition on ground about as unlike this one as the union contained — literate, industrialised, richer per head than the metropole that took it — and returns the same censorship reading for the same reason, an order that could not concede the existence of a single two-page document for fifty years. That is the sort of confirmation a revision needs: the terrain varied to the limit and the finding held, which locates it in the grammar of the doctrine rather than in anything about Central Asia.

The corollary worth carrying separately is about the achievement column, which is very large and which this study has counted in full. Where the doctrine's predictions had actually been arrived at from an observed record — that people will learn to read if they are taught, that parents want their children

not to die — the machinery delivered on a scale no European colonial power approached anywhere. Where the predictions were deduced from the sequence rather than observed — that the steppe contained an exploiting class, that a nomad would make a peasant, that belief was a clerical imposition which would lift when the clergy were removed — they failed, and the failures were unlearnable. The same administration built the clinics and annulled the census, which disposes of cruelty and incompetence as explanations at once. **What separated the two halves was not the sincerity of the people executing them and not the resources behind them. It was whether the prediction had come from looking or from the sequence.**

The strongest case against all of this

Now the counter-position, stated at its full strength from the people who actually make it, before anything is said in reply.

First, and most seriously, the framing may be wrong. The leading historian of the region argues that this study's central move — treating the Soviet period as a conquest of the same kind the corpus examines elsewhere — misdescribes it. Much recent scholarship has seen Soviet Central Asia as directly comparable to the overseas colonies of modern European states. Adeeb Khalid takes issue with this trend: European colonial rule, he argues, was predicated on the perpetuation of difference, while the Soviets sought to conquer it. Central Asia was indeed subject to colonial rule in the tsarist period, but its transformation in the early Soviet period was the work of a different kind of polity — an activist, interventionist, mobilisational state that sought to transform its citizenry — and he compares that transformation with the reforms of the early Turkish republic, which were strikingly similar in intent and scope. He restates the position without softening it: "There are elements of economic exploitation in Central Asia that look a lot like colonial exploitation... But the Soviet state also mobilised its people in ways that colonial empires never did." And: "the Russian Empire and the British Empire were very similar. The Soviet Union was a little bit, was something else." On the tsarist half he is unambiguous the other way: "there's no doubt that during the tsarist period, both the steppe and Turkestan were colonies."

If that is right, then this study has run a colonial template over an object that is not a colony, and much of what it has scored as colonial pathology —

formation maximised, cadres promoted, republics chartered, women educated — is simply what a mobilisational state does to all its citizens, including its Russian ones.

Second, the achievement is real and it is very large. A population that was almost entirely illiterate in 1917 was almost entirely literate by 1970. Universities, academies of sciences, publishing houses, hospitals and clinics were built where none had existed. Infant mortality fell and life expectancy rose across the Soviet decades. Women were educated, employed and admitted to professions from which the previous order had excluded them absolutely. No European colonial power did anything remotely comparable for any colony it held, and the parsimonious tsarist administration — which this study has described at length as cheap — spent twelve thousand six hundred roubles on schools in a year of seven and a half million.

Third, the testimony from inside is not what a colonial reading predicts. A religious teacher who ran underground Islamic study circles in Uzbekistan from the 1970s — a man with every reason to say the opposite — held that under Soviet rule Islam in Central Asia had remained intact, for Muslims could cultivate their faith, perform rituals, and transmit their own culture. And when the whole population was asked in March 1991 whether it wished to remain in the union, it answered yes by ninety-five per cent in Uzbekistan and nearly ninety-eight in Turkmenistan, against seventy-six per cent union-wide.

Fourth, the nations are real. Five sovereign states now exist, with languages, literatures, academies, frontiers and international recognition. Cameron's finding is that even the catastrophe contributed to this: the famine created a new Kazakh national identity that largely supplanted Kazakhs' previous identification with a system of pastoral nomadism, so that in its aftermath Kazakhs began to think of themselves as a national group rather than a social one. A study that calls these nations manufactured is telling a hundred million people that their nationhood is somebody else's artefact.

And fifth, the evidence in this study is overwhelmingly the order's own. The budget tables, the statutes, the census, the party plena, the trial records, the demographic reconstructions — nearly every number in twelve modules was produced by, or recovered from, the archives of the state being examined.

Answered

Take these in turn, conceding first where concession is owed.

On the framing, Khalid is substantially right and the study has tried to say so throughout. The Soviet order was not a European overseas colony and this study has not treated it as one: it has recorded a maximised formation programme with no colonial parallel, a robe cut for the conquered rather than the metropole, native cadres promoted at expense, and a state that spent enormously on people from whom it extracted. It has also recorded that the same state's own doctrine forbade the word "colony," which is a fact about the doctrine and not an argument about the classification. And the honest opposing view within the same debate should be given equal room: Botakoz Kassymbekova holds that "comparison is not only warranted but necessary," and that "the Russian state and academia denies its colonial past because the Soviet regime presented itself as anti-colonial, and this is something that the current regime inherited from the Soviet state." The dispute is live between serious people and this study does not settle it.

But the framework does not require the classification. It asks a narrower question that survives either answer: who held organised violence, who received the surplus, whose belief was needed, who could make a claim and to whom. Those questions returned the same answers in Tashkent whether the arrangement is called a colony or a periphery — and they returned different answers in Tashkent than in Tula, which is the only comparison the framework needs.

And Khalid's own comparison is the sharpest available test of it, which is why this study will take it rather than avoid it. He sets early Soviet Central Asia beside the early Turkish republic, and the comparison is exact in intent and scope: the alphabet changed, the clergy dissolved, the courts secularised, the women unveiled, the calendar altered, the schools built, the nation constructed. The corpus has already examined the Turkish case and found that the reforms succeeded there because a century of obstacles — the Janissary veto, the *ulema*'s institutional power, the provincial notables, the multi-confessional population, the foreign creditors — had been removed by defeat, partition and forced population movement, so that the programme succeeded when the empire it was designed to save no longer existed.

Hold the two side by side and the difference is not in the programme. It is in who was holding the pen.

In Turkey the men who abolished the caliphate, adopted the Swiss civil code, changed the script and unveiled the women were Turks, doing it to Turkey, with a Turkish army behind them, answerable — however imperfectly — to a Turkish assembly, and able to stop when they judged it prudent to stop. In Central Asia the men who did those same things were, at the decisive moments, answerable to Moscow. And Central Asia had its own candidates for the Turkish role, and they are unusually well documented, because the Jadids were pursuing precisely the Ottoman programme: new-method schools teaching the alphabet phonetically with arithmetic and geography, a vernacular press, the reform of the clergy, the education of women, engagement with the modern world from inside Islam rather than against it. They wrote the Theses on forming Uzbekistan. They constituted, at Kokand in November 1917, a representative government with reserved seats for Russians, seeking self-rule within a reformed Russia.

They were destroyed. Kokand was shelled in February 1918 and between five and fourteen thousand people were killed in a city sacked by a soviet from which Muslims were excluded. Fayzulla Khojaev, who had proposed Uzbekistan, was shot in March 1938 after confessing that he had opposed it, and Akmal Ikramov with him.

One concession is owed before that argument is made, and making it first is what keeps the argument honest. The Jadids were a small reformist minority. Most of the *ulama* rejected them, and so, on the evidence available, did most of the population; nothing here should be read as a claim that Central Asia was waiting for them or would have chosen them. But that concession does not do the work it is usually asked to do, because it was equally true of the men it is being compared with. Mustafa Kemal's programme was not what most Anatolian villagers wanted either, and the hat law and the alphabet were imposed on a population that had not asked for them. A reformist minority imposing a programme is what both cases are.

Which is why the difference has to rest where the study has already put it, and not on a counterfactual about consent. Setting Soviet Central Asia against British India or French Algeria is a comparison between conquests rather than between conquest and self-rule, and the relevant alternative is not the absence of modernisation. It is the same modernisation with a different

hand on the pen — and the specification that matters is not that the hand would have been native but that it would have been *answerable*, and answerable locally. Kemal could be made to stop by an assembly in Ankara. Khojaev could not be made to stop by anything in Tashkent, and was shot in Moscow for having had views about two decisions taken there. That alternative is not hypothetical: it had a programme, a press, a leadership, a constitution and a seventy-eight-day government, and the record of its destruction is dated. What it did not have, and what the argument does not require it to have had, is a majority.

On the third objection — the testimony from inside — the evidence is admitted in full and it cuts both ways, which is why this study reported it. Hindustani's judgement stands, and so does the ninety-five per cent. Alongside them stands the fact that the state which those people were assessing had, within living memory of many of them, killed more than a third of one of its nationalities and then destroyed the census that measured it and shot the men who took it. A comparison is only as good as what the person comparing was permitted to know, and a large part of what a Central Asian in 1991 could weigh was a comparison the state had spent sixty years arranging. That is not a reason to dismiss the testimony. It is a reason to record the conditions under which it was formed, and both belong on the page.

On the fourth objection specifically, the refusal of cynicism. The nations are real. Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Tajik nationhood are not fictions because a resolution of 12 June 1924 gave them borders, any more than Islam in Bukhara was a fiction because Qutayba billeted Arabs in half the houses in 709. This study's own opening principle is that a built thing which became real is more durable than a lie and more genuine than one, and that naming a constructed origin is not debunking it. What the study has recorded is not that these nations are artificial but that a set of quarrels which existed before 1924 were chartered in that year by a party that reserved the right to adjudicate between them — and that the chartering took, so completely that the lines are now defended by armies belonging to the chartered.

And on the fifth objection, the evidence, it is granted without qualification and it is the sharpest thing that can be said against this study. Nearly every figure here comes from the archives of the state being examined: Schuyler's transcription of the Turkestan budget, the *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov*, the party plena, the trial records, the census that was annulled and later

recovered, the demographic reconstructions built out of Soviet returns. A tradition that documents itself this thoroughly hands its own prosecutors their brief. The Kokand khanate published no self-indictment. The emirate of Bukhara's ledger was never opened by Bukhara.

The answer is the one the corpus has given before and it should not be softened. What distinguishes an order that keeps records is not that it did less; it is that it can eventually be audited. But the audit's latency is the measurable quantity, and this case supplies a second reading of it. The liberal cases in this collection run at a lag of about a century. Here there was no audit machinery at all — no court, no press, no opposition, no rival power with standing, and a statistical service whose senior staff had been shot for counting — and the archives opened not because the order corrected itself but because it ended. Sixty years on the famine; a century and a quarter on the conquest. **An order with a slow audit and an order with none produce comparable lags, and the difference is that the first eventually indicts itself and the second must be outlived.**

Finally, the refusals of the syllogism and of credit for parsimony, because both are available here and both are tempting.

The syllogism is *it survived, therefore it was justified*, and its Central Asian form is that five functioning states with high literacy exist and would not otherwise. Durability is a fact about incentive structures and not a verdict; the arrangement lasted because at every link from the Kremlin to the kolkhoz a man defending his own position thereby defended the whole, and that is an explanation of its persistence and not a defence of it.

And credit for parsimony is the mirror temptation, available for the tsarist half. This study has described an administration that held five million people with thirty-six thousand soldiers, forbade its missionaries, left the *qazi* courts standing, declined to touch the endowments and taxed through categories the population already understood. It would be easy to read that as restraint. The same modules record that the schools line was twelve thousand six hundred roubles, that the press at Samarkand was forbidden by name, that the province could not read its own country and governed through interpreters it did not trust, and that the whole configuration was the product of a treasury spending a third of its income on debt service and a governor-general who believed the local religion would collapse if left alone. **Where the same devices produced both**

the mildness and the underdevelopment, the mildness is a fact about the endowment and not about the conqueror's character.

A note on sources. The confirmations and revisions summarised in the first half of this module are established in Modules 1 to 11 and are sourced there; nothing new is asserted here that is not sourced in the module it comes from, and the ranges and cautions given in those modules apply unchanged — in particular the contested mortality figures for 1916, 1918, the basmachi war and the famines of 1919–22 and 1930–33, the unverified claim about the proportion of Uzbek officials purged, and the uncorroborated figure of 700,000 attributed to Baymirza Hayit.

Adeeb Khalid's argument is quoted from the abstract of "Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective" and from an interview given to *The Diplomat*, and his statement about the tsarist period from an interview with Qalam; his fuller cases are in *Making Uzbekistan* (2015) and *Central Asia: A New History from the Imperial Conquests to the Present* (2021), which this study has not read in full and has drawn on through reviews, interviews and the secondary literature. That is a real limitation and is stated as one: a study that rests its closing counter-position on a scholar's work owes it to him to have read the books, and anyone building further on this module should do so and correct whatever needs correcting. Botakoz Kassymbekova's position is quoted from the same *Diplomat* piece; the ongoing dispute between these positions, and the parallel political dispute over the word "colonialism" in the region's school textbooks, are live and are reported here rather than adjudicated.

Sarah Cameron's finding on the famine's role in forming a Kazakh national identity is from an interview and is developed in *The Hungry Steppe* (2018). Muhammadjan Hindustani's assessment of Islam's survival is quoted at second hand from the scholarly literature on the KGB and Soviet Muslims. The 1991 referendum figures are official results of a state-managed plebiscite and are treated as such, with the reported irregularities noted in Module 10.

The comparison with the early Turkish republic is Khalid's; the account of why the Ottoman reform programme succeeded only after the empire it was designed to save had been destroyed is from this collection's briefing on Ottoman reform, and the disciplinary caution attached to that briefing applies here with equal force: it is a structural observation about what removed the

constraints, and the means by which the Ottoman population was homogenised include one of the great crimes of the twentieth century.

The Jadid programme, the Kokand Autonomy and its destruction, and the fate of Khojaev and Ikramov are sourced in Modules 4, 8 and 10. The literacy, enrolment and mortality claims entered on the credit side are official Soviet series and are directional rather than exact, as stated in Module 11.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.